Ds 2003:20
Sweden’s first national report under the
Joint Convention on the safety of spent fuel management and on the safety of radioactive waste management
Swedish implementation of the obligations of the Joint Convention
Ds 2003:20
Sweden’s first national report under the
Joint Convention on the safety of spent fuel management and on the safety of radioactive waste management
Swedish implementation of the obligations of the Joint Convention
SOU och Ds kan köpas från Fritzes kundtjänst. För remissutsändningar av SOU och Ds svarar Fritzes Offentliga Publikationer på uppdrag av Regeringskansliets förvaltningsavdelning.
Beställningsadress: Fritzes kundtjänst 106 47 Stockholm
Orderfax:
Svara på remiss. Hur och varför. Statsrådsberedningen, 1993.
– En liten broschyr som underlättar arbetet för den som skall svara på remiss.
Broschyren kan beställas hos: Information Rosenbad Regeringskansliet
103 33 Stockholm
Fax:
www.regeringen.se/propositioner/sou/pdf/remiss.pdf
Tryckt av Elanders Gotab AB
Stockholm 2003
ISBN
ISSN
CONTENTS | ||
Foreword................................................................................................................ | 5 | |
List of abbreviations.................................................................................................. | 7 | |
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY............................................................................................. | 8 | |
SECTION A | INTRODUCTION.......................................................................... | 11 |
SECTION B | POLICIES AND PRACTICES ........................................................... | 25 |
SECTION C | SCOPE OF APPLICATION ............................................................. | 27 |
SECTION D | INVENTORIES AND LISTS............................................................. | 29 |
SECTION E | LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY SYSTEM....................................... | 45 |
SECTION F | OTHER GENERAL SAFETY PROVISIONS......................................... | 85 |
SECTION G | SAFETY OF SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT..................................... | 115 |
SECTION H | SAFETY OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT ...................... | 135 |
SECTION I | TRANSBOUNDARY MOVEMENTS............................................... | 167 |
SECTION J | DISUSED SEALED SOURCES........................................................ | 169 |
SECTION K | PLANNED ACTIVITIES TO IMPROVE SAFETY................................. | 171 |
List of references | ................................................................................................ | 175 |
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4
Foreword
This report is issued according to Article 32 of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.
Sweden signed the Joint Convention September 29, 1997, the first day it was open for signing, during the ongoingGeneralConferenceatIAEA.About20statessignedtheJointConventionduringthatweek.Sweden ratified the Joint Convention about two years later, on July 29, 1999 and the Joint Convention entered into force on June 18, 2001.
Sweden has been active for many years in the international effort to enhance nuclear safety and radiation protectionwithregardtotheoperationof nuclearreactorsaswellasthemanagementof spentfuelandradioactive waste. The Convention on Nuclear Safety was an important first step to deal with the most immediate safety issues, i.e. the safety of operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management constitutes another important step by promoting the safe handling and disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste.
The areas covered by the Joint Convention have been incorporated in the Swedish system for spent fuel and radioactive waste management for a long time. The Swedish Government considered at the time of signing of the Joint Convention that the safety philosophy, legislation and the safety work conducted by the licensees and the authorities in Sweden complied with the obligations of the Convention. This is confirmed in the present report.
The Swedish Government directed the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI) to prepare this report in
Section A of this report provides an overview of the Swedish nuclear waste programme, including a brief historical review, in order to give the reader a background to the current programme for the management of spent fuel and radioactive waste.
Sections B to J provide information on which the conclusions are drawn about the compliance with the obligations of the Joint Convention. By necessity this information is rather brief and strongly focused on those aspects which are addressed in the articles. Too many details and additional information would overload the report and make the review process difficult. The goal has been to provide enough details to make the Swedish practices understandable. Data that might be missing will be added on request as a part of the review process.
The general conclusions about the Swedish compliance with the obligations of the Joint Convention are presented in the executive summary.
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6
List of abbreviations
ALARA | As Low As Reasonable Achievable (a principle applied in radiation protection ) |
ASAR | As operated Safety Analysis Report |
BKAB | Barsebäck Kraft AB |
BNFL | British Nuclear Fuel Ltd |
BSS | The Basic Safety Standards Directive of the Euratom |
BWR | Boiling Water Reactor |
CLAB | Centralt Lager för Använt Bränsle (Central Interim Storage for Spent Fuel) |
COGEMA | Compagnie Général de Matières Nucléaires |
CTH | Chalmers Tekniska Högskola (Chalmers Institute of Tecnology) |
FKA | Forsmarks Kraftgrupp AB |
GDC | General Design Criteria |
INES | The IAEA/NEA International Nuclear Event Scale |
KASAM | The National Council for Nuclear Waste |
KSU | KärnkraftSäkerhet och Utbildning AB (the Swedish Nuclear Training and Safety Center) |
KTH | Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan (Royal Institute of Technology) |
LER | Licensee Event Report |
LILW | Low and Intermediate Level Waste |
MTO | Interaction between |
NEA | Nuclear Energy Agency within the OECD |
NKS | Nordisk kärnsäkerhetsforskning (Nordic Safety Research Project) |
NPP | Nuclear Power Plant (including all nuclear power units at one site) |
OKG | Oskarshamns Kraftgrupp AB |
PWR | Pressurized Water Reactor |
QA | Quality Assurance |
RAB | Ringhals AB |
R&D | Research and Development |
SAR | Safety Analysis Report |
Repository for Spent Fuel | |
SFL |
Repository for |
Repository for Operational Waste | |
SKI | Statens kärnkraftinspektion (Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate) |
SKIFS | Statens kärnkraftinspektions författningssamling (the SKI Code of Regulations) |
SSI | Statens strålskyddsinstitut (Swedish Radiation Protection Authority) |
STF | Säkerhetstekniska föreskrifter (Technical Specifications) |
VLLW | Very Low Level Waste |
WENRA | Western European Nuclear Regulators Association |
7
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Article32of
-The responsibility for safety is clearly defined in the Swedish legal framework. In order not to dilute the responsibility of the licence holders, the Swedish regulations are designed to define requirements to be achieved, not the detailed means to achieve them. Within the framework given by the regulations, the licence holders have to define their own solutions, and demonstrate the safety level achieved to the regulatory bodies.
-The legislation clearly defines that all licence holders are responsible for the safe handling and disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste, as well as for the decommissioning and dismantling of facilities.
-The operators of nuclear power plants must jointly carry out the research and development activities needed to ensure the safe handling and disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste, as well as for the decommissioning and dismantling of facilities. The
-The operators of nuclear power plants must pay fees to the Nuclear Waste Fund, which is subject to regulatory supervision, to ensure that resources are available for the handling and disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste, and for the decommissioning and dismantling of the facilities.
-There is an open and generally constructive relationship between the regulatory bodies and the licence holders.
Even though comprehensive and very active programmes for the management of spent fuel and radioactive
8
waste have been established, many challenges remain. Over the next
Sweden also wishes to mention that there are areas in which improvements to the national waste management system are needed:
-The system for the management of radioactive waste generated outside the nuclear fuel cycle is incomplete. A Governmental committee was appointed in 2002 to propose a national system for such waste.
-More comprehensive, consistent and clear safety regulations for decommissioning of nuclear facilities need to be developed. The regulatory bodies have recently taken actions towards this end.
Sweden is looking forward to reporting on its progress to future Review Meetings under the Joint Convention.
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10
SECTION A – INTRODUCTION
A.1 Summary
Spent fuel in Sweden emanates mainly from four commercial nuclear power plants. In addition there is one material testing reactor and one research reactor. The radioactive waste originates from the nuclear power industry as well as medical use, industry, research and consumer products. Past research activities have also generated some waste, which are either stored or have already been disposed of.
Under Swedish law, the holder of a licence to operate a nuclear facility is primarily responsible for the safe handlinganddisposalof spentnuclearfuelandradioactivewaste,aswellasdecommissioninganddismantling of the facility. The four utilities operating nuclear power reactors in Sweden have formed a special company, theSwedishNuclearFuelandWasteManagementCo.(SKB),toassisttheminexecutingtheirresponsibilities. Thus, SKB is responsible for all handling, transportation and storage of spent fuel and radioactive waste outside the nuclear power plants. Furthermore, the company is responsible for the planning and construction of all facilities required for the management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive wastes, and for such research and development work as is necessitated by the provision of such facilities (R&D programmes).
These R&D programmes have to be reported to the Government, or an authority designated by the Government, and reviewed by the authorities every third year. The programme should include a comprehensive description of the measures taken to ensure safe handling and disposal of spent fuel and nuclear waste. SKB is further responsible for
Spent nuclear fuel is transported to an interim storage facility (CLAB). Radioactive operational waste from nuclear reactors, medical and research institutions and industrial radioactive waste is disposed of in an underground repository in crystalline bedrock
Facilities that remain to be realised are an encapsulation plant for spent fuel and repositories for spent fuel,
Furthermore the producer of
11
Figure A1: Nuclear Facilities in Sweden
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A.2 | Fundamental principles |
Principles for the management of spent fuel and radioactive waste have evolved over the years and have been discussed by the Swedish parliament. The allocation of responsibilities is reflected in the Swedish legislation, and is further described in section E.19. The principles can be summarised:
1The expenses for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste are to be covered by fees on the production of energy that has resulted in these expenses.
2The reactor owners are to safely dispose of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste.
3
4Each country is to be responsible for the spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste generated in that country. The disposal of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste from nuclear activities in another country may not occur in Sweden other than in an exceptional case
A.3 | The Swedish nuclear waste management system |
Sweden has today 11 nuclear power reactor reactors in operation at four sites giving rise to nuclear waste and spent nuclear fuel. In addition nuclear waste is produced at the Studsvik site (research reactor,
In total the Swedish nuclear power programme will generate approximately 19 000 m3 spent fuel, 60 000 m3 low and intermediate level waste (LILW), and 160 000 m3 decommissioning waste (based on
A.3.1 | Existing waste management practicies |
Most of the LILW are conditioned (solidified, compacted, etc.) at the point of origin, i.e. at the reactor sites. Some wastes are sent to Studsvik’s waste treatment facilities for incineration or melting (scrap metal).
Repository for radioactive operational waste,
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Figure A2: Management system for spent fuel and nuclear waste
Shallow land burial
The nuclear power plants at Ringhals, Forsmark and Oskarshamn as well as the Studsvik site have shallow land burials for
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CLAB
The spent nuclear fuel from all Swedish nuclear power reactors is stored in a central interim storage (CLAB) situated at the Oskarshamn nuclear power plant. The fuel is stored in water pools in rock caverns
Construction started in 1980 and it was taken into operation in 1985. The current total storage capacity is 5 000 tonnes of spent fuel, and at the end of 2002 3 900 tonnes were being stored.
CLABiscurrentlybeingexpandedwithasecondrockcavernandwaterpool.Thecapacityaftertheexpansion will be sufficient for storing all spent fuel from the nuclear power reactors (approx. 8 000 tonnes).
Transportation system
All transportation of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste is by sea, since all the nuclear facilities are situated on the coast. The transportationsystemhasbeen inoperationsince 1982andconsistsof theship M/S Sigyn, transport casks and containers, and terminal vehicles for loading and unloading.
Clearance
Althoughclearanceisnota”facility”itisanimportantcomponentinthewastemanagementsystem.Material may be cleared for unrestricted use or for disposal as conventional
A.3.2 | Planned facilities and siting |
Fourmajorfacilitiesremaintobedesigned,sited,constructedandlicensed.Namelyaplantfortheencapsulation of spent nuclear fuel, a repository for spent fuel, a repository for
The main alternative for disposal of spent fuel,
Encapsulation plant for spent nuclear fuel
The main alternative is to site the encapsulation plant adjacent to CLAB. Other alternatives are however under investigation, e.g.
The time schedule for encapsulation of the spent nuclear fuel has been developed by SKB, and the following sequence of events is proposed:
2005 | Submission of the license application for siting and construction |
Construction and commissioning, including inactive trial operation | |
2012 | Submission of application for operation |
2014 | Active trial operation, followed by operation |
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In 1998 a canister laboratory was commissioned. The aim is to develop welding techniques and methods for
Repository for spent nuclear fuel
In the early 1990’s SKB initiated an active programme for siting a spent nuclear fuel repository
Site investigations, presently at two sites, which include surface based investigations | |
from deep bore holes | |
2007 | Submission of the license application for siting and construction |
Detailed site characterisation and construction | |
2013 | Application for the initial operation |
2015 | Start of waste emplacement |
Site investigations
Licence application for siting and construction
Regulatory review
Detailed site characterisation and construction Application for initial operation
Regulatory review
Initial operation
Evaluation period
Regular operation
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 | 2025 |
Figure A3: Time schedule for disposal of the spent nuclear fuel.
An important step in the repository development programme was the construction of the Äspö hard rock laboratory at a depth of 460 meter. The laboratory is situated close to the Oskarshamn nuclear power plant. At Äspö methods are developed and tested for such things as site characterisation, deposition and retrieval of canisters, excavation of tunnels and shafts.
Repository for
ThewasteiscurrentlystoredatStudsvik,thenuclearpowerplantsandCLAB.Therearehoweverpreliminary plans to construct a special central interim storage for this waste.
Repository for
Itisplannedtodisposeof thewastefromthefuturedecommissioningof thenuclearpowerplantsinanextension to
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Swedish border | ||
Westinghouse | Ranstad | |
Atom AB | ||
Uranium recycling | ||
Fuel fabrication | ||
Studsvik | ||
NPP’s | Shallow land | Research reactor |
burial | Hot cell | |
11 operating | Uranium Recycling | |
Storage | ||
1 closed | ||
CLAB | ||
Repository for | ||
Interim storage | ||
low and intermediate | ||
for spent fuel | ||
Encapsulation
plant
SFL 2 | SFL |
||
Repository for | Repository for | ||
Repository for | |||
decommissioning | low and intermediate | ||
waste | spent fuel |
Clearance | Planned facilities: | ||||
Very Low Level Waste (VLLW) | |||||
Operational Waste | |||||
Spent fuel / fuel rods | |||||
Fresh fuel | |||||
Uranium material | |||||
Future waste streams |
Figure A4: Material and waste streams in the Swedish nuclear fuel cycle.
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A.4 | Legal and regulatory framework |
The management of spent fuel and nuclear waste is regulated by a series of statutory provisions, of which the three main legislative instruments are:
-TheActonNuclearActivities(1984:3),whichdefinesthelicensingrequirementsfortheconstructionand operation of nuclear facilities and for handling or using nuclear materials (including radioactive waste).
-The Radiation Protection Act (1988:220), which defines the licensing requirements for radiation protection and for radiological work.
-The Act on the Financing of Future Expenses for Spent Nuclear Fuel etc. (1992:1537), which deals with the main financial aspects, and defines the responsibilities pertaining to the management and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste.
UndertheActonNuclearActivitiestheholderof alicensetooperateanuclearreactorisprimarilyresponsible for the safe handling and disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste produced by the reactor. In addition the holder is responsible - under the Radiation Protection Act - to take the all measures and precautions necessary to prevent or counteract injury to human health and the environment by radiation.
The Act on the Financing of Future Expenses on Spent Nuclear Fuel is an essential part of the Swedish nuclear waste management system since it lays down the principles for the financing the expenses for decommissioninganddisposalof spentnuclearfuelandnuclearwaste.Thebasicrequirementstipulatesthattheholder of a licence to operate a nuclear power reactor must pay a fee per generated kWh of electricity to the Nuclear Waste Fund. The fee varies from year to year and is different for each utility. The purpose of the Fund is to coverallexpensesincurredforthesafehandlinganddisposalof spentnuclearfuel,aswellasdismantlingnuclear facilities and disposing of the decommissioning waste. The Fund must also finance SKB’s R&D.
The Environmental Code (1998:808) is also of great importance, in particular for the siting and construction of new facilities since amongst other things it regulates the environmental impact statement that must accompany a licence application. Any new nuclear facility must be licensed according to both the Act on Nuclear Activities and the Environmental Code. In both cases the Government grants the licence on the basis of recommendations and reviews of the competent authorities.
Authorities responsible for enforcing compliance with the legislation are:
-the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI),
-the Swedish Radiation Protection Authority (SSI)
The National Council for Nuclear Waste (KASAM) was established in 1985 and is an independent committee within the Ministry of the Environment since 1992. KASAM is an advisory body to the government on matters related to nuclear waste management.
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Parliament
Government
Ministry of
Environment
Swedish | Swedish | |||||
Nuclear Power | Radiation Protection | |||||
Inspectorate | Authority | |||||
SKI | SSI | |||||
Regulatory | Regulatory | |||||
Supervision | Supervision | |||||
Acts
§
Ordinances
§
Regulations
§
Legislation
Licensees
Figure A5: Organisational structure for nuclear safety and radiation protection supervision.
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A.5 | Historical review |
A.5.1 | Past practices |
No formal requirements for the management of spent fuel and radioactive waste were established in Sweden until the late 1970’s.
In the
Thestudyfocusedonthemanagementof radioactivewastecontainingplutoniumfromresearchactivities.Activities
Early activities that generated most of the spent fuel and radioactive waste in Sweden are:
-R1 (the first research reactor, 1954 - 1970),
-Studsvik (an institute established for the Swedish nuclear programme with research reactors, 1958 - ),
-Ågesta (the first power reactor in Sweden, 1964 - 1974).
A.5.2 | Early waste management at the nuclear power plants |
Swedishpolicywasoriginallybasedontheassumptionthatreprocessingandplutoniumrecyclingwouldform attractive and desirable elements of the nuclear fuel cycle. However, the construction of a reprocessing plant in Sweden was not envisaged. As commercial NPPs were built arrangements were made therefore to send the spent nuclear fuel abroad for reprocessing. During the late 1970’s attitudes changed, and reprocessing was, for various reasons, not considered an acceptable method for the management of spent nuclear fuel. The current policy regarding the management of spent nuclear fuel was established in the late 1970’s, and aims at direct disposal without reprocessing.
A.5.3 Reprocessing
In 1969 the Swedish nuclear power company, OKG, signed a contract with the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Agency, which was later taken over by The British Nuclear Fuel Limited (BNFL), for the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel from OKG in Windscale (later Sellafield). In all 140 tons of fuel was shipped to Sellafield between 1972 and 1982. The fuel was reprocessed in 1997 and resulted in 136 tons of uranium and 833 kilograms of plutonium. OKG’s plans to manufacture and use about 100
Between 1978 and 1982 an agreement was made between the Swedish Nuclear Fuel Supply Company (SKBF later renamed SKB) and Compagnie Générale des Matières Nucléaires (COGEMA) regarding the reprocessing of 672 tons of spent nuclear fuel from the Barsebäck, Ringhals and Forsmark sites (Swedish nuclear power companies). A total of 55 tons was shipped to La Hague before the contracts were cancel-
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led. The fuel was then exchanged for 24 tons of used
A.5.4 | The nuclear weapons programme |
As early as the middle of August 1945, Sweden decided to evaluate the then new situation regarding atomic weapons. The main aim of the research was to find out how Sweden could best protect itself against a nuclear weapon attack. However, from the outset there was an interest in investigating the possibilities of manufacturing nuclear weapon. In 1968, the Swedish government signed the
A.6 | The development of the waste management programme |
In1973theGovernmentappointedacommittee(CommitteeonRadioactiveWaste)toinvestigatetheproblem of
-Reprocessing of spent fuel was recommended, with disposal of glass or ceramic solidification of the
-Further studies should be carried out to clarify the conditions for a
-A central storage facility for spent fuel should be established
-A central repository for lowand medium level radioactive waste should be established
In the
As a result of the ”Conditional Act” the nuclear industry initiated a joint project on nuclear fuel safety (KBS). This included a
The first summary report of the KBS project
A second summary report
Since 1986 SKB has produced five R&D programmes with
21
Figure A6:
The
A.7 | Costs for management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste |
A.7.1 | Development of the financing system |
During the 1970’s the nuclear power utilities established their own internal funds for future waste management expenses. These funds were transferred to an new financing system, under regulatory supervision, established in 1981 when the Swedish Parliament passed the Act on the Financing of Future Expenses for Spent Nuclear Fuel etc.
A.7.2 | Payments to the Nuclear Waste Fund |
The nuclear power utilities pay a fee per generated
Since 1996 the nuclear power utilities must provide two forms of guarantees in addition to the fees paid to the Nuclear Waste Fund:
Guarantee I
If a reactor is closed before it has reached 25 years of operating time, a smaller amount than expected will be paid into the Nuclear Waste Fund. The guarantees provided by the reactor licensees must cover this shortfall.
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Guarantee II
The other type of guarantee must be available until all nuclear waste has been placed in a repository and must cover contingencies for the waste programme. Guarantee II will be used if expenses for future nuclear waste management become higher than expected, if these expenses have to be met earlier than expected, or if the actual amount in the Fund is lower than was estimated.
SKB makes annual estimates for all nuclear power utilities that form the basis for the regulatory authority’s review as well as the basis for calculating the fee.
A.7.3 | Regulatory supervision |
SKI is the regulatory authority that reviews the nuclear power utilities’ cost estimates. Furthermore, SKI reviews the guarantee that the nuclear power utilities must make available. After its review, SKI submits a proposal for the size of the fees, and of the guarantees required, to the Government. Based on this proposal, the Government sets the fee and guarantees.
The management of the Nuclear Waste Fund is the responsibility of a separate government agency, the Board of the Nuclear Waste Fund.
A.7.4 | Current cost estimates |
The estimated total future cost, from 2003 onwards (up to the 2050’s), is approximately SEK 50 billion. The sumof thefutureexpensesandof thosealreadyaccruedonvariousnuclearwasteprojects,areapproximately SEK 65 billion.
To date, the Nuclear Waste Fund has covered the expenses for:
-CLAB;
-the transport system, i.e., the ship Sigyn, containers, special trucks, etc;
-the Canister Laboratory and the Äspö Hard Rock Laboratory;
-SKB’s research and development costs, including siting activities.
The Nuclear Waste Fund will eventually cover expenses for:
-the encapsulation of spent nuclear fuel;
-the repositories for spent nuclear fuel and
-the dismantling of nuclear power plants and the disposal of decommissioning waste;
-continuing research and development work;
-the expenses for regulatory control and supervision after closure of the reactors.
The repository for radioactive operational waste
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Figure A7:
Flow of funds in the financing system.
A.7.5 | Costs for waste for past practices |
As of 1989, a special fee has been levied on the nuclear power utilities according to a special law, the Studsvik Act (1988:1597). This fee is intended to cover expenses for the management of nuclear waste from older experimental facilities, in particular the facilities at Studsvik, the Ågesta reactor and the uranium mine in Ranstad, and for dismantling these facilities. According to estimates, SEK 1.2 billion will be needed up to the year 2030 to meet these expenses. The special fee is the same for all four nuclear power utilities, currently SEK 0.0015 per
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SECTION B – POLICIES AND PRACTICES
ARTICLE 32. REPORTING
1.In accordance with the provisions of Article 30, each Contracting Party shall submit a national report to each review meeting of Contracting Parties. This report shall address the measures taken to implement each of the obligations of the Convention. For each Contracting Party the report shall also address its:
(i)spent fuel management policy;
(ii)spent fuel management practices;
(iii)radioactive waste management policy;
(iv)radioactive waste management practices
(v)criteria used to define and categorize radioactive waste.
B.32 Reporting
The present report constitutes the first Swedish report issued in concurrence with Article 32.
B.32.1 | Spent fuel management policy |
The Swedish policy is that spent nuclear fuel should be managed and disposed of in a geological formation in Sweden.
B.32.2 | Spent fuel management practices |
After removal from the reactor core the spent fuel elements are stored at the NPP sites for roughly one year and they are then transported to the central interim storage facility for spent nuclear fuel (CLAB). According to current plans, fuel elements after a storage period of about 30 – 40 years will transported to the final repository for spent nuclear fuel (SFL 2). Prior to this they will be be placed in a cast iron insert in a copper canister. In the final repository they will be surrounded by a buffer of bentonite clay, and deposited in individual vertical bore holes in crystalline bedrock at a depth of
The siting process for the repository is ongoing and described in the introduction. According to SKB’s plans, the repository for spent nuclear fuel (SFL 2) is expected to commence operation in 2015. When the ongoing extension of the interim storage for spent fuel (CLAB) is finalised, the storage capacity will be sufficient to provide for all the spent fuel that will be produced in Swedish NPP’s over an average of 40 years operation.
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B.32.3 | Radioactive waste management policy |
The Swedish policy is that radioactive waste that has arisen in Sweden should be managed and disposed of in Sweden.
B.32.4 | Radioactive waste management practices |
Very low level
-disposed of in shallow land burials that are licensed according to the Act on Nuclear Activities
-subject to clearance according to SKI and SSI requirements and decisions, and either
-released for unrestricted use or
-disposed of in municipal landfills
-and that contaminated oil may be incinerated using specific furnaces.
B.32.5 | Criteria to define and categorize radioactive waste |
The definition of nuclear waste according to the Act (1984:3) on Nuclear Activities is:
-spent nuclear fuel that has been placed in a repository;
-a radioactive substance formed in a nuclear plant and which has not been produced or removed from the plant to be used for education or research, or for medical, agricultural or commercial purposes;
-materials, or other items, that have belonged to a nuclear plant and become contaminated with radioactivity, and are no longer to be used in that plant;
-radioactive parts of a nuclear plant that is being decommissioned.
In the Radiation Protection Act (1988:220) the term ”radioactive waste” is used. The term includes radioactive waste from nuclear activities, as well as from
The legal definitions are discussed further in section E.19.1, and section D, in which the disposal routes for different waste streams are presented.
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SECTION C – SCOPE OF APPLICATION
ARTICLE 3. SCOPE OF APPLICATION
1This Convention shall apply to the safety of spent fuel management when the spent fuel results from the operation of civilian nuclear reactors. Spent fuel held at reprocessing facilities as part of a reprocessing activity is not covered in the scope of this Convention unless the Contracting Party declares reprocessing to be part of spent fuel management.
2This Convention shall also apply to the safety of radioactive waste management when the radioactive waste results from civilian applications. However, this Convention shall not apply to waste that contains only naturally occurring radioactive materials and that does not originate from the nuclear fuel cycle, unless it constitutes a disused sealed source or it is declared as radioactive waste for the purposes of this Convention by the Contracting Party.
3This Convention shall not apply to the safety of management of spent fuel or radioactive waste within military or defence programmes, unless declared as spent fuel or radioactive waste for the purposes of this Convention by the Contracting Party. However, this Convention shall apply to the safety of management of spent fuel and radioactive waste from military or defence programmes if and when such materials are transferred permanently to and managed within exclusively civilian programmes.
This Convention shall also apply to discharges as provided for in Articles 4, 7, 11, 14, 24 and 26.
C.3 Scope
C.3.1 | Reprocessing and Military or defence programmes |
Reprocessing is not part of the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle in Sweden. There is no reprocessing facility in Sweden and spent fuel from nuclear power reactors is not sent for reprocessing in other countries. Reprocessing agreements were made with United Kingdom Atomic Energy Agency (now the British Nuclear Fuel Limited, BFNL) in 1969 and Compagnie Générale des Matières Nucléaires (COGEMA) for reprocessing spent nuclear fuel from civilian nuclear power plants. Only a small number of fuel elements were in fact shipped for reprocessing and the agreements were terminated in the early 1980’s. These past practices are discussed further in Section H.
Sweden terminated all research activities related to military or defence programmes in 1970, and all radioactive residues from activities involving nuclear technology are since then part of the civilian sector. Radioactive waste from research activities related to military or defence programmes, before 1970, has been permanently transferred to the management programme for civilian radioactive waste. These past practices are further discussed in Section H.
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Sweden declares all spent fuel and all radioactive waste originating from the nuclear fuel cycle for the purpose of the Joint Convention, pursuant to Article 3, paragraph 1 and 3.
C.3.2 | Naturally occurring radioactive materials |
Sweden does not declare waste that contains only naturally occurring radioactive material and that does not originate from the nuclear fuel cycle as radioactive waste for the purpose of the Joint Convention, pursuant to Article 3, paragraph 2.
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SECTION D – INVENTORIES AND LISTS
ARTICLE 32. REPORTING
2.This report shall also include:
(i)a list of the spent fuel management facilities subject to this Convention, their location, main purpose and essential features;
(ii)an inventory of spent fuel that is subject to this Convention and that is being held in storage and of that which has been disposed of. This inventory shall contain a description of the material and, if available, give information on its mass and its total activity;
(iii)a list of the radioactive waste management facilities subject to this Convention, their location, main purpose and essential features;
(iv)an inventory of radioactive waste that is subject to this Convention that:
(a)is being held in storage at radioactive waste management and nuclear fuel cycle facilities;
(b)has been disposed of; or
(c)has resulted from past practices.
Thisinventoryshallcontainadescriptionof thematerialandotherappropriateinformationavailable, such as volume or mass, activity and specific radionuclides;
(v)a list of nuclear facilities in the process of being decommissioned and the status of decommissioning activities at those facilities.
D.32 | INVENTORIES AND LISTS |
D.32.1 | Management of spent nuclear fuel |
MostspentnuclearfuelinSwedenemanatesfromcommercialnuclearpowerplantsattheBarsebäck,Forsmark, Oskarshamn and Ringhals sites. Small amounts of spent nuclear fuel originate from the research reactors in Studsvik. In addition, some spent nuclear fuel from the decommissioned research reactor R1and from the closed Ågesta reactor must be managed.
Spent nuclear fuel from the NPPs is temporarily stored in fuel pools, before being transported to the central interim storage for spent nuclear fuel (CLAB), where it will be stored for at least another 30 years before being encapsulated and deposited in a repository.
Spent nuclear fuel from the research reactors R2 and
Spent nuclear fuel from the research reactor R1 is stored temporarily in Studsvik, pending a final solution. This type of fuel is not suitable for disposal in accordance with the
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in Swedish NPPs. The spent R1 fuel is stored on site in the temporary dry storage building AT. No spent nuclear fuel is currently disposed of in Sweden.
D.32.2 | Spent nuclear fuel facilities and inventories |
D.32.2.1 | Interim storage at the nuclear power plants |
Each NPP there has a fuel pool, close to the reactor vessel, in which spent fuel is stored temporarily for at leastninemonthsbeforebeingtransportedtoCLAB.Thefuelpoolsconstituteintegratedpartsof thereactor facilities, and are for the purpose of the Joint Convention not considered to be separate spent fuel management facilities. The amount of spent fuel stored in pools at the nuclear power stations as of
Fuel pool | Pool capacity | Spent nuclear fuel stored |
|
at NPP | (no of fuel assembly positions) | (no of assemblies) | (tonnes) |
Barsebäck 2 | 644 | 405 | 72 |
Oskarshamn 1 | 894 | 706 | 120 |
Oskarshamn 2 | 935 | 369 | 65 |
Oskarshamn 3 | 918 | 188 | 38 |
Forsmark 1 1) | 612 | 263 | 47 |
Forsmark 2 1) | 491 | 351 | 65 |
Forsmark 31) | 1 040 | 284 | 51 |
Ringhals 1 | 644 | 268 | 46 |
Ringhals 2 | 260 | 200 | 84 |
Ringhals 3 | 212 | 167 | 72 |
Ringhals 4 | 190 | 163 | 71 |
Notes | 1) Data from |
Table D1: Inventory of spent fuel in NPP pools
D.32.2.2 Interim storage at Studsvik
As described above, spent fuel from the research reactors R2 and
R2,
The fuel pool constitutes an integrated part of the reactor facility, and is for the purpose of the Joint Convention not considered to be a separate spent fuel management facility.
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The fuel storage facility (FA) at Studsvik
This facility, which contains two water pools, was built in 1965 for the interim storage of spent nuclear fuel from the Ågesta reactor. As all fuel from Ågesta has been transferred to CLAB the facility may be used for otherpurposessuchasstorageof spentfuelfromotherreactors,orforstorageof otherradioactivematerials. Currently, the facility is only being used for the temporary storage of spent nuclear fuel from the research reactors R2 and
The facility comprises a main building and an extension. The main activities are carried out above ground level in the main building. There are three pools; one for loading/unloading of transport casks and two for thestorageof spentfuelassemblies.Thestoragepoolsarebuiltinreinforcedconcreteandlinedwithstainless steel. They have a depth of 8.2, and a diameter of 3.8 meters. The amount of spent fuel stored in the pools is presented in the table below.
The basement contains service areas and equipment for management of the piping and water systems. The ventilation and drainage systems are monitored for any radioactive substances.
The extension comprises a
Facility | Spent fuel originating from | Spent nuclear fuel stored |
|
(no of assemblies) | (kg) | ||
Storage building FA | R2, |
111 | 181 |
Table D2: Spent fuel from the research reactors R2 and
The storage facility AT at Studsvik
Spent nuclear fuel rods from the decommissioned research reactor R1 are temporarily stored in the storage building AT (dry storage). The fuel consists of rods of metallic uranium enclosed in an aluminium alloy casing. The amount of spent fuel stored in the building is presented in the table below. The facility, which was built for the purpose of the temporary storage of intermediate and high level solid waste from the reactor R2, is 44 meters long, 9 meters wide and comprises a concrete slab with circular and rectangular storage positions. The walls and roof are constructed of sheet metal on a steel structure. The facility is heated by means of air conditioning and the outgoing air is filtered. Besides the spent fuel from R1, and a reactor core lid from the old R1 reactor, the waste in the storage is now being treated, packed and transferred to other facilities in Studsvik.
Facility | Spent fuel originating from | Spent nuclear fuel stored |
|
(no of rods) | (kg) | ||
Storage building AT | R1 | 209 | 4 796 |
Table D3: Spent fuel from the research reactor R1 temporarily stored in the storage building AT
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D.32.2.3 The central interim storage for spent nuclear fuel, CLAB
General information
Spent fuel assemblies will, as mentioned above, be stored at the CLAB facility for at least 30 years. The main reason being to permit the heat generation to decay by about 90% before encapsulation and disposal. Other highly radioactive components such as control rods from reactors are also stored in CLAB awaiting disposal.
CLAB is situated at the OKG site, on the Simpevarp peninsula, and was taken into operation in 1985. Approximately100peopleworkatthefacility,half of
CLAB consists of two parts; one building above ground for unloading spent fuel assemblies from transport casks, and one underground building in a rock cavern for storage. The rock cavern, with a rock cover of approximately 25 meters, is 120 m long, and contains four storage pools and one reserve pool. The existing poolscanholdabout5000tonnesof fuelandareexpectedtobefullinapproximately2004.CLABiscurrently being expanded with a second rock cavern containing additional storage pools. Construction work started in January 1999 and is scheduled to be completed in the second half of 2004. The capacity after expansion will be approximately 8 000 tonnes. The facility is schematically illustrated in figure D1.
Afterbeingremovedfromthecaskinanunloadingpool,thespentfuelassembliesaretransferredtostorage canisters for subsequent transport and storage. A
The water, which circulates in a closed system, acts both as coolant and as an effective radiation shield, and no additional radiation protection equipment is needed. The water is circulated through filters to keep it clean before being returned to the pools. The heat is removed in heat exchangers, cooled by seawater, in an intermediate cooling system. There are
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Figure D1: | |
The central interim storage for spent nuclear | |
fuel, CLAB. The ongoing extension work | |
with additional storage pools is illustrated | |
schematically in the lower |
|
Principal data for CLAB | |
Owner and license holder: | Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co (SKB) |
Operation and maintenance: | OKG AB |
Start of construction: | 1980 |
Start of operation: | 1985 |
Number of staff: | Approximately 100 |
Storage capacity (including extension): | 5 000 (8000) tonnes of uranium |
Receiving capacity: | 300 tonnes uranium per year |
Number of storage pools (incl. extension): | 4 + 1 in reserve (8 + 2 in reserve) |
Pool temperature (normal conditions): | Maximum 36°C |
Cooling capacity: | 8.5 MW |
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Inventory of spent fuel in CLAB
Specification | Spent nuclear fuel stored |
|
(No of assemblies) | (tonnes) | |
BWR fuel | 16 863 | 3 002 |
PWR fuel | 1 839 | 833 |
Fuel from Ågesta district heating nuclear power plant | 222 | 20 |
Fuel from Studsvik | 18 | 2 |
German |
217 | 23 |
Total | 19 159 | 3 880 |
Table D4: Inventory of spent fuel stored in CLAB
D.32.3 Management of radioactive waste
Waste management at the NPP sites is fully integrated into the operations at the site. Fulfilment of the requirements in SKI’s general regulation is accomplished and verified through regulatory review and inspection activities at the nuclear power plants, as reported in the Swedish reports under the Convention on Nuclear Safety. Temporary storage of radioactive waste at the nuclear power plant sites, is in practice an integrated part of the site.
Waste with very low activity (VLLW) is disposed of in shallow land burials on site, except for Barsebäck.
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The waste is treated differently at the different nuclear power plants. The table below describes methods and packages for operational waste produced at the nuclear power plants.
Type of waste | Ringhals | Barsebäck | Oskarshamn | Forsmark |
Ion exchange resins | Solidified in concrete, | Solidified in bitumen, | Solidified in concrete | Solidified in bitumen and |
packed in concrete | packed in steel drums | and packed in | packed in steel drums | |
and steel moulds | concrete moulds | and steel moulds | ||
Dewatered and packed | Dewatered and packed | |||
in concrete tanks | in concrete tanks | |||
Metal scrap and residues | Casted in concrete | Packed in standard | Casted in concrete | Casted in concrete |
and packed in | ISO containers. | and packed in | and packed in | |
concrete moulds. | concrete moulds. | steel moulds. | ||
Packed in standard | Packed in standard | |||
ISO containers. | ISO containers | |||
Sludges | Solidified in concrete, | |||
packed in | ||||
concrete moulds. | ||||
Table D5: Waste treatment methods at the NPPs |
D.32.4 | Radioactive waste management facilities and inventories |
D.32.4.1 | Radioactive waste management facilities at the NPP sites |
AttheOKGsite,theinterimstorageforlowandintermediatelevelwasteisbuiltinarockcavern.Attheother nuclear power plants sites, there are special buildings for interim storage of conditioned operational waste located on the nuclear plant site. Safety reports exist for all facilities where radioactive waste is handled and stored. The safety reports describe the facility and the waste handling activities, the content of radioactive substances, supervising activities and include a safety analysis.
As waste packages from the NPP sites are transported to SFR on a regular basis it is not relevant for the purpose of the Joint Convention to present a list of the inventories for the interim storage at the sites.
D.32.4.2 Radioactive waste management facilities at Studsvik
Hot cell laboratory, HCL
The Hot Cell Laboratory, built in the late 1950’s, is primarily used to investigate irradiated nuclear fuel, although it is also used for studies of other types of irradiated materials. In addition, the laboratory is used for theconditioning,treatmentandencapsulationof spentfuelfragmentsinpackagessuitableforinterimstorage
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in other facilities. The Laboratory has seven cells with thick concrete walls, and lead windows, to protect the personnel from ionising radiation. All waste is removed from the laboratory after conditioning.
The incineration facility, HA
The facility is used for the incineration of solid
The melting facility, SMA
The melting facility in Studsvik is used for volume reduction of contaminated metal scrap. After melting and radiological measurement, the material may be exempted from regulatory control or returned to the source for further management. The current license permits the treatment of 2 500 tons of metal annually. The exhaust gas and ventilation systems are monitored for any radioactive substances.
Treatment facility for intermediate waste, HM
The facility is used for the treatment of intermediate solid and liquid waste from other facilities in Studsvik.
Treatment of solid waste comprises sorting, volume reduction (compaction), packing and conditioning by means of stabilisation with concrete. Treatment of liquid waste comprises sedimentation and solidification by means of stabilisation with concrete. The ventilation and drainage systems are monitored for any radioactive substances.
Interim storage for lowand intermediate waste, AM
The interim storage for lowand intermediate radioactive waste in Studsvik (called AM) was constructed in the 1980’s for the interim storage of conditioned waste from other treatment facilities from the Studsvik site. The storage is constructed in a cavern in crystalline bedrock with a rock cover of at least 20 meters. The rock mass is grouted with concrete, the walls in the are reinforced by means of rendering concrete, and special arrangements are made to drain the rock.
The storage is dimensioned to receive waste until about the year 2020. The storage area is divided into two parts; one part is used for waste that requires shielding and the other is used for waste for which shielding is not necessary.
The shielded part of the AM storage has a maximum capacity corresponding to 14 400 200 litre drums, the unshielded part can hold 4 600 drums. A further 1 000 drums can be deposited in others parts of the repository. The waste is conditioned and packed in special containers before being positioned in the storage. The ventilation and drainage systems are monitored for any radioactive substances.
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The following type of waste originating from the Studsvik facilities are currently being stored:
-operational waste from the R2 reactor and the tests that are performed in the reactor,
-irradiated and contaminated material from the production of isotopes,
-irradiated and contaminated material from the fuel testing laboratory,
-start sources from an old research reactor and
-operational waste from the waste handling facilities,
as well as from external waste producers;
-rest products from incinerated waste from nuclear power plants, hospitals and industry,
-rest products from the use of isotopes in industry and hospitals and
-decommissioning waste from old nuclear facilities.
Number of packages | Volume (m3) | Mass (tonnes) | Activity (Bq) |
1363 | 7 881 | 14 714 | 4,64*1015 |
Table D6: Inventory of disposed radioactive waste in AM
Storage for solid intermediate waste, AT
See section D32.2.2.
Storage facility, FA
See section D32.2.2.
Storage for radioactive waste, AU
The AU facility is an interim storage for conditioned
D.32.4.3 | Repository for radioactive operational waste (SFR) |
General information
SFR is designed for the disposal of low and intermediate level radioactive waste from the Swedish nuclear power plants and the Central Interim Storage for Spent Nuclear Fuel (CLAB), and for similar waste from other industry, research and medical usage which is treated in Studsvik before being transported to SFR.
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and organisation of FKA. Approximately 12 people work at the facility.
The SFR is intended for 90 000 m3 of waste. In the safety assessment the total radioactivity of this waste is assumed to be 1016 Bq. The waste capacity of the existing parts of the facility
Therepository is designedtoisolate thewaste from the biosphere inorder toavoid harmfulconsequences to man and the environment both during operation and after closure. This is accomplished by emplacement
Figure D3:
The repository for radioactive operational waste (SFR)
The Silo
The main part of the radioactivity in the waste for
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The Silo consists of a cylindrical concrete construction with shafts of different sizes for waste packages. The concrete cylinder is approximately 50 m high, with a diameter of approximately 30 m, and the largest shafts measure 2.5 m by 2.5 m. The waste packages are placed in the shafts, normally in layers of four moulds or 16 drums. The spaces between the waste packages are gradually
The rock vault for intermediate level waste (BMA)
The radioactivity in the waste that is disposed of in BMA is generally lower than in the waste in the Silo The waste that is intended to be disposed of in BMA comes from many different waste streams. The most important one is
The rock vaults for concrete tanks (BTF)
In
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The rock vault for low level waste (BLA)
The waste that is disposed of in BLA -
Principal data on |
|||||
Owner and license holder: | Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co (SKB) | ||||
Operation and maintenance: | FKA AB | ||||
Start of construction: | 1983 | ||||
Start of operation: | 1988 | ||||
Number of staff: | Approximately 12 | ||||
Storage capacity,( total): | 63 000 m3 | ||||
Silo | Short lived LILW, max dose rate 500 mSv/h | ||||
BMA | Short lived LILW, max dose rate 100 mSv/h | ||||
1 BTF | Short lived LILW, max dose rate | 10 mSv/h | |||
2 BTF | Short lived LILW, max dose rate | 10 mSv/h | |||
BLA | Short lived LLW, max dose rate | 2 mSv/h | |||
Receiving capacity: | 6 000 m3/year | ||||
Current disposal rate: | 1 000 - 1 500 m3/year | ||||
Storage section | Number of packages | Volume (m3) | Activity (Bq) | ||
Silo | 3 664 | 4 040 | 3,9*1014 | ||
BMA | 9 772 | 8 694 | 1,3*1014 | ||
1 BTF | 4 589 | 2 202 | 1,0*1012 | ||
2 BTF | 584 | 5 840 | 1,8*1013 | ||
BLA | 364 | 8 200 | 4,4*1011 | ||
SFR total | 18 973 | 28 976 | 5,5*1014 |
Table D7: Inventories of disposed radioactive waste in SFR
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Figure D4: Nuclide specifi c inventory for most common isotopes in
D.32.4.4 | Shallow land burial |
The nuclear power plants at Ringhals, Forsmark and Oskarshamn as well as the Studsvik site have shallow land burial facilities for
Thewastedisposedof atthenuclearpowerplantsRAB,FKA,andOKG consistsof lowlevelionexchange resins, piping, tools, isolation material, protective clothes and rubbish such as plastics, paper and cables. The predominant nuclides are
At the shallow land burial in Studsvik the following waste has been disposed of (in addition to
-sand and gravel from decontamination activities,
-decommissioning waste from the old
-lime from the cleaning of exhaust gases from an incineration plant,
-bricks from an old incineration plant in Studsvik and
-metal scrap and concrete from previous and current activities in Studsvik.
The design and layout of the shallow land burial facilities differs. There are sealing layers in the bottom and on the top. The closed burial facilities are fi nally covered with a layer of e.g. soil approximately 1 m thick. There are monitoring programmes for sampling leachate water, e.g. with respect to radionuclides.
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Figure D5: | ||||||
Principle section of a shallow | ||||||
land burial at OKG. | ||||||
Site | License conditions | Water disposed of |
||||
License | Volume | Max activity/ | Mass | Volume | Activity/ | |
period | (m3) | max alpha activity | (t) | (m3) | alpha | |
Forsmark (FKA) | 2010 | 42 500 | 100 GBq/100 MBq | 2 463 | 3 929 | 48.4 GBq/0.6 MBq |
Oskarshamn (OKG) | 2010 | 6 000 | 100 GBq/100 MBq | 2 463 | 5 800 | 47.1 GBq/5.7 MBq |
Ringhals (RAB) | 2010 | 10 000 | 100 GBq/100 MBq | 2 410 | 3 471 | 48.5 GBq/35.1 MBq |
Studsvik | 2010 | 1 540 | 100 GBq/100 MBq | 683 | 999 | 49 GBq/5 MBq1 |
Table D8: Inventories of disposed waste in shallow land burials. | ||||||
1 The inventory of disposed waste at Studsvik from |
||||||
D.32.4.5 | Waste from fuel fabrication |
Westinghouseoperatesafactoryforthefabricationof nuclearfuelinVästerås(approximately100kmwestof
The uranium extraction process at Ranstad Mineral AB is highly effi cient; at least 95% of the uranium in the incoming material is recovered. Besides Westinghouse, Ranstad has customers from other countries.
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The wastes from the process, with very low uranium concentrations (on average well below 200 ppm) are disposed of at municipal landfills, and at special landfills for hazardous waste in accordance with licence conditions set by SSI and SKI.
D.32.5 | Nuclear facilities under decommissioning |
D.32.5.1 | Experience from past decommissioning activities |
Sweden has limited experience from decommissioning of nuclear facilities. It is limited to the decommissioning of the R1 research reactor and laboratories in Stockholm as well as some smaller test facilities and laboratories in Studsvik. The most relevant decommissioned facilities are listed below.
The research reactor R1, which was in operation between 1954 and 1970, was situated in a rock cavern in central Stockholmandwasusedforresearchandisotopeproduction.Thereactorwasdecommissionedbetween1981 and 1983, and the site was released for unrestricted use in 1985. Virtually all waste was shipped to Studsvik. Exceptions were electric motors, handrails, stairways, etc, from
The research reactor R0, a ”zero power” reactor in Studsvik, was a low power reactor which was in operation between 1959 and 1968. The normal operational power was about 1 W, and the maximum power was 50 W. The reactor vessel was transferred to R2 (another reactor in Studsvik) for alternate usage. Some parts could not be decontaminated and were packed and stored in Studsvik. The concrete elements from the radiation shield were disposed of in a refuse disposal facility in Studsvik, since no activity could be measured.
The
The
The Van de Graaff laboratory in Studsvik was used for neutron physics experiments between 1962 and 1989. The building was not classified as a nuclear facility but later it was found to be contaminated with tritium.
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An extensive measuring program was performed to identify the contaminated material and surfaces. After decontaminationthebuildingwasreleasedfromregulatorycontrolanddemolishedin1999.Threedrumsand one steel box with tritium contaminated waste is now stored in the interim storage.
D.32.5.2 | Nuclear facilities currently under decommissioning |
The nuclear power plant Barsebäck 1
Barsebäck 1, which was closed in November 1999, was the first commercial nuclear power plant to be permanently taken out of operation in Sweden. All spent fuel has been transferred to the central interim storage for spent fuel (CLAB). Already before the plant was shut down the regulatory authorities increased their control and review activities at the site to ensure that there would be no decline in the safety work. Detailed planning for decommissioning is underway and is being closely monitored by the regulatory bodies. The actual decommissioning work will not start until the second unit at the site, Barsebäck 2, has also been permanently closed down.
The Ågesta reactor
Ågesta district heating nuclear power reactor (heavy water) was operated between 1964 and 1974 supplying parts of the Stockholm suburb Farsta with heated water. The reactor is now shut down in such a manner that it is not possible to start it up again. The fuel from the reactor has been transferred to CLAB for interim storage. Theheavywaterhasbeenremovedandtwo,outof four,steamgeneratorshavebeendismantled,butotherwise the facility is more or less intact. Detailed planning for its decommissioning is underway and is being closely monitored by the regulatory bodies.
Aktiva centrallaboratoriet, ACL
The central active laboratory (ACL) in Studsvik was built between 1959 and 1963 with the purpose to be used as a research facility for reprocessing spent fuel. The activities in the laboratory ended in 1997, and had involved for example research on plutonium enriched fuel, plutonium analyses, material testing and test fabrication of rods with
Tank and Silo facility, TS
The tank and silo facility (TS) in Studsvik was constructed at an early stage, with the purpose of storing liquid
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SECTION E – LEGASLATIVE AND
REGULATORY SYSTEM
ARTICLE 18. IMPLEMENTING MEASURES
Each Contracting Party shall take, within the framework of its national law, the legislative, regulatory and administrative measures and other steps necessary for implementing its obligations under this Convention.
The legislative, regulatory and other measures to fulfil the obligations of the Joint Convention are discussed in this report.
ARTICLE 19. LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
1.EachContractingPartyshallestablishandmaintainalegislativeandregulatoryframeworktogovern the safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste management.
2.This legislative and regulatory framework shall provide for:
(i)the establishment of applicable national safety requirements and regulations for radiation safety;
(ii)a system of licensing of spent fuel and radioactive waste management activities;
(iii)asystemof prohibitionof theoperationof aspentfuelorradioactivewastemanagementfacility without a licence;
(iv)a system of appropriate institutional control, regulatory inspection and documentation and reporting;
(v)the enforcement of applicable regulations and of the terms of the licences;
(vi)a clear allocation of responsibilities of the bodies involved in the different steps of spent fuel and of radioactive waste management.
3.Whenconsideringwhethertoregulateradioactivematerialsasradioactivewaste,ContractingParties shall take due account of the objectives of this Convention.
E.19 | NUCLEAR SAFETY LEGISLATION AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK |
General
This section is divided into two parts. The first part presents some basic information concerning definitions within the Swedish legislative system, and presents an overview of the relevant acts. The second part
45
describes the implementation of the requirements in the regulatory review activities. Special emphasis is placed on the licensing system, prohibition, institutional control, regulatory inspection, documentation and reporting, enforcement of regulations and terms of a license, and clear allocation of responsibilities of the bodies involved.
Fundamental principles
The rationales for the management system for spent fuel and radioactive waste are based on basic principles that have been derived from extensive discussions in the Swedish parliament. The Swedish parliament has supported four basic principles for the management of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste (bill 1980/81: 90, Appendix 1, p. 319, bill 1983/84:60, p. 38, bill 1997/98:145, p. 381, bill 1992/93:98, p. 29 as well as the final reports of the Standing Committee on Industry and Trade, 1988/89:NU31 and 1989/90:NU24):
1.The expenses for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste are to be covered by fees on the production of energy that has resulted in these expenses.
2.The reactor owners are to safely dispose of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste.
3.
4.Each country is to be responsible for the spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste generated in that country. The disposal of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste from nuclear activities in another country may not occur in Sweden other than in an exceptional case.
These are the basic principles for the structure of the Act (1984:3) on Nuclear Activities. They are also contained in the Act (1992:1537) on the Financing of Future Expenses for Spent Nuclear Fuel etc. (Financing Act). The first principle has been wholly incorporated into the Financing Act. The second principle has been regulated in
Another basic prerequisite for the actual management of spent fuel is that reprocessing will not take place. Thus, spent nuclear fuel is in practice considered and treated as waste, although it is not legally defined as waste until disposed of in a repository.
Nuclear and radioactive waste
IntheActonNuclearActivities(1984:3),radioactivewasteproducedbynuclearactivitiesisdefinedas”nuclear waste”. The precise definition according to the act is presented in the next section. The authority responsible according to the Nuclear Activities Act is the Swedish Nuclear Inspectorate (SKI).
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In the Radiation Protection Act (1988:220) the term ”radioactive waste” is used. The term includes radioactive waste from nuclear activities as well as from
E.19.1 | LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK |
The framework of Sweden’s legislation in the field of waste management, and nuclear safety and radiation protection, is to be found in five Acts: the Nuclear Activities Act (1984:3); the Radiation Protection Act (1988: 220); the Environmental Code (1998:808); the Act (1992:1537) on the Financing of Future Expenses on Spent Nuclear Fuel; and parts of the Act (2000:1064) on the Control of
The Acts are supplemented by a number of ordinances and other secondary legislation, which contain more detailed provisions for particular aspects of the legal framework.
E.19.1.1 The Act on Nuclear Activities
General
The basic law in Sweden regulating nuclear safety is the Act on Nuclear Activities (1984:3). It contains basic provisions concerning safety in connection with nuclear activities, and applies to the handling of nuclear material and nuclear waste as well as to the operation of nuclear plants.
The Swedish Parliament has on several occasions declared that Sweden supports and will follow the principle of every country’s responsibility to take care of and dispose of spent fuel and radioactive waste produced within the country. Disposal, as well as interim storage, of foreign spent fuel and radioactive waste in Sweden is prohibited.
A special license may however be granted by the Government in special cases, to allow for small amounts of foreign spent fuel or radioactive waste to be disposed of in Sweden, on condition that it does not hinder the
The Act does not contain provisions concerning radiation protection. This is regulated in a separate act, the Radiation Protection Act (see below). As far as nuclear activities are concerned, the Radiation Protection Act and the Act on Nuclear Activities are implemented in close association witheach other.
Definitions
The handling, transport or other dealings with nuclear waste are defined as nuclear activity. The precise definition of nuclear waste is:
-Spent nuclear fuel that has been placed in a repository;
-A radioactive substance formed in a nuclear plant and which has not been produced or removed from the plant to be used in education or research, or for medical, agricultural or commercial purposes;
-Materials or other items that have belonged to a nuclear plant and become contaminated with radioactivity, and are no longer to be used in such a plant;
-Radioactive parts of a nuclear plant that is being decommissioned.
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Basic requirements on safety
Nuclear activities shall be conducted such that they meet safety requirements and fulfil the obligations pursuant to Sweden’s agreements for the purpose of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and unauthorised dealing with nuclear material and spent nuclear fuel.
Safety in nuclear activities shall be maintained by the taking all measures required to prevent errors in or defective functioning of equipment, incorrect handling or anything else that may result in a radiological accident, and to prevent unlawful dealings with nuclear material or nuclear waste.
The Government or the authority appointed by the Government may issue more detailed provisions concerning these matters.
Licensing
In principle, all activities with nuclear material or nuclear waste are deemed to constitute nuclear activity for which a licence is required. However, nuclear waste and nuclear material with a very low level of radiation can be released from regulatory control.
Environmental Impact Assessment and general rules of consideration
In all licensing cases according to the Act on Nuclear Activities an EIA (Environmental Impact Assessment) shall be made. The Environmental Code regulates the way in which the EIA shall be performed as well as its contents. The general rules of consideration in the Environmental Code shall also be complied with in licensing cases according to the Act on Nuclear Activities (see section E.19.1.3 below).
General obligations of licensees and licence conditions
The holder of a licence for nuclear activities shall be responsible for ensuring that all measures are taken that are needed for:
-Maintaining safety, with reference to the nature of the activities and the conditions under which they are conducted;
-Ensuring the safe handling and disposal of nuclear waste arising from the activities or nuclear material arising therein that is not reused;
-The safe decommissioning and dismantling of plants in which nuclear activities are no longer to be conducted.
The holder of a licence for a nuclear activity has to ensure that all measures are taken that are needed to maintain safety. This is a very general obligation and it has to be complemented with licencing conditions. The licencing conditions are imposed when a licence is issued. Licencing conditions can also be imposed during the period of validity of a licence.
Safe management and disposal of nuclear waste
The holder of a license for conducting nuclear activities is responsible for the management and disposal of the waste produced and for decommissioning. The holder of a licence for the operation of a nuclear power reactor shall - in
48
- establish and carry out a
According to the Ordinance on Nuclear Activities SKI has been assigned by the Government to be responsible for the evaluation of the
Supervision
The Government assigns a regulatory body to supervise the compliance with the Act on Nuclear Activities and of conditions or regulations imposed pursuant to the Act. A licensee shall if the regulatory body requires it:
-Submit all information and documentation necessary to execute the supervision;
-Provide access to a nuclear installation, or site for nuclear activities, investigations and tests to the extent needed for the supervision.
Theregulatorybodymaydecideonanymeasures,conditionsandprohibitionsnecessaryinindividualcasesto implement the Act on Nuclear Activities, or regulations or conditions issued as a consequence of the Act.
Revocation of licences
A licence to conduct nuclear activities may be revoked by the authority issuing the permit if:
-Conditions have not been complied with in some essential respect;
-The licensee has not fulfilled its obligations concerning research and development work on waste managementanddecommissioning,andthereareveryspecificreasonsfromtheviewpointof safetytorevoke the licence;
-There are any other very specific reasons for revocation, from the viewpoint of safety.
This means that a revocation of a licence may be decided only in cases of severe misconduct by the operator or otherwise for exceptional safety reasons. If the licence to operate a nuclear power plant is revoked, the licence holder remains responsible for waste management and decommissioning.
Sanctions
The Act on Nuclear Activities also contains rules about inspections, safeguards, sanctions, etc. Anyone who conductsnuclearactivitieswithoutalicence,ordisregardsconditionsorregulationsshallbesentencedtopayafine,or to imprisonment for a maximum of two years. If the crime is intentional and aggravated, he shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a minimum of six months and a maximum of four years. On the other hand, liability shall not be adjudged if the crime is trivial. The police authority shall provide the assistance necessary for the supervision.
Civil liability for nuclear damage is regulated in the Atomic Liability Act, (1968:45) which came into force
49
in 1968. Sweden is one of the parties to the Paris Convention and to the Brussels Supplementary Convention on this subject. The Swedish Act reflects these agreements.
Public insight
It is considered very important to give the public insight into and information on nuclear activities. In municipalities where major nuclear facilities are located (power reactors, research reactors, facilities for manufacturing, handling, storage or disposal of nuclear material or nuclear waste) it is particularly important that the residents are given correct and reliable information. For this purpose
The holder of a licence for a major nuclear plant is bound to allow the local safety board insight into the safety and radiation protection work at the plant. The licensee shall, at the request of the board:
-Give the board information of the facts available and allow the board to study relevant documents;
-Give the board access to plants and sites.
The function of the boards is to obtain insight into safety and radiation protection matters and to inform the public about these. It is therefore important to point out that the board is not supposed to impose requirements on or to prescribe
The ordinance on Nuclear Activities
The Ordinance on Nuclear activities (1984:14) designates SKI as the responsible authority with regard to nuclearsafety.TheOrdinanceonNuclearActivities(1984:14)containsdetailedprovisionsonsuchmattersas definitions,applicationsforlicenses,reviewing,evaluationsandinspection.SKIissuespermitsfortransportation of nuclear materials and
Regulations on Nuclear Safety
SKIFS 1998:1 Regulations Concerning Safety in Certain Nuclear Facilities
SKI issued regulations concerning safety in certain nuclear facilities (SKI FS 1998:1) in 1998. These regulations cover the operation of most nuclear facilities, i.e. nuclear power reactors, research or materials testing reactors, fuel fabrication plants, facilities for handling and storage of spent nuclear fuel and facilities for handling, storage or disposal of nuclear waste. The regulations cover the following areas:
-Requirements for a quality system covering:
-documentation of guidelines for the safe operation of the facility
-decisions of importance for the safety should be preceded by comprehensive investigations
-competence of the personnel
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-definitions of responsibilities and authority for different personnel categories
-feedback of experience
-continuous development of safety
-Requirements regarding the safety analysis and safety report e.g.:
-description of the site, e.g. hydrology, geology, seismic activities, etc.
-design basis, including factors of importance for
-description of the facility and its systems, function and performance
-source terms
-radiation protection (in accordance with provisions issued by SSI)
-description of the organisation for operational control, maintenance, quality assurance, etc.
-An
-Repositories should be designed so that safety can be maintained without monitoring or maintenance after closure
-The measures taken to ensure the safe handling, storage and disposal of nuclear waste shall be described in a safety report
-If waste is generated which does not conform to the safety report, a plan for the management of this waste shall be documented and submitted to SKI
-Decommissioning and dismantling shall be documented in a plan, which shall be submitted to SKI for approval
SKIFS 2002:1 Regulations concerning Safety in connection with the Disposal of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Waste
SKI regulations concerning the
-qualitative requirements on the barrier system
-scenario definitions and classifications
-time scales for the safety assessment (as long as barrier functions are needed to isolate and/or to retard dispersion of radionuclides, but for at least 10 000 years)
-topics to be covered in the safety report.
E.19.1.2 | Radiation Protection Act |
General
The framework for all radiation protection is defined in the Radiation Protection Act (1988:220) and in the Radiation Protection Ordinance (1988:293). The Act and the Ordinance entered into force in1988. The purpose of the Act is to protect people, animals and the environment against the harmful effects of radiation. Persons engaged in activities involving radiation are obliged to take the requisite precautionary measures. They are also responsible for the proper handling and disposal of the radioactive waste produced.
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Definitions
The Act applies to all activities involving radiation and these are defined to include all activities involving radioactive substances or technical devices capable of generating radiation.
Consequently the Act applies to radiation from nuclear activities and to harmful radiation, ionising as well as
The Government or the responsible authority may, in so far it does not conflict with the purpose of the act,prescribeexemptionsorcertainprovisionsconcerningradioactivesubstancesortechnicaldevisescapable of generating radiation.
Basic requirements on radiation protection
Any person who conducts activities involving radiation shall, according to the nature of the activities and the conditions under which they are conducted:
-Take the measures and precautions necessary to prevent or counteract injury to people and animals and damage to the environment;
-Supervise and maintain the radiation protection at the site, on the premises and in other areas where radiation occurs;
-Maintainthetechnicaldevicesandthemeasuringandradiationprotectionequipmentusedintheactivities correctly.
The provision implies that all measures should be taken to improve radiation protection; it is not sufficient only to follow regulations or conditions issued by the responsible authority.
The Government or the authority assigned by the Government may also issue further regulations as required for protection against, or control of, radiation in the respects specified in the Act.
Environmental Impact Assessment
The Government or the responsible authority may, in licensing cases, prescribe that the applicant make an EIA (Environmental Impact Assessment) before consent is given. Such an EIA shall be made in accordance with the rules in the Environmental Code (see section E.19.1.3).
Licensing
According to the Radiation Protection Act a license is required for:
-The manufacture, import, transport, sale, transfer, leasing, acquisition, possession, use, depositing or recycling of radioactive substances;
-The manufacture, import, sale, transfer, leasing, acquisition, possession, use, installation or maintenance of a technical device capable of and intended for emitting ionising radiation, or a part of such a device that is of substantial importance from the viewpoint of radiation protection;
-The manufacture, import, sale, transfer, leasing, acquisition, possession, use, installation or maintenance of technical devices, other than those referred to in the previous
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ment has prescribed a licence requirement;
-The export of radioactive substances if a licence is not granted according to the Act (2000:1064) on the Control of
A license according to the Radiation Protection Act is not required for activities licensed according to the Act on Nuclear Activities.
Licensing conditions
Whenalicenceis,orhasbeen,issuedinagreementwiththeRadiationProtectionActtheresponsibleauthority may impose conditions needed for radiological protection. Such conditions can also be imposed on activities licensed within the legal frame of the Act on Nuclear Activities.
Supervision
The Government assigns a regulatory body to supervise compliance with the Radiation Protection Act and licenses and conditions issued in accordance with the Act. The regulatory body may decide on all measures necessaryandallconditionsandprohibitionsrequiredinindividualcasestoimplementtheAct,orregulations or conditions issued as a consequence of the Act.
Attherequestof theresponsibleauthority,anyonewhoconductsactivitiesinvolvingradiationshallsubmit the information and provide the documents required for its supervision. The authority should also be given access to the installation or site where the activities are conducted, for investigations and sampling, to the extent required for its supervision.
Sanctions
The Government and the responsibleauthority decide upon matters regarding licences under the Radiation Protection Act. A licence under this Act may be revoked if specific regulations or conditions have not been complied with in any significant respect, or if there are other very specific reasons.
Liability under the Act is not adjudged if responsibility for the offence may be assigned under the Penal Code or the Act on penalties for illicit trafficing. Nor is liability adjudged in the instance of a minor offence to be a trivial case. The police authority shall provide the necessary assistance for supervision.
The Ordinance on Radiation Protection
The Ordinance on Radiation Protection designates the Swedish Radiation Protection Authority (SSI) to be the responsible authority in the area of radiation protection. The Ordinance contains detailed provisions pursuant to authorisation under the Radiation Protection Act. It stipulates that SSI may issue regulations concerning further provisions concerning general obligations, radioactive waste and prohibitions against activities with certain materials, etc.
The Ordinance on Radiation Protection also stipulates that certain provisions in the Act do not apply to very
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Regulations on Radiation Protection
Currently there are 49 regulations in force covering all the areas in which radiation can occur. In general these requirements and regulations are in agreement with recommendations by international organisations such as IAEA, ICRP, EU. There are 14 regulations of particular interest for waste management.
SSI FS 2002:4 Regulations on the Planning Before and During Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities
These regulations will enter into force in 2004. These regulations contain provisions concerning the planning of decommissioning of nuclear facilities in matters of importance from a radiation protection point of view. Requirementsareputondecommissioningplanningandotheradministrativemeasuressuchasdocumentation before and during decommissioning and reporting to the SSI at different stages of a facility’s life cycle.
SSI FS 2001:1 Regulations on the Handling of Radioactive Waste and Nuclear Waste at Nuclear Facilities
Theseregulationscontainprovisionsconcerningtheplanningandqualityassuranceof radioactivewastemanagement at nuclear facilities, as well as documentation and registration of radioactive waste and reporting to the SSI
SSI FS 2000:12 Regulations on the Protection of Human Health and the Environment from Discharges of Radioactive Substances from certain Nuclear Facilities
These are applicable to all releases of radioactive substances from nuclear facilities that are directly related to the normal operation at each facility. The limitation of releases of radioactive substances from nuclear facilities shall be based on the optimization of radiation protection and shall be achieved by using the best availabletechnique.Theoptimizationof radiationprotectionshallincludeallfacilitieslocatedwithinthesame geographically delimited area. The effective dose to an individual in the critical group of one year of releases of radioactive substances to air and water from all facilities located in the same geographically delimited area shall not exceed 0.1 millisievert (mSv).
SSI FS 2000:11 Regulations on Radiation Protection Manager at Nuclear Plants
According to these regulations a license holder shall appoint a radiation protection manager at the facility in order to implement and look after radiation protection conditions issued by the authorities.
SSI FS 2000:10 Regulations on Radiation Protection of Workers Exposed to Ionising Radiation at Nuclear Plants
SSI FS 1998:5 The Swedish Radiation Protection Institute’s Regulations on Monitoring and Reporting of Individual Radiation Doses
These regulations apply to measurements of individual radiation doses to workers of category A2 working with ionising radiation and reporting of doses received to the National Dose Database.
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SSI FS 1998:4 Regulations on Dose Limits at Work with Ionising Radiation
These regulations apply to the limitation of radiation doses to workers and the general public resulting from applications using ionising radiation. The regulations also apply to the protection of pregnant women who otherwise might be exposed to ionising radiation by their work.
SSI FS 1998:3 The Swedish Radiation Protection Institute’s Regulations on Categorisation of Workplaces and Workers at Work with Ionising Radiation
These regulations apply to applications using ionising radiation where humans may receive radiation doses.
SSI FS 1998:1 Regulations on the Protection of Human Health and the Environment in connection with the Final Management of Spent Nuclear Fuel and Nuclear Waste
These regulations apply to the final management of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste. The regulations do not apply for
SSI FS 1997:1 Regulations on Filing at Nuclear Plants
These regulations apply to the filing of documentation that is drawn up or received in connection with the operation of nuclear plants. Certain documentation has to be filed. If the practice ceases, the archives shall be transfered to the National Archives of Sweden.
SSI FS 1996:3 Regulations on Outside Workers at Work with Ionising Radiation
These regulations apply to outside workers of category A working within controlled areas in Sweden and when Swedish workers of category A perform similar tasks in other countries.
SSI FS 1996:2 Regulations on Clearance of Goods and Oil from Nuclear Facilities
Theseregulationssetupthelevelsforclearanceof contaminatedgoodsandoilfromnuclearfacilities.Material may be cleared for unrestricted use or for disposal as conventional
SSI FS 1995:4 Regulations on the Control of Shipment into or out of Sweden of Radioactive Waste
Theseregulationsdealwiththesupervisionandcontrolof shipmentsof radioactivewastebetweenEuropean Community member states and into and out of the Community.
SSI FS 1983:7 Regulations on Radioactive Waste Not Associated with Nuclear Energy
These regulations apply to the handling of solid and liquid wastes from medical care, laboratories and science.
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E.19.1.3 | The Environmental Code |
General
The objective of the Environmental Code is to support a sustainable development and thereby ensure a healthy environment for current and future generations. The Code includes general provisions on environmental protection and applies to all activities, which are important for its objective. The Code is applicable to all kinds of environmentally hazardous activities including nuclear activities and activities involving radiation. The Code shall be applied in parallel with the Act on Nuclear Activities and the Radiation Protection Act.
The Environmental Code is supplemented by a number of ordinances, which are laid down by the Government.
Definitions
In the Code environmentally hazardous activities are defined as:
-The discharge of wastewater, solid matter or gas from land, buildings or structures onto land or into water areas or groundwater;
-Anyuseof land,buildingsorstructuresthatentailsariskdetrimentaltohumanhealthortheenvironment due to discharges or emissions other than those referred to in above bullet or to pollution of land, air, water areas or groundwater; or
-Any use of land, buildings or structures that may bedetrimental to the surroundings due to noise, vibration, light, ionising or
General rules of consideration
The general rules of consideration assert some important principles that the implementer has to comply with, e.g.:
The precautionaryand the
The most suitable
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The general rules of consideration operate as a preventive tool, and to the principle that the risks of environmental impact should be borne by the polluter and not by the environment.
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)
The Swedish EIA legislation is in accordance with the Council Directive 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985, amended by Council Directive 97/11/EC of 3 March 1997, on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment. An EIA shall be submitted together with an application for a permit for environmentally hazardous activities. An EIA shall also be submitted at the prospect of the decommissioning of nuclear facilities.
The purpose of an EIA is to establish and describe the direct and indirect impacts of a planned activity, or measure, on people, animals, plants, land, water, the air, the climate, the landscape and the cultural environment, on the management of land, water and the physical environment in general, and on the management of materials, raw materials and energy. Another purpose is to enable an overall assessment to be made of this impact on human health and the environment.
An environmental impact statement shall contain the following information:
-A description of the activity or measure including details of its location, design and scope;
-A description of the measures being planned with a view to avoiding, mitigating or remedying adverse effects, for example action to prevent the activity or measure leading to an infringement of an environmental quality standard;
-Theinformationthatisneededtoestablishandassessthemainimpactonhumanhealth,theenvironment and management of land, water and other resources that the activity or measure is likely to have;
-Adescriptionof possiblealternativesitesandalternativedesigns,togetherwithastatementof thereasons why a specific alternative was chosen and a description of the consequences if the activity or measure is not implemented;
-A
Local consultation
In the EIA process the implementer shall consult the county administrative board at an early stage. They shall also consult with private individuals who are likely to be affected, and must do so in good time and to an appropriate extent before submitting an application for a permit and preparing the environmental impact statement. Prior to consultation, the implementer shall submit information about the location, extent, and nature of the planned activity and its anticipated environmental impact to the county administrative board and to any private individuals affected.
If the county administrative board decides that the activity or measure is likely to have a significant environmental impact, an environmental impact assessment procedure shall be performed. In such a procedure the person who intends to undertake the activity or measure shall consult the other government agencies, the municipalities, the citizens and the organisations that are likely to be affected. The consultation shall relate to thelocation,scope,designandenvironmentalimpactof theactivityormeasureandthecontentandstructure of the environmental impact statement.
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Consultation with other countries
If an activity is likely to have a significant environmental impact in another country, the responsible authority as designated by the Government shall inform the responsible authority in that country about the planned activity. This is to give the country concerned and the citizens who are affected the opportunity to take part in a consultation procedure concerning the application and the environmental impact assessment. Such information shall also be supplied when another country that is likely to be exposed to a significant environmental impact so requests.
Licensing
According to the Environmental Code, a permit or notification is required for environmentally hazardous activities (9 chapter). The Government has in the Ordinance (1998:899) on Environmentally Hazardous Activities and Health Protection stipulated that facilities for the treatment, storage or disposal of spent fuel, nuclear waste or radioactive waste need a permit.
The environmental court is the first instance for the hearing of cases concerning such activities.
In addition the Government has to consider the permissibility of nuclear activities, e.g. the disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste.
Licensing conditions
The Environmental Court’s judgement when granting a permit for an activity may include provisions concerning supervision, inspections and checks, safety and technical design of the activity and conditions that are necessary to prevent or limit any harmful or other detrimental impact.
Supervision
Thepurposeof supervisionshallbetoensurecompliancewiththeobjectivesof thisCodeandrulesissuedin pursuance thereof. For this purpose the supervisory authority shall supervise compliance with the provisions of the Environmental Code and rules, judgements and other decisions issued in pursuance thereof and take any measures that are necessary to ensure that faults are corrected. The County Board conducts supervision of the Governments permissibility decision and the Environmental Court’s judgement.
Sanctions
The supervisory authority may issue any injunctions and prohibitions that are necessary in individual cases to ensurecompliancewiththeprovisionsof theEnvironmentalCodeandrules,judgementsandotherdecisions issued in pursuance thereof.
E.19.1.4 | The Act on the Financing of Future Expenses on Spent Nuclear Fuel |
The Act (1992:1537) on the Financing of Future Expenses on Spent Nuclear Fuel is an essential part of the Swedish nuclear waste management system since it lay down the principles for the financing of expenses for disposal and decommissioning.
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The basic requirement stipulates that the holder of a licence to operate a nuclear power reactor must pay a feepergeneratedkWhof electricity.Thesizeof thefeeisbasedona25yearearningperiodperreactor.When the operating period of a reactor exceeds 25 years, a fee must be levied for future expenses for the additional spent fuel and nuclear waste produced.The fee varies from year to year and is different for each utility.
The fees are collected in the Nuclear Waste Fund, which is subject to regulatory supervision. The purpose of the Fund is to cover all expenses incurred for the safe handling and disposal of spent nuclear fuel, as well as for dismantling nuclear facilities and disposing of the decommissioning waste. The Fund must also finance SKB’s R&D.
Since 1996 the nuclear power utilities must provide two forms of guarantees in addition to the fees paid to the Nuclear Waste Fund:
Guarantee I
If a reactor is closed before it has reached 25 years of operating time, a smaller amount than expected will be paid into the Nuclear Waste Fund. The guarantees provided by the reactor licensees must cover this shortfall.
Guarantee II
The other type of guarantee must be available until all nuclear waste has been placed in a repository and must cover contingencies for the waste programme. Guarantee II will be used if expenses for future nuclear waste management become higher than expected, if these expenses have to be met earlier than expected, or if the actual amount in the Fund is lower than was estimated.
SKBmakestheannualestimatesforallnuclearpowerutilitiesthatformthebasisfortheregulatoryauthorities’ review as well as the basis for calculating the fee. SKI reviews the cost estimates every year. Furthermore, SKI proposes the size of the guarantee that the nuclear power utilities must make available. After its review, SKI submits a proposal for the size of the fees, and of the guarantees required, to the Government. Based on the proposal the Government sets the fee and guarantees.
The management of the Nuclear Waste Fund is the responsibility of a separate government agency, the Board of the Nuclear Waste Fund.
To date, the Nuclear Waste Fund has covered the expenses for:
-CLAB;
-the transport system, i.e., the ship Sigyn, containers, special trucks, etc;
-the Canister Laboratory and the Äspö Hard Rock Laboratory;
-SKB’s research and development costs, including siting activities.
The Nuclear Waste Fund will eventually cover expenses for:
-the encapsulation of spent nuclear fuel;
-the repositories for spent nuclear fuel and
-the dismantling of nuclear power plants and the disposal of decommissioning waste;
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-continuing research and development work;
-the expenses for regulatory control and supervision after closure of the reactors.
The repository for radioactive operational waste
E.19.1.5 | Act (2000:1064) on the Control of |
The export of nuclear material and equipment is governed by the Act on the Control of Export of
TheActspecifies,throughreferencetotheRadiationProtectionAct,thatalicencetoexportspentnuclear fuel from Sweden cannot be given if the destination is:
-south of latitude 60 degrees south;
-a State party to the Fourth
-a State that has forbidden the import of spent nuclear fuel; or
-a State that, in the opinion of the responsible Swedish authorities, does not have the technical, legal or administrative resources to manage the spent nuclear fuel safely.
E.19.1.6 | Other relevant Acts |
The Rescue Services Act
The Rescue Services Act (1986:1102) contains provisions as to how the community rescue services shall be organised and operated. According to the act, the County Administrative Board is responsible for the rescue operations in cases where the public needs protection from a radioactive release from a nuclear installation or in cases where such release seems imminent. The Act also stipulates that a rescue commander with a specified competence, with
The Rescue Services Ordinance (1986:1107) contains general provisions concerning emergency planning. The County Administrative Board is obliged to make a radiological emergency response plan. The Swedish Rescue Services is responsible, at the national level, for the
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The Occupational Safety and Health Act
The Occupational Safety and Health Act (1977:1160) contains requirements about the work environment and provisions on protection from accidents caused by technical equipment, dangerous materials or other work conditions. It also contains detailed rules concerning responsibility and authority with respect to occupational safety issues.
The Act on Transportation of Hazardous goods
The Act concerning the Transportation of Hazardous goods (1982:821) and the Ordinance (1982:923) on the Transportation of Hazardous goods.
E.19.2 NATIONAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS AND REGULATIONS
This section describes the legislative and regulatory system that has been established in Sweden comprising a system for licensing, the possibility to prohibit activities, institutional control, regulatory inspection, documentation and reporting, enforcement of regulations, the terms of a license and the clear allocation of responsibilities of the bodies involved.
E.19.2.1 Licensing
This section describes the licensing system for the treatment and disposal of spent fuel, radioactive waste, very low radioactive waste and
Facilities for the management and disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste
The licensing is issued in accordance to several acts with different purposes and involves a number of authorities. A general permissibility consideration has to be made as to whether to grant a permit for the activity or not. Furthermore the activity shall be approved according to aspects of nuclear safety, and the protection of human health and the environment. Finally licensing conditions are set up according to the various acts by the responsible authorities.
An important instrument during the licensing process is the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). Early consultation with private individuals likely to be affected, and with government agencies, the municipalities, and the organisations concerned, is emphasised in the Swedish
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Permissibility
AccordingtotheEnvironmentalCode(1998:808)theGovernmentshallconsiderthepermissibilityof certain activities such as interim storage or the disposal of spent fuel or waste. An environmental impact statement shall be submitted for the permissibility assessment. The Environmental Court reviews an application on permissibility, which thereafter is handed over to the Government for the final consideration.
According to the Environmental Code the Government may only permit an activity if a municipal council has already approved it (municipal veto). But without prejudice to a municipal approval the Government may permit an activity that involves interim storage or disposal of spent fuel or waste, if the activity is of the utmost importance with regard to the national interest. However, this shall not apply where another site is considered to be more appropriate for the activity, or if an appropriate site has been designated for the activity in another municipality that is likely to approve the activity.
Licensing approval
If the Government grants permissibility, licensing approval has to be issued for the nuclear activity according to the Act on Nuclear Activities and the environmentally hazardous activity according to the Environmental Code.
The Government (or the authority appointed by the Government) grants a license in accordance with the ActonNuclearActivities.TheapplicationisreviewedbySKIandthereafterhandedoverfortheGovernment’s decision. A permit under the Radiation Protection Act is not required for activities covered by the Act.
Finally the Environmental Court grants the licence on environmentally hazardous activities according to the Environmental Code.
Licensing conditions
Licensing conditions can be issued under the Act on Nuclear Activities, the Radiation Protection Act and the Environmental Code. This means that SKI, SSI and the Environmental Court can issue the conditions necessary from specific aspects concerning nuclear safety, radiation protection and environmental protection. The conditions could be issued in connection with such approvals or during the period of validity of the permits.
InconnectionwiththepermissibilitydecisiontheGovernmentcouldissueconditionsinordertosafeguard public interests, such as the labour market, trade and industry and regional politics. The implementer could e.g. be requested to pay for improvements to the roads in the area where the facility is sited.
It should be mentioned that during the last ten years there has been a development among the responsible authorities to issue general regulations instead of licensing conditions. The difference between licence conditionsandgeneralregulationsisthatconditionsarelinkedtoindividuallicenseswhilegeneralregulationsapply
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Shallow land burials
Shallow land burial for very
Licensing approvals
In the Act on Nuclear Activities shallow land burial for very
SKB
prepares and submits applications, including an EIA, for permits/licences under the Environmental Code and the Nuclear Activities Act
The Environmental Court
•prepares the permissibility matter pursuant to the Environmental Code and holds the main hearing
•examines the matter pursuant to the Environmental Code (results in an opinion)
The Municipality Council
approves or disapproves of the activity
The Environmental Court
•holds a new hearing
•issues a permit and stipulates conditions under the Environmental Code
Coordination | SKI (SSI) | |
prepares the matter | ||
pursuant to the Nuclear | ||
Activities Act | ||
The Government
declares the | issues a licence |
activity permissible | under the Nuclear |
according to the | Activities Act |
Environmental | |
Code | |
SKI,SSI
stipulate conditions under the Nuclear Activities Act and the Radiation Protection Act.
The conditions are stipulated in stages
Figure E1: Licensing procedure for nuclear facilities.
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activityandconsequentlyhastobelicensedaccordingtothatact.SSIistheresponsibleauthoritywhichgrants licences for shallow land burial according to the Act on Nuclear Activities. Furthermore shallow land burial is defined as an environmentally hazardous activity and has to be approved in accordance to the Environmental Code by the Environmental Court.
Licensing conditions
The responsible authorities may issue all conditions or regulations necessary with regard to aspects of safety, radiation protection and environmental protection.
For
Release
Release of nuclear materials or nuclear waste must be in accordance with the Act on Nuclear Activities by SKI, and in accordance with the Radiation Protection Act by SSI. Material may be cleared for unrestricted use, or for disposal as conventional
E.19.2.2 Prohibition
It is prohibited to carry out nuclear activities or activities involving radiation without a permit. Any person who deliberately, or through negligence, operates an activity without the necessary permits shall be fined or sentenced to not more than two years imprisonment. The same penalty (for unauthorised environmental activity) applies according to the Environmental Code.
E.19.2.3 | Institutional control, regulatory inspection, and documentation and reporting |
Institutional control
According to SSI Regulations on the Protection of Human Health and the Environment from Discharges of Radioactive Substances from certain Nuclear Facilities (SSI FS 2000:12), the holder of a license shall conduct environmental monitoring. All discharges from facilities for storage or disposal of radioactive waste shall be monitored by a nuclide specific measuring programme. The dose to any individual in the critical group shall notexceed0.1mSv/y.Theregulationsareapplicabletofacilitiesinoperation,butwillbeamendedinduetime to deal with the period following closure of a disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste.
SSIhasalsoissuedconditionsregardinginstitutionalcontrolof existingshallowlanddisposalfacilities.The regulations stipulate that institutional control shall continue until the radioactivity no longer is a ”significant” hazard to public health and the environment. The municipalities’ detailed development plans are also of
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importance, by providing conditions concerning the use of the land. All nuclear facilities, including shallow land disposals are within areas where detailed development plans have been established.
Regulatory inspection
In accordance with legal authorisation and the mandate defined by the Government, SKI and SSI conduct regularinspectionsand assessmentsof theSwedish nuclearfacilitiestoascertain compliancewith regulations and licence conditions.
The supervision of the compliance with the Act on Nuclear Activities, as well as conditions or regulations imposed under the Act, is executed by SKI. Correspondingly SSI performs supervision of compliance with the Radiation Protection Act and conditions or regulations imposed under that Act. The County Board fulfils supervision of the compliance with the Environmental Code and conditions or regulations imposed by the Code.
On request the implementer shall submit to the authority information and provide the documentatrion required for its supervision. The authority shall also be given access to the installation or site where the activities are conducted, for investigations and sampling, to the extent required for supervision (see also sections E.19.1.1 and E.19.1.2).
SKI practice
Over the last few years, SKI has developed its inspection practice as a result of the new general safety regulations (SKIFS 1998:1). These regulations have made it possible to adopt a more structured approach to inspection and safety assessment.
Topical inspection
Topical inspections are carried out with a team of experts, to assess the licensee’s compliance with relevant regulations. These inspections are documented in extensive reports covering the purpose and objectives of the inspection, observations, compliance and deviations from requirements, as well as an assessment of the magnitude and safety significance of the deviations, and a proposal for further regulatory action. Careful planning is needed for these inspections which is documented in an inspection plan.
Covering current plant issues
The purpose of this practice is to be generally informed about activities at the plants, to collect information about plans, the status of ongoingprojects, etc.Another purpose is tohave apractical possibility of detecting early signs of deteriorating performance. The information is used by SKI for preparation and planning of regulatory activities. Preparation and documentation is simpler than for topical inspections.
SKI has in recent years developed a new practice called the
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assessments concerning the facility, as well as information from ”covering of current plant issues”, a general conclusion is made regarding the safety of the facility in relation to relevant requirements. The findings and conclusions are documented in report, which is an important tool for prioritising further regulatory activities.
SSI practices
At SSI an internal inspection policy, decided by the Director General, defines the types of inspections that should be performed:
-System inspections;
-Detailed inspections;
-Theme inspections.
System inspections
During system inspections the license holder’s organisation, administrative routines,
Detailed inspections
A detailed inspection is concentrating on one specific issue. A detailed inspection could e.g. be triggered by an unexpected radiological event.
Theme inspections
A theme inspection is coordinated and performed towards several license holders, on a specific theme (e.g. air monitoring programme at the nuclear facilities).
Joint
Because of the strong links between nuclear safety and radiation protection SKI and SSI must
Another area of concern is the
Documentation and reporting
Accordingtotheannuallettersof appropriation,governmentdecisionsandordinances,theauthoritiesarerequired to submit the following reports concerning regulatory activities to the Government on a regular basis:
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-In Annual Activity Reports, the authorities are required to summarise results, effects and costs of their activities, in accordance with general regulations issued by the Government and the Swedish National Audit Office for such annual reports issued by all government authorities.
-SKI and SSI are required to submit a joint annual Report on the Status of Safety and Radiation Protection at the Swedish NPP’s. The central interim storage for spent nuclear fuel (CLAB) and the repository for operational waste (SFR) are included in the report. The report summarises important findings and conclusions from operational experience and regulatory inspections and reviews, both with regard to the technical safety status of the plants and the quality of the safety work at the plants, as well as on occupational and environmental doses and other radiological data.
-SKI is required to perform a periodic safety review of each operating nuclear facility and document its findings,conclusionsandrecommendationsintheformof
-Every three years, SKI is required to submit a Review Report on the Nuclear Industry Research, Development and Demonstration Programme on Disposal of Spent Fuel and Nuclear Waste and the Dismantling and Decommissioning of Nuclear Installations (the SKB R&D programme). In addition to the findings, conclusions and recommendations as to the purposefulness and quality of the programme, the review report also proposes conditions for the future conduct of the SKB R&D programme that the Government may wish to prescribe in accordance with the Act on Nuclear Activities.
-Every year, SKI is required to submit a proposal for the fees per produced kWh to be paid by the owners of the nuclear power reactors to cover the costs for the disposal of spent fuel and nuclear waste and the dismantling and decommissioning of nuclear installations. SKI also includes a review report on the cost estimates provided by the SKB.
-SSIshallonanannualbasisreporttotheGovernmentonthelicensesgrantedconcerningexport,import or the transit of nuclear waste and the erection, possession or operation of shallow land burial sites.
-SSI also on a regular basis, in agreement with international conventions, issues reports to a number of organisations, such as UNSCEAR, OECD, IAEA, etc. The major part of that reporting is within the environmental radiation protection area but some parts also consider occupational radiation protection.
In addition to the
-A quarterly newsletter with
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-NUCLEUS, a publication reporting on research projects and results, including special reports on some
-Both SKI and SSI have report series, where
-Strålskyddsnytt (radiation protection news), a publication reporting on national and international radiation protection rotection research, relating to ionising as well as
The media and the public can order all the reports published by SKI and SSI.
E.19.2.4 | Enforcement of regulations and terms of licenses |
The authorities have extensive legal regulatory and enforcement power. As described in section E.19.2.3 concerning prohibition, a license may be revoked for activities that do not fulfil the obligations set out in the legislation. If there is a ongoing licensed activity that does not comply with regulations or terms of the license, the supervisory authorities may issue any injunctions and prohibitions required in the specific caseto ensure compliance. Injunctions or prohibitions under the Acts may carry contingent fines.
If a person fails to carry out a measure incumbent upon him under the Acts, under regulations or conditions issued pursuant to the Acts, or under the supervisory authority’s injunction, the authority may arrange for the measure to be taken at his expense.
E.19.2.5 | Clear allocations of responsibilities of the bodies involved |
The Swedish legal framework allocates a clear division of responsibilities between the bodies involved. As already mentioned, the producer of spent fuel and radioactive waste has the responsibility to safely handle and dispose of the waste produced. All necessary measures and precautions should be taken by the waste producer. The authorities independently supervise, regulate and review existing or planned activities with spent fuel and radioactive waste.
The ultimate responsibility for ensuring the safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste rests with the State. According to a Government statement, the ultimate responsibility of the State ”is a matter of course” and does not need to be implemented in the legislation.
E.19.3 Conclusion
The Swedish Party complies with the obligations of Article 19.
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ARTICLE 20. REGULATORY BODY
1.EachContractingPartyshallestablishordesignatearegulatorybodyentrustedwiththeimplementationof thelegislativeandregulatoryframeworkreferredtoinArticle19,andprovidedwithadequate authority, competence and financial and human resources to fulfil its assigned responsibilities.
2.Each Contracting Party, in accordance with its legislative and regulatory framework, shall take the appropriate steps to ensure the effective independence of the regulatory functions from other functions where organizations are involved in both spent fuel or radioactive waste management and in their regulation
E.20 | REGULATORY BODY |
E.20.1 | Regulatory bodies and their mandates |
E.20.1.1 | General introduction |
The legal basis for the regulatory activities in Sweden is given in a number of documents of various types: laws, governmental ordinances, annual government letters of appropriation, and specific governmental decisions, including specific licensing decisions. Through government ordinances and specific decisions, the Government delegates to the regulatory body specified parts of the legal authority given to the Government by the Parliament through legislation.
There are two regulatory bodies in Sweden authorized to supervise spent fuel and radioactive waste management. They are the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI) and the Swedish Radiation Protection Authority (SSI). SKI exercises supervision in compliance with the Act on Nuclear Activities. SSI exercises supervision in compliance with the Radiation Protection Act. The County Administrative Board exercises supervision in compliance with the Environmental Code. In addition the Swedish Rescue Services Agency is responsible for evaluating the major emergency preparedness exercises
SKI and SSI are both central administrative authorities reporting to the Minister of the Environment. In the Swedish public administration system the central administrative authorities are quite independent within the legislation and the statutes given by the Government. An individual minister cannot, according to the Swedish Constitution, interfere in specific administrative cases that are being handled by an administrative authority under the Government.
The ministries are small units, by comparison with ministries in most other countries. They are concerned with: (1) preparing the Government’s bills to Parliament on budget appropriations and laws; (2) issuing laws and regulations and general rules for the administrative authorities; (3) international relations; (4) appointment of higher officials in the administration; and (5) certain appeals from individuals which are addressed to the Government.
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The Cabinet as a whole is responsible for all governmental decisions. Although in practice a great number of routinemattersaredecideduponbyindividualministers,andonlyformallyconfirmedbytheGovernment, the principle of collective responsibility is reflected in all forms of government work.
SKIandSSIarebothheadedbyaDirectorGeneralappointedbytheGovernment,normallyforaperiodof six years.BoardschairedbytherespectiveDirectorGeneralsupervisebothauthorities.TheBoardsnormallyconsists of ninepeople:theDirectorGeneral,membersof Parliamentrepresentingthemajorparties,seniorofficialsfrom other agencies, and a couple of independent specialists. The Director General of SKI is a member of the SSI Board and vice versa. The tasks of the Board are mainly to advise the Director General, but on a few issues, such as applications for appropriations and the issuing of general regulations, the Board has to make the decisions.
Every year SKI and SSI have to submit reports to the Government. These reports are all submitted to the Ministry of Environment. In addition, all matters, for instance licensing issues, to be decided by the Government are sent to the Ministry. Every year SKI and SSI also submit proposals or recommendations to the Ministry on issues, which have been assigned, to the authorities in the annual letters of appropriation. Often, on the basis of their practical experience, SKI and SSI propose, in their respective fields, amendments to laws and regulations to be decided upon by Parliament and the Government.
ThesystemandmeansbywhichtheSwedishGovernmentcontrolstheactivitiesof governmentauthoritieswere completelyrevisedduringthe1990s.Previouslytheactivitiesof authoritieswerecontrolledbydetailedrulesforeach type of activity and detailed control of each type of cost, such as salaries, foreign travel, domestic travel, etc.
In the present system, the emphasis is on the objectives set by the Government for each authority, in their annual letter of appropriation, after an evaluation of the results and effects of the authority’s activities in relation to its expenditure. This evaluation shall be made in the Annual Activity Report of each authority.
There are very high requirements and expectations on both SKI and SSI regarding openness and the provision of information services to the Government, the media and the public. Most official documents in Sweden are accessible to the media and to private citizens. All files of any administrative office are open to the public unless classified as ”secret”, according to the Freedom of the Press Act and the Secrecy Act. Reasons for secrecy could be related to military security, international relations, or the privacy of individuals concerned, because for instance they contain criminal or medical records, etc.. Nobody is obliged to justify his wish to see a public document or to reveal his identity to get access to the document.
E.20.1.2 Regulatory authorities
In this section the responsible authorities SKI and SSI will be described in relation to their missions, tasks and organizations. It should be mentioned that the offices of SKI and SSI are located in Stockholm, and that regulatory personnel are not stationed at any of the nuclear sites.
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E.20.1.2.1 Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI)
General
The Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate’s (SKI) organization, mission and tasks eminate from the Act on NuclearActivities(1984:3),theOrdinanceonNuclearActivities(1984:14),theOrdinancewithInstructionsfor the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (1988:523) and the Government’s annual letter of appropriation.
Organization
Under the Director General, SKI is organised in three Offices, namely
-Office of Reactor Safety (R) with
departments for: Inspection, Plant Safety Assessment, Reactor Technology and Structural Integrity, Man Technology Organisation
- Office of Nuclear
(N)
-Office of Nuclear Waste Safety (K)
and five departments reporting directly to the Director General, namely
- Department of Communication and
PR
- Department of Research
- Department of Administration
- Department of Personnel
- Department of IT
Figure E2: The SKI organisation
The Swedish International Project Nuclear Safety (SIP), which administers Swedish nuclear safety assistance and participates in the multilateral assistance to the Central and East European countries, is operationally independent from SKI but reports directly to the Director General.
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The distribution of responsibilities, authorities and tasks are regulated in detail in the SKI quality system (SKIQ) and the annual Activity Plan. The Office of Nuclear Waste Safety is responsible for supervising and reviewing the current management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste. The Office also review the development of methods for future the handling and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste and for decommissioning and dismantling of nuclear facilities.
The Office is responsible for taking initiatives for research and development regarding safety with respect to methods for the handling, storage and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste that are used now and in the future as well as methods for the decommissioning and dismantling of nuclear installations.
In addition, the Office is responsible for the review of SKB’s
Mission and tasks
SKI has established the following goals for the regulatory activities:
-That Swedish nuclear installations shall have satisfactory protection in several barriers to prevent serious accidentsandincidentsoriginatingfromtechnology,organizationorcompetence,andwhichshouldalso prevent or reduce the dispersion of radioactive substances to the environment if an accident were to occur;
-ThatnuclearinstallationsandnuclearmaterialunderSwedishjurisdicationshallhavesufficientprotection against terrorist attacks, sabotage and theft;
-That the Swedish Government, in
-That disposal of spent fuel and nuclear waste shall be carried out in such a manner that potential leakage of radioactive substances to the environment over different
-That the nuclear industry shall conduct a comprehensive and appropriate research and development programmes so that safe handling and disposal of spent fuel and nuclear waste is accomplished;
-That methods will be in place for decommissioning and dismantling nuclear installations, and that sufficient funds are built up for the future financing of these activities;
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-That decision makers and the public shall be well informed about nuclear risks and safety, and about the handling and disposal of spent fuel and nuclear waste;
-That an active contribution shall be made to the development and strengthening of the international
Letter of appropriation from the Government
In the Government’s letter of appropriation for 2003 the following missions have been given to SKI in the field of nuclear waste safety:
Appropriate requirements
SKI’s requirements shall be clearly defined; both with regard to the technical design of facilities, and with regard to the licensee’s obligations to achieve high quality in
Supervision of the licensees’ responsibilities for safety
SKI shall supervise that the licensees’ have good control of safety in their facilities, and that the quality of their safety work is satisfactory.
Promote safety improvements
SKIshallpromotesafetyimprovementsatthelicensee’sfacilities,wheneverjustifiedbyoperatingexperience, or research and development and through international
Maintain and develop competence and knowledge
SKIshallpromotethemaintenanceanddevelopmentof nationalcompetenceinnuclearsafety.Furthermore, SKI shall develop the supervision and promote safety through research and the feedback of experience.
Active information, reporting and insight
SKI shall issue regular reports on the state of safety at the facilities and the quality of the licensees’ safetyrelated work, and, in general, actively communicate on circumstances and events within all areas of SKI’s responsibilities.
Similar missions have been given to SKI for reactor and nuclear materials safety, and for nuclear
These missions given by the Government are broken down by SKI into concrete regulatory objectives, priorities and production requirements. Since 1997 this has been done in a structure with missions and well defined activites for the Offices with allocated resources and accountable leaders. The missions are of a long-
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term, strategic character, which are divided into annual production requirements delegated by the Director General. The mission structure defines what is to be done; how it should be done in principle and it is regulated in SKI’s internal quality system (SKIQ). The Office directors, and the Director General, according to a regular schedule evaluate the results.
SKIQ
Over the past few years, SKI has devoted considerable effort to developing its regulatory processes and practices as a consequence of the decision taken in 1997 to develop and implement a new quality management system. This system (SKIQ) builds on the basic philosophy behind the Swedish Quality Award (similar to the EFQM model) of the Swedish Institute for Quality Development. The focus is on a systematic improvement of processes and practices. SKIQ currently covers:
1The tasks and missions of SKI
2 What is SKIQ? (a description of the
4Activity planning,
5 Ensuring the availability of competent staff (recruiting and training staff) 6 Development of the work environment
7 Document management and filing
8General internal administration
9 Regulatory supervisionprinciples and direction (documentation of the regulatory philosophy)
10Issuing of regulations and general recommendations
11Safety review of licensee applications
12Inspection and ”following current plant issues”
13National
14Experience feedback of safety related events and conditions
15Integrated assessments of safety and the control of nuclear materials
16International work
17Research
18Information (external and internal)
The documents are available to all staff through the Intranet. The system contributes considerably to enhancing the transparency and consistency of SKI’s decision making.
E.20.1.2.2 Swedish Radiation Protection Authority (SSI)
General
TheSwedishRadiationProtectionAuthority’s(SSI)organization,missionandtasksemnanatefromtheRadiation ProtectionAct(1988:220),theRadiationProtectionOrdinance(1988:293),theOrdinancewithInstructionsfor the Radiation Protection Authority (1988:295) and the Government’s annual letter of appropriation.
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Organization
The SSI operates within four main areas:
-Nuclear energy supervision and emergency preparedness against radiation accidents
-General supervision
-Environmental supervision
-Radiation protection research
The organization of SSI is shown in Figure #. SSI is organized in four departments.
Department of Occupational and Medical Exposures with programmes for:
-Nuclear installations;
-Industrial and research installations;
-Medical installations;
-National laboratory for ionising radiation.
Department of Waste Management and Environmental Protection with programmes for:
-Installations and transport;
-Repositories and siting.
Department of Emergency Preparedness and Environmental Assessment with programmes for:
-Emergency preparedness and IT;
-Natural and
-Environmental Analysis.
Department of Administration responsible for:
-Economy;
-Personnel;
-Legal services and registry;
-Internal services.
Two offices reporting directly to the Director General:
-Office for Information;
-Office for DG secretariat.
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Figure E3: The SSI organisation
In addition to the four departments there is a special department for radiation protection support to the East European countries: the International Development
SSI - Quality requirements
At the SSI a number of documents, approved by the Director General or heads of the departments, provides descriptions of administrative routines, work plans and guidelines in order to establish and maintain standard of quality in the work performed by the authoritiy. Quality improvements are a continuously ongoing process with the purpose of developing and adjusting the authority’s work toward changing demands from the society.
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Mission and tasks
SSI’s role in radiation protection is to issue regulations and norms and to ensure that they are adhered to through inspections, to inform, educate and give advice, and to monitor radiation levels in the environment. SSI also has a central role in the national emergency preparedness organization in the event of a radiation accident. Furthermore, SSI administers research projects with the purpose of increasing the knowledge concerning the occurrence and effects of radiation. In the Government’s annual letter of appropriation, some areas are pointed out that should be paid particular attention. one of these areas is that spent fuel and radioactive waste shall be taken care of safely from a radiation protection point of view. Generation of radioactive waste, as well as the emission of radiation, shall as far as possible be limited. Further the decommissioning of nuclear installations should be performed in such a way that radiation doses to workers and the general public, and the radioactive waste produced, as well as the transportation of waste, are all dealt with in a safe manner from radiological point of view.
TheInstructionforSSIidentifiesanumberof specialresponsibilities.Thosedirectlyandindirectlyrelated to waste management are:
-Acquire detailed knowledge of the risks associated with radiation and attentively follow developments in the fields of biological radiation effects and radiation physics;
-Have central
-Undertake well defined research and development in the radiation protection field;
-Promote the creation and observance of international standards in the radiation protection field;
-Act as the
-Inform about radiation protection and about radiation and its characteristics and uses;
-Maintain emergency plans for the provision of advice to the authorities responsible for protecting the populationandforemergencyservicesconcerningtheradiationprotectionrequiredif anuclearaccident should occur within or outside the country, and also concerning decontamination after emissions of radioactive substances;
-Be responsible for the
-Regulatory matters concerning transports and shipments of radioactive waste;
-Maintainanationalregisterof radiationdosesthatemployeeshavebeensubjectedtoormaybesubjected to in connection with activities involving radiation, and issue personal dose control documents (dose passports) for such employees;
-Continuously evaluate the radiation exposure of the population as a whole as well as of critical groups;
The areas of high priority today are:
-Operation of nuclear power plants,
-Radioactive waste management,
-Emergency preparedness against radiation accidents,
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-Medical radiation exposures,
-Powerful sources of ionising radiation,
-Ultra violet radiation,
-Radon in dwellings,
-Magnetic fields, and
-International collaboration.
Safe Radiation Environment – an environmental quality objective
TheSwedishParliamentdecidedinNovember2001onobjectives,measuresandstrategiesaimedatachieving fifteen environmental quality objectives described in the Government’s Bill 2000/01:130.
One of the environmental quality objectives is a Safe Radiation Environment. SSI has the main responsi-
SSI is responsible for a programme for the environmental monitoring of radiation, both as emissions and local sources, and their influence on human beings and the environment. The environmental monitoring programme will become a valuable tool for supervision and research, and also for the national radiation protection preparedness.
Government financing supporting progress towards a Safe Radiation Environment has so far focused on support for a national environmental monitoring programme, and for educating the public on the harmful effects of too much exposure to ultraviolet radiation from the sun.
E.20.2 | Human and financial resources |
E.20.2.1 | Human resources |
Currently SKI has a staff of 118 (2002). Of these, 14 belong to the Office of Nuclear Waste Safety.
With the exception of the administrative personnel, most of the SKI staff is comprised of professional scientists or engineers; seven persons have qualified behavioural science training. In 2002 the distribution in educational backgrounds was the following:
Level | Women | Men | Total |
Post graduate degree (lic, PhD) | 5 | 19 | 24 |
Bachelor, master | 26 | 38 | 64 |
Secondary high school | 17 | 8 | 25 |
Other education | 4 | 1 | 5 |
Total | 52 | 66 | 118 |
Table E1: The educational level of the SKI staff
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At SSI 111 persons are employed (2003). Of these approximately 25 are occupied with matters in direct connection to the radioactive waste. Most of the staff is engineers and scientists in the area of physics and radiation physics. There are also physicians, biologists, lawyers, communication experts and administrative personnel. The distribution of education background in 2002 was as follows:
Level | Women | Men | Total |
Post graduate degree (lic, PhD) | 6 | 18 | 24 |
Bachelor, master | 26 | 26 | 52 |
Secondary high school | 10 | 10 | 20 |
Other education | 7 | 8 | 15 |
Total | 49 | 62 | 111 |
Table E2: The educational level of the SSI staff 2002.
SKI and SSI have on average a higher level of education than other public and private administrative organizations in Sweden. The staff of both authorities has a high level of technical and scientific competence, and enjoys high international esteem. About 20% of the staff have
As both authorities are
Both authorities have one inspector per site designated as
TheSSIinspectorsaremainlyconcernedwithoccupationalradiationprotection,environmentalmonitoring and waste management related activities.
Internationally the numbers of regulatory staff at SKI and SSI are quite small for the size of nuclear programme in Sweden. Each professional staff member is typically involved in several tasks, for instance inspections, regulatory reviews and approval tasks, revision of regulations, handling research contracts and participation in public information activities, each requiring his or her expertise.
Experience during the recent years has shown that the staff is sufficient to carry out normal routine regulatory work. However, as soon as some major event occurs requiring a mobilisation of investigation and assessment resources, the number of staff is not sufficient to handle also the regular and more longterm issues without delays. For instance revision and development of regulations, as well as research, staff training programmes and the development of the internal quality assurance system are often delayed under such circumstances.
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E.20.2.2 | Financial resources |
The SKI and SSI regulatory activities are financed as part of the state budget. The Government considers proposals from the two authorities for activities during the next financial year, in the same way as for other agencies. The Government evaluates proposed activities, and the result of the evaluation is presented in the budget bill. Resources are allocated in the Government’s letter of appropriation, prescribing in addition directives for the activities.
Contrary to what is normal for state budget financed agencies; the costs for the regulatory activities have a neutral impact on the state budget. The costs are paid by the nuclear facilities to the Government as regulatory, research and emergency preparedness fees.
Appropriations available to SKI and SSI shall cover Administration costs and Research costs. The resources available for 2002 are shown in the table below. Administration includes all costs for staff salaries and operational activities.
Appropriation | SKI total | SSI total |
Administration | 84 360 | 86 700 |
- Salaries | 58 080 | 52 020 |
- Operational costs | 26 280 | 34 680 |
Research | 69 270 | 12 000 |
Total | 153 630 | 98 700 |
Table E3: The SKI and SSI budgets for 2002 in kSEK
About 75% of the SKI administration budget covers fixed costs, such as salaries and costs for premises, telecommunications,etc.Theremaining25%coversthevariablecosts,mainlytravellingandconsultancycosts. About 60% of the resources are estimated to be used for reactor and nuclear materials safety work; and about 10% for information activities. The remainder is used for safeguards and nuclear waste safety work.
The research budget assogned to the Office of Nuclear Waste Safety is used to contract university institutions and consultant companies, in Sweden and abroad. It is also used to contribute to some international projects(organisedbyOECD/NEA,IAEAandEU).Nearlyalltheresearchcoversthefinaldisposalof spent nuclear fuel. About 25 % is used for the engineered barrier system (canister and bentonite), and about the same amount for site investigation and chemistry. Safety assessment and models for radionuclide transport takes about 35 %. The remaining 15 % is used for research on cost estimates and risk communication.
In 2002, the research expenditures for the Office of Nuclear Waste Safety were distributed over research programmes as shown in the table below [kSEK].
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Research programme | Expenditures 2002 (kSEK) |
Encapsulation of spent fuel | 1 690 |
Bentonite and coupled processes | 1 674 |
Site characterisation | 1 102 |
Chemistry | 2 429 |
550 | |
Geosphere radionuclide transport | 3 052 |
Safety Assessment methodology | 1 143 |
Cost Estimation | 727 |
Risk Communication | 834 |
Other | 193 |
Total | 13 394 |
Table E4: Breakdown of the research budget for the Office of Nuclear Waste
Safety [SEK ’000].
The SSI research budget is used for research in all areas of radiation protection, relating to ionising radiation as well as
Selected research programmes for the Department of Waste Management and Environmental Protection during 2002, is shown in table E5. The total research budget was aproximately 5 438 kSEK
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Research programme
Biosphere modelling
Environmental protection
Regulatory guidance
Risk assessment
Risk communication
Studies of the geosphere/biosphere interface
Table E5: Selected research programmes for the Department of Waste Management and Environment
E.20.3 | Relations between SKI and SSI |
The rational for having two regulatory bodies has been officially discussed on several occasions. In the Government bill of 1984 on the Act on Nuclear Activities it was stated:
”... A double supervisory organization may provide a greater guarantee that the problems will come to light... At the same time ... two supervisory authorities in this area imposes heavy demands on
On several occasions the Government has requested SSI and SKI to investigate and report on the possibilities of increasing and improving the
The possibility for overlapping responsibilities was acknowledged in the preparation of both the Act on Nuclear Activities and the Radiation Protection Act and was again confirmed in the revision of the Act on Nuclear Activities in 1991.
”The overlap is necessary in order to avoid that any safety issue fall outside of the regulatory system. Safety issues are to make sure that all different barriers, in the fuel, the reactor, the containment, transport casks, packages and storage facilities work as intended in order to prevent any harmful amounts of radiation to reach the environment. In parallel it is a radiation protection issue to prevent the radiation, which anyhow could arise during normal operation, abnormal barrier functions or accidents, to produce harmful effects on people and the environment. This means that both authorities should
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is a member of the SSI board, and vice versa. Both authorities are represented on their respective research committees.
-organised consultations in connection with specific issues. This means for example that personnel from the two authorities participate in joint regulatory assessment groups;
-production of the joint annual report to the Government on the status of the safety and radiation protection;
-joint review of applications for disposal of nuclear waste, with regards to the
A formal
In the work to develop the new general safety regulations of SKI, constructive discussions were held betweentheauthorities,andmorecleardefinitionshavebeenachievedconcerningtheregulatoryresponsibilities of the two authorities, especially concerning emergency preparedness and nuclear waste management.
E.20.4 | Independence of the regulatory functions |
Theroleof SKIandSSIisexclusivelytohavearegulatoryfunction.Thedescriptionaboveshows(sectionE.19) the clearly established legislation, which makes it possible to establish the independent regulatory role.
E.20.5 | Swedish National Council for Nuclear Waste, KASAM |
KASAM, the Swedish National Council for Nuclear Waste was established in 1985, and is an independent committee attached to the Ministry of the Environment. KASAM’s mandate is to study issues relating to nuclear waste and the decommissioning of nuclear installations and to advise the government and certain authorities on these issues. The Government has authorised the Minister of Environment to appoint the Chairman and up to ten other Members.
Themembersareindependentexpertswithindifferentareasof importanceforthedisposalof radioactive waste, not only within technology and science but also within areas such as ethics, psychology, law and the social sciences.
According to its instructions (Dir. 1992:72), KASAM shall:
-present a report on the state of knowledge in the nuclear waste area every third year. The latest report was issued in 2001;
-present an independent review of the research and development programme for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel which the nuclear power utilities prepare once every three years;
-act as an advisory committee - upon request - to SKI and SSI on matters connected with nuclear waste and the decommissioning of nuclear power plants.
Besides technical seminars, KASAM also arranges seminars with the aim of opening up a dialogue between different interest groups which are seriously interested in nuclear
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E.20.6 Conclusion
The Swedish Party complies with the obligations of Article 20.
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SECTION F – OTHER GENERAL SAFETY PROVISIONS
ARTICLE 21. RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LICENCE HOLDER
1.Each Contracting Party shall ensure that prime responsibility for the safety of spent fuel or radioactive waste management rests with the holder of the relevant licence and shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that each such licence holder meets its responsibility.
2.If there is no such licence holder or other responsible party, the responsibility rests with the Contracting Party which has jurisdiction over the spent fuel or over the radioactive waste.
F.21. | RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LICENCE HOLDER |
F.21.1 | The legal requirements |
F.21.1.1 | The prime responsibility |
The Act on Nuclear Activities is very clear about the prime responsibility for safety:
10 §: The holder of a licence shall be responsible for ensuring that all measures are taken which are needed for
(1)maintaining safety, with reference to the nature of the activities and conditions in which they are conducted,
(2)ensuringthesafehandlingof thefinaldisposalof nuclearwastearisingintheactivitiesornuclearmaterial arising therein and not reused, and
(3)the safe decommissioning and dismantling of plants in which nuclear activities are no longer to be conducted.
SKI’s safety regulations (SKIFS 1998:1) further clarify this responsibility through strong provisions on safety management, design and construction, safety analysis and review, operations, nuclear materials, spent fuel and waste management as well as documentation and archiving.
The licensee´s responsibility is accordingly not limited merely to formal compliance with requirements imposed when the licence is/was granted. It is clearly pointed out in the regulations that safety shall not only be maintained but also developed continuously. Thus continuous preventive safety work is legally required, includingsafetyreassessments,analysisof eventsinthelicensee’sownandotherfacilities,analysisof relevant new safety standards and practices and research results. Any reasonable measure useful for safety shall be taken as a result of this proactive and continuous safety work.
According to the Radiation Protection Act the license holder has to take the measures and precautions necessary to prevent or counteract injury to human health and the environment. The provision implies that
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all measures should be taken to improve radiation protection; it is not sufficient only to follow regulations or conditionsissuedbytheresponsibleauthority.TheGovernmentortheauthorityassignedbytheGovernment may also issue further regulations as required for protection against, or control of, radiation in the respects specified in the act .
In SSI Regulations on Dose Limits at Work with Ionising Radiation (SSI FS 1998:4) limitation of radiation doses to workers and the general public at practices with ionising radiation is stipulated. Anyone who conducts a practice with ionising radiation shall ensure that the practice is justified by which is meant that the use of radiation gives a benefit that exceeds the estimated health detriment caused by the radiation. The radiation protection measures shall be optimised by which is meant that human exposures are as low as reasonably achievable social and economic factors taken into account and no dose limit in these regulations is exceeded (these regulations are further explained in section F.24.1.1)
F.21.1.2 | The ultimate responsibility |
The State has an obvious overall responsibility for activities regulated in the Act on Nuclear Activities. Thus, the ultimate responsibility for ensuring the safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste rests with the State. AccordingtoaGovernmentstatement,thefinalresponsibilityof theState”isamatterof course”.Nofurther clarification of the State responsibility is therefore considered necessary in the legislation.
F.21.2 | Measures taken by the licence holders |
SKB is the licensee for CLAB and SFR. CLAB is situated at the Oskarshamn site and personnel from OKG were heavily involved in the construction and commissioning of the facility. SKB has therefore made an agreement with OKG for operation of the facility. For similar reasons, SKB has made an agreement with FKA for the operation of SFR. The management systems for CLAB are therefore fully integrated with the management system for the operation of the NPP’s at Oskarshamn, and the management system for SFR is fully integrated with the management system for the operation of the NPP’s at Forsmark. In addition to the regulatory review of the overall management and performance of FKA and OKG, SKB reviews and audits both organisations regarding the management of CLAB and SFR. SKB has personnel specifically assigned to ensure that the operation of CLAB is performed in accordance with the agreement with OKG, and that the performance of OKG is according to relevant regulatory requirements, especially regarding spent fuel management.
Similarily, SKB has personnel specifically assigned to ensure that operation of SFR is performed in accordance with the agreement with FKA, and that the performance of FKA is according to relevant regulatory requirements, especially regarding radioactive waste management.
As the responsible organisation for the
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F.21.3 | Regulatory control |
In the 1998 letter of appropriation the Government confirmed a revision of SKI’s mission and regulatory tasks, in order to make the division of roles between the regulatory authority and the licensees clearer. It was stated in the directives from the Government that it is a fundamental prerequisite for the SKI activities that the licensees have the full and undivided responsibility for safety. The basic missions of SKI are to define the contents of this safety responsibility, and to supervise how the licensees execute it.
For this SKI shall in particular:
-provide a clear definition of requirements,
-check compliance with requirements by supervision focusing on processes and activities, and
-initiate safety improvements.
In the Governments letter of appropriation (2002) for SSI it is stated that operation of activities involving radiation (e.g. nuclear activities, waste management and decommissioning) shall be conducted in a way that a safe radiation protection environment could be established in relation to workers and the public. SSI shall annually report to the Government on the regulatory and research measures taken by the authority in order to estimate the need to limit the risks in the treatment and the final disposal of the spent fuel and radioactive waste.
F.21.3.1 | Provide a clear definition of requirements |
Individual licensing conditions have been replaced by general regulations in the SKI Code of Regulations (SKIFS 1998:1). These regulations, which apply to most nuclear facilities, describe principals and are functional in order not to have a negative impact on licensee responsibility. Details about the regulations are provided in section E.
F.21.3.2 | Check compliance by supervision focusing on processes and activities |
In recent years, SKI’s supervision has focused more and more on processes and activities asit is considered the most
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F.21.3.3 | Initiate safety improvements |
Supervision focusing on processes and activities means that SKI will not spend as much resources as earlier on
F.21.4 Conclusion
The Swedish Party complies with the obligations of Article 21.
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ARTICLE 22. HUMAN AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:
(i)qualified staff are available as needed for
(ii)adequate financial resources are available to support the safety of facilities for spent fuel and radioactive waste management during their operating lifetime and for decommissioning;
(iii)financialprovisionis madewhich willenabletheappropriate institutionalcontrolsandmonitoring arrangements to be continued for the period deemed necessary following the closure of a disposal facility.
F.22 | HUMAN AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES |
F.22.1 | Regulatory requirements |
F.22.1.1 | Qualified staff during the operation lifetime |
The general safety regulations of SKI (SKIFS 1998:1) are specific about the staffing of the nuclear facilities. Long term planning is required of the licensees in order to ensure that they have enough staff with sufficient competence for all
The regulations also contain provisions that the staff must be fit for their duties. This implies medical requirements and tests for drugs, etc.. Such provisions have not been issued previously by SKI, but how the licensee manages the fitness for duty issues has been followed through inspections.
F.22.1.2 Adequate financial resources
During operation and for decommissioning
It is clear from the Swedish Act on Nuclear Activities that in order to obtain a licence, economical resources must be committed in order to manage the safety obligations mentioned in chapter 10. Every presumptive licensee must be assessed in this respect during the licencing procedure.
Provisionforfinancialresourcesduringdecommissioningisprovidedbymeansof investmentsingovernmentcontrolledfunds.LicenseesfornuclearpowerplantsmustpayafeetotheNuclearWasteFundonevery kWhproduced,accordingtotheActontheFinancingof FutureExpendituresforSpentFuel,etc(1992:1537) as described in section E.19.1.4. This is to ensure the financing of decommissioning, handling and disposal
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of spent fuel and nuclear waste, including the research needed for these activities.
The repository for radioactive operational waste (SFR) has been paid for directly by the nuclear power utilities and not by the Fund. Operational waste is not covered by the Act on the Financing of Future Expenses for Spent Nuclear Fuel etc. but is instead paid for by the nuclear power utilities at the time the waste is produced. However, final disposal in SFR of operational waste from CLAB is paid for through the Nuclear Waste Fund, since all of CLAB’s operations are financed by this Fund.
Provisions for institutional control and monitoring after the closure
As described in chapter F.26.1.1 the holder of a licence for nuclear activities shall be responsible for ensuring that all measures are taken that are needed for the safe decommissioning and dismantling of plants in which nuclear activities are no longer to be conducted. Institutional control and monitoring is not foreseen in the Swedish management system for spent fuel and radioactive waste. It follows that a licencee may be exempted from their responsibilities when decommissioning and dismantling has taken place and financial provisions for institutional control and monitoring after closure are not required.
The State has an overall responsibility for activities regulated in the Nuclear Activities Act as described in section F.21.1.2. It follows that if the need for institutional control and monitoring were to arise in the future, the State would be responsible for the arrangements and costs.
F.22.2 | Measures taken by the licence holders |
As described in the introduction, the nuclear power utilities have formed a jointly owned company, the SwedishNuclearFuelandWasteManagementCompany(SKB),tofulfiltheirobligationsregardingnuclearwaste management. SKB is assigned to make the annual estimates that form the basis for calculating the annual fee on every kWh produced that the licensees for nuclear power plants must pay to the Nuclear Waste Fund.
The NPP licensees also make two forms of guarantees available to the government in the event that the Nuclear Waste Fund should prove to be inadequate. The two types of guarantees serve different purposes.
F.22.3 Regulatory control
Qualified staff during operation
CompliancewiththerequirementsconcerningcompetenceassuranceinthegeneralsafetyregulationsSKIFS 1998:1 was inspected in 2000 at all the nuclear power sites. These inspections showed a need for improved analysis tools, in order to define competence requirements, for other personnel groups than operations personnel for whom a systematic approach has been used for several years. Work was initiated within the implementing organisations at all the sites to improve the analysis tools, and was in principle completed by the end of 2002. Both CLAB and SFR benefited from these improvements as the management systems for operation those facilities are fully integrated with the management systems for the operation of the nuclear power plants at OKG and FKA respectively.
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Adequate financial resources
SKI reviews the nuclear power utilities’ cost estimates for dismantling and final disposal. Furthermore, SKI reviews the size of the guarantee that the nuclear power utilities must make available to ensure that the financing system will be able to meet future needs. After its annual review, SKI submits a proposal for the size of the fees, and of the guarantees required, to the government.
F.22.4 Conclusion
The Swedish Party complies with the obligations of Article 22.
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ARTICLE 23. QUALITY ASSURANCE
Each Contracting Party shall take the necessary steps to ensure that appropriate quality assurance programmes concerning the safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste management are established and implemented.
F.23 | QUALITY ASSURANCE |
F.23.1 | Regulatory requirements |
The general safety regulations (SKIFS 1988:1) apply to the operation of all types of nuclear installations, including facilities for the treatment, storage and disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste. CLAB and SFR are operated by OKG and FKA respectively, and integrated in the management systems for the operation of the nuclear power plants at the sites. The main requirements with regard to quality assurance can be summarised as follows:
-the licensee shall ensure that the activities of the facility arecontrolled and developed with the support of a quality system, which covers those activities which are important for safety.
-the quality system shall be kept
-the applicability, suitability and effectiveness of the quality system shall be systematically and periodically inspected by a quality assurance function, which shall have an independent position in relation to those activities that are to be audited.
The general recommendations to the legally binding regulations point out that in order to cover all activities important to safety, the scope of the quality system should not be too narrow. The IAEA Code and Guides forqualityassurancearementionedasguidancefordevelopingthesystem.Therecommendationsalsoaddress the integrity and independent position of the auditing function directly under the plant manager, the competence of the audit teams, the audit intervals, and that audits of the
F.23.2 | Measures taken by the licence holders |
F.23.2.1 | Quality programmes |
In Sweden the general description of the quality and management system is normally regarded as the plant’s mostimportantdocument,asitgivesanoverviewof therequirementsandthewayinwhichtheorganization
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is supposed to work in order to meet these demands. The documents are to be kept available for everyone in the plant organization, and also for others who are affected by the information in the documents, for instance contractors, consultants and the regulatory authorities. All documents in the quality and management system are under controlled revision, regularly or when needed, in order to reflect the actual situation at the plant at all times.
Development of quality assurance programmes at the Swedish NPPs began during the late 1970’s. These programmes have since been developed continuously over the years, and have, of course, been affected by regulations and expectations from the regulatory body and business associates. In the beginning the quality manuals of the NPPs were limited to descriptions of routines in a number of functional areas, but they lacked clear statements of the objectives and requirements. During the 1990´s there has been considerable developmentof theconcept,andthequalityassuranceprogrammesof theSwedishNPPsaretodayintegrated in the total management system of every plant.
The main principles are the same for the quality and management systems of the Swedish NPPs, with documents on three levels. The first level documents are issued by the plant director. Included in these are typically a vision to strive after, a business idea which outlines the mission of the facilty, objectives for different areas and strategies to accomplish the objectives. Objective typically exist for:
-nuclear safety,
-occupational safety,
-economic results,
-confidence from society,
-environmental impact, and
-personnel responsibility.
A comprehensive description of the organization with responsibilities for functions and processes, division of responsibility and management principles are also included in the
The second level documents of the management system contain committments from the responsible managers on how to work with the tasks delegated by the plant director in the
Thethirdlevelof documentsincludesinstructionsforspecificactivitiesandtasksincludedinthedifferent areas of responsibility as defined by the second level documents.
In addition to the three levels of documents, there can also be various types of administrative handbooks
The purpose of the quality and management system is to achieve a unified and consistent control system forallplantactivitiesbasedonclearpoliciesandmeasurableobjectives.Thereshouldbecompletetraceability from policy to work instruction.
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The standard ISO 9001:2000 for quality management systems, lead to more emphasis on processes and attempts to implement
F.23.2.2 | Quality system implementation and quality audit programmes |
Every Swedish NPP has developed a quality audit programme, which is used to monitor how well the quality system is implemented and applied in the organization on different levels, as well as the efficiency of the system to ensure quality and safety.
SKB is the licensee for CLAB and SFR as described in section F.21.2. SKB has agreements with OKG for the operation of the CLAB facility and with FKA for the operation of SFR. SKB therefore reviews and audits both organisations regarding management of CLAB and SFR. Being responsible for the
F.23.2.3 | Quality audits of suppliers |
According to the SKI requirements on quality assurance, all purchases of goods and services which might have an affect, directly or indirectly, on the protection and safety of the environment or personnel, shall be made from suppliers that through quality audits, or in other ways, have shown that they can comply with quality requirements. The ambition of the NPPs is not limited to these demands, but also includes suppliers of goods and services, where malfunctioning might cause considerable consequences for the NPPs. A review of a supplier includes not only a quality audit, but also a technical and commercial evaluation of the equipment or services offered. Since 1998 a review of the supplier’s environmental management system is included in the review. These aspects will, however, not be covered in this report.
The purpose of a quality audit of a potential supplier is not only to evaluate whether the supplier has implementedandusesadocumentedqualitysystem,butalsotoevaluatethesupplier’scapabilityof providing the correct and expected quality. Quality audits are typically performed by teams of
Aqualityauditresultsinareport,whichmustbeacceptedbythecompanyreviewed,beforebeingpresented to the purchasing organization. If deficiencies are revealed during the audit, the organization under reviewed is requested to describe what measures will be taken to correct the deficiencies, in order to be accepted as a supplier of products or services to the organisation. In certain cases a
Approved quality audits accomplished by any of the other Swedish NPPs are normally considered comparable with a plant´s own quality audits and, consequently, audit duplications of a given supplier can be avoided.Simplifiedqualityauditsorevaluationof previousexperienceof asupplieraresometimesacceptable, when purchasing goods and services dedicated for use in the lower quality classes.
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F.23.4 | Regulatory control |
SKI’s own qaulity system includes guidance for
SKI also makes assessments of quality assurance processes when reviewing large modification plans, for example the onging extention of CLAB. The licencees´s plans for quality audits and the reports of the audits that have been performed are also subject to review by SKI.
In general SKI has been satisfied with the implementation of quality assurance. The development of the integrated approach to quality and management systems has taken several years and considerable effort. In some cases implementation has not been well prepared, and has been slowed down due to insufficient staff resources, or lack of support from all organizational levels. Organizational changes have also affected the implementationwork,andmaderevisionsnecessary.Theregulatoryexperienceshowsthenecessityof having a living quality audit programme at the plants, and using the audits to develop quality and safety. This means that the audits should not only investigate compliance with the documented routines, but also the suitability and the efficiency of the routines in line with the concept of a learning organization.
F.23.5 Conclusion
The Swedish Party complies with the obligations of Article 23.
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ARTICLE 24. OPERATIONAL RADIATION PROTECTION
1.Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that during the operating lifetime of a spent fuel or radioactive waste management facility:
(i)the radiation exposure of the workers and the public caused by the facility shall be kept as low as reasonably achievable, economic and social factors being taken into account;
(ii)no individual shall be exposed, in normal situations, to radiation doses which exceed national prescriptions for dose limitation which have due regard to internationally endorsed standards on radiation protection; and
(iii)measures are taken to prevent unplanned and uncontrolled releases of radioactive materials into the environment.
2.Each Contracting Party shall take appropriate steps to ensure that discharges shall be limited:
(i)to keep exposure to radiation as low as reasonably achievable, economic and socialfactors being taken into account; and
(ii)so that no individual shall be exposed, in normal situations, to radiation doses which exceed national prescriptions for dose limitation which have due regard to internationally endorsed standards on radiation protection.
3.Each Contracting Party shall take appropriate steps to ensure that during the operating lifetime of a regulated nuclear facility, in the event that an unplanned or uncontrolled release of radioactive materials into the environment occurs, appropriate corrective measures are implemented to control the release and mitigate its effects.
F.24 | OPERATIONAL RADIATION PROTECTION |
F.24.1 | Regulatory requirements |
F.24.1.1 | Regulatory requirements on occupational radiation protection |
To ensure low radiation exposure from nuclear facilities, including facilities for the management of spent fuel or radioactive waste, Sweden has a number of regulatory requirements. Fundamental radiation protection requirements for workers and the public are given in:
SSI FS 1998:4 Regulations on Dose Limits at Work with Ionising Radiation.
The regulations apply to limitation of radiation doses to workers and the general public at practices with ionising radiation. The regulations also apply to the protection of pregnant women that may be exposed to ionising radiation in their work. In the general obligations it is stipulated that anyone who conducts a practice with ionising radiation shall ensure that
-the practice is justified by which is meant that the use of radiation gives a benefit that exceeds the esti-
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mated health detriment caused by the radiation,
-the radiation protection measures are optimised by which is meant that human exposures are as low as reasonably achievable social and economic factors taken into account and
-no dose limit in these regulations is exceeded.
For workers in general the annual effective dose limit is 50 mSv. In addition for five consecutive years the effective dose limit is 100 mSv. Concerning the general public the sum of the dose contributions from practices with ionising radiation shall not exceed
-1 mSv annual effective dose,
-15 mSv annual equivalent dose to the lens of the eye or
-50 mSv annual equivalent dose to the skin evaluated as the mean equivalent dose over an area of 1 cm2 regardless of the size of the exposed area.
Effective dose is defined as the sum of all equivalent doses to organs or tissues, weighted for their different sensitivity for radiation. Equivalent dose is defined as an absorbed dose to an organ or tissue, weighted by factors taking into account the biological efficiency of the kind of radiation.
SSI takes the dose limits into account when judging conditions for licenses. As several practices may contribute to the exposure of an individual, specified regulations or conditions are given for the various practices.
SSI FS 1998:5 Regulations on Monitoring and Reporting of Individual Radiation Doses.
The regulations apply to measurements of individual radiation doses to workers of category A engaged in work with ionising radiation and reporting of such doses to the National Dose Database. The National Dose Database is a database at SSI that records measured individual doses.
SSI FS 1996:3 Regulations on Outside Workers at Work with Ionising Radiation
The regulations apply to outside workers of category A working within controlled areas in Sweden and on cases when Swedish workers of category A perform similar tasks in other countries.
SSI FS 1998:6 Regulations on Medical Examinations for Work Involving Ionizing Radiation
The regulations apply to medical examinations of individuals in Category A. The regulations also apply to medical examinations of outside workers that will work within a controlled area. Category A and controlled area is defined below in SSI FS 1998:3.
SSI FS 1998:3 Regulations on Categorization of Workplaces and Workers at Work with Ionising Radiation. The regulations apply to practices with ionising radiation where humans may get radiation doses such that
-the annual effective dose exceeds 1 (mSv) or
-the annual equivalent dose to the lens of the eye exceeds 15 mSv or
-the annual equivalent dose to the hands, forearms or the skin exceeds 50 mSv.
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Anyone who runs a practice shall classify the workers into category A or B. A worker shall belong to category A if the likelihood is not negligible that
-the annual effective dose exceeds 6 mSv or
-the annual equivalent dose to the lens of the eye exceeds 45 mSv or
-the annual equivalent dose to the hands, forearms or the skin exceeds 150 mSv.
WorkersnotbelongingtocategoryAshallbelongtocategoryB.Forthoseworkerssurveillanceof dosesshall be performed to such an extent that it is possible to demonstrate that this classification is correct.
A workplace where the workers may get any of the annual doses pointed out above or from which radioactive contamination may be spread shall be a controlled area. A controlled area shall be delineated and access restricted to authorised persons by which is meant such persons who have been sufficiently trained.
With all the above regulations as a basis two regulations specially directed towards nuclear facilities have been formulated:
-Regulations on radiation protection of workers exposed to ionising radiation at nuclear facilities (SSI FS 2000:10)
-Regulations on radiation protection manager at nuclear facilities (SSI FS 2000:11)
The most important requirements in SSI FS 2000:10 and SSI FS 2000:11 are listed below:
Optimisation
The work shall be performed in such a way that human exposures are limited as far as reasonably achievable, social and economical factors being taken into account. For this purpose the
The goals and actions of control shall be adjusted with respect to the prerequisite of the facility and be drawn up to take care of daily as well as
Information and education
All personnel, permanent staff and contractors, shall be informed about radiation protection prior to work within a controlled area (categorisation of work places and workers at work with ionising radiation is defined in SSI FS 1998:3). Repetitive information shall thereafter be given at least every third year.
All persons who are working with matters related to radiation protection or operation and maintenance, as well as external workers holding posts as foremen, shall have gone through an education programme, including among other things the fundamental principles of radiation protection. The work shall be adjusted
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withregardtothekindandextentof thework,aswellastheenvironmentinwhichitisperformed.Repetitive education shall be given as necessary.
Medical examination
Medical examination for radiological activities is regulated in special regulations (SSI FS 1998:6).
The
Controlled areas
Within a controlled area, premises and places shall be especially marked and admittance restricted, if the risk of receiving a yearly effective dose exceeding 50 mSv in these places is not negligible.
Smoking and consumption of food are forbidden in controlled areas. Beverages may be obtained from a drinking fountain, or maybe served within special areas.
For the purpose of showing that the requirement on categorisation of working places is met, monitoring of areas outside the controlled area shall be performed.
Visitors
Visitors of the general public in a controlled area must only be permitted if guided by a responsible person and if a prearranged plan is followed. Visitors to controlled areas must be at least 14 years old.
Personal dose monitoring
All personnel, permanent staff as well as external workers, at work within a controlled area, shall carry an individual dose meter that meets the requirements stated in the SSI regulations on monitoring and reporting of individual radiation doses (SSI FS 1998:5).
All persons within a controlled area that is classified with respect to surface or air contamination shall undergo contamination checks before leaving the area. If there is reason to suspect that individuals have been internally contaminated, or if internal contamination is confirmed, all such individuals shall undergo whole body counting.
Dose limits at nuclear facilities are the same as those recommended by the ICRP, i.e. 100 mSv effective dose over a 5 year period and 50 mSv for one year. Dose limits are stated in SSIs regulations on dose limits at work with ionising radiation (SSI FS 1998:4).
Instruments and equipment
All instruments used for radiation protection and the control of radiation doses shall be calibrated and undergo regular functional checks .
Transport within the facility
All transportation within the industrial area shall, as far as is practical, be in accordance with the regulations
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on the transport of hazardous goods on roads with regard to the requirements on
Work with irradiated fuel elements
Work with dismantling irradiated fuel elements at a reactor, where single fuel rods are handled, must not take place earlier than five days after the reactor is put into the cold shut down mode. During work with fuel rods only persons directly involved in the work may be present. Air monitoring shall be performed continuously during the work at the working position for fuel dismantling. Documented instructions for alarms and evacuation of the premises shall be available. The instructions shall be well known by all persons working on the premises.
Policy in the event of fuel damage
A documented policy for the event of fuel damage shall be established at all facilities where nuclear reactors are involved. The policy shall include a description of the facility’s strategy for avoiding fuel damage as far as reasonably possible. In addition there shall be a strategy for how to handle a situation with fuel damage.
Reporting to SSI
An annual written report shall be sent to SSI that contains a compilation of the radiation doses to personnel as well as the results of the radiation surveillance outside the controlled area.
Any work for which the total collective dose is expected to exceed 100 mmanSv shall be reported in writing to SSI in advance. No later than 3 months after the any work for which the total collective dose has exceeded 100 mmanSv is finished , a written report shall be sent to SSI that includes the experience obtained concerning radiation protection matters.
Anyinternalcontaminationoccurring,inonesingleevent,whichiscalculatedtogiveacommittedeffective dose exceeding 5 mSv shall be reported to SSI. The report shall comprise the type of intake, the estimated committed effective dose and the basis for those calculations, as well as the cause and circumstances of the internal contamination. The report shall be sent as soon as possible after the contamination has been discovered.
If there has been an event that has implied, or could have implied, that any given dose limit (SSI FS 1998:4) is exceeded, a report shall be sent to SSI as soon as possible.
Documentation and filing of measurement data
Primary data on the evaluation of individual radiation doses due to external as well as internal exposure shall be kept at least one year after the calendar year in which the measurements were made. From the final results of these evaluations it shall be possible to correlate a measured dose to the person that received that dose. The final results shall be available in a central register that is approved by SSI.
Radiation protection manager
The licencee shall appoint a radiation protection manger. This person shall be approved by SSI and have sufficient competence in matters related to radiation protection (SSI has issued general advice on the com-
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petence of radiation protection experts, SSI FS 2000:6). The manger shall e.g. ensure that the individual and collective doses are followed up, actively work for acceptable radiation levels in the nuclear facility, and ensure that local rules are established in order to avoid unacceptable or unnecessary doses.
F.24.1.2 Regulatory requirements on environmental radiation protection
In 1977 SSI issued the first general regulations concerning the limitation of discharges of radioactive substances from nuclear power plants. Minor revisions of the regulations have been made during the period of more than twenty years that the regulations have been in use (SSI FS 1991:5).
A major revision was made in
The regulations apply for nuclear power reactors, research reactors, fuel fabrication facilities, storages for spent fuel and waste disposal facilities during their operational phase (shallow land burial sites are excluded). The previous regulations were only applicable for nuclear power plants. Other facilities were regulated separately but basically in the same manner.
Purpose of the discharge regulations
The main purpose with the new regulations is to limit and decrease the discharges of radionuclides from nuclear facilities. The limitation of discharges of radioactive substances from nuclear facilities shall be based on optimisation of radiation protection and use of the best available techniques.
Dose constraints and critical group
According to SSI’s regulations (SSI FS 1998:4) the dose limit for members of the public is 1 mSv per year from all contributing artificial radiation sources. This limit is also in accordance with EU BSS. Taking into consideration that an individual may be affected by dose contributions from more than one facility/source, a dose constraint for a particular site is set to 0.1 mSv per year in the regulations (SSI FS 2000:12). This means that the facility has to show that the doses from discharges are below 0.1 mSv per year to the most affected individual. When taking into account that some of the radionuclides will be present in the environment for a long time, it is important to compare the dose constraint of 0.1 mSv with the dose commitment from a yearly discharge, rather than with the dose from the discharge. SSI has chosen to set the integration time to 50 years when calculating the dose commitment. When the calculated dose is 0.01 mSv or more per calender year, realistic calculations of radiation doses shall be conducted for the most affected area. These calculations shall be based on measured dispersion data and knowledge within the most affected area.
Discharge limits
No nuclide specific discharge limitations have been formally defined by SSI. Limitation is being implemented through the restriction of dose to the critical group. Thus, for each nuclear facility and for each radionuclide discharge,
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Previouslyemissionstoairof
Use of best available technology
The best available technology shall be used for monitoring all discharges at nuclear facilities. However, for nuclear power reactors, in particular, a new concept, reference and target values, has been introduced.
A reference value is a value for the release of individual radionuclides, or groups of radionuclides that indicate the optimal operation of the reactor in terms of performance and management of systems of importance for the generation, elimination or delay of discharges into the environment. Nuclide(s) should be chosenonthebasisof,e.g.,impactorindicativefunctionforsystemperformance.Theoperatorisresponsible for formulation of reference values for a specified time, and they are to be scrutinized by SSI.
Atargetvaluewilldefinetheambitionof theoperatorintermsof dischargelimitation,takingintoaccount, inter alia, BAT. The target value is to be defined by the operator, as well as the time frame within which the operator plans to reach the target.
The discharge of radioactive substances to the environment shall be measured. In particular, discharges to the atmosphere via the main stacks of nuclear power reactors shall be controlled through continuous
Releases to water shall be controlled through the measurements of representative samples for each release pathway. The analyses shall cover
Environmental monitoring shall be conducted in the area surrounding a nuclear facility in accordance with a programme formulated by SSI.
According to the regulations, quality assurance and documentation of environmental monitoring shall be provided in accordance with the principles of the ISO 9000.
Reporting
The nuclear power reactor licensees shall report to SSI annually the measures that have been adopted, or that are planned to be adopted, to limit radioactive releases with the aim of achieving the specified target value. If reference values are exceeded, the measures that are planned to achieve the reference values shall be reported.
Releases of radioactive substances to the air and water as well as results from environmental monitoring shall be reported
Events leading to increased releases of radioactive substances from nuclear facilities shall be reported as soon as possible to SSI, describing the measures adopted to mitigate the releases.
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F.24.2 | Radiation impact of spent fuel and radioactive waste management facilities |
F.24.2.1 | Occupational radiation doses |
In general both individual and collective doses from radioactive waste handling at nuclear power plants are low compared to doses from normal operation, and maintenance and service work performed at outages. Nevertheless it is important that the working methods are carefully planned to make sure the occupational doses are optimised.
In this section examples of occupational doses received at spent fuel and radioactive waste management facilities are presented. Personnel that work with radioactive waste at the nuclear power plants are exposed to annual doses in the order of a few mSv. The annual collective doses at the NPPs to this category of workers are normally in the order of
At the central interim storage facility for spent nuclear fuel (CLAB) doses are obtained from the normal operation with receiving, unloading and cleaning the transport containers with the spent fuel. In addition maintenance and service of CLAB’s internal lift and handling equipment, and the water cleaning system give radiation doses. The doses to the personnel at CLAB reported between 1993 and 2001 are shown in figure #
Figure F1. Doses to the personnel at CLAB
No open radiation sources are handled at the final repository for low and intermediate level waste (SFR) and all radioactive waste is conditioned. Thus, the doses to the personnel originate from external radiation. Contamination of transport casks and waste packages has never occurred to the extent that any airborne radioactivity has been measured. The yearly doses to the personnel at SFR are very low. There are some variations depending upon whether waste packages have been covered with cement during the year or not. The doses to the personnel since 1988 (when SFR was taken into operation) until 2002 have been about 25 mmanSv. This gives a yearly average of about 2 mmanSv.
Studsvik RadWaste operates several facilities at Studsvik for treatment of radioactive waste. For 2001 they reported a yearly dose of 28 mmanSv and an average dose of 0.9 mSv.
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RanstadMineralrecyclesuraniummainlyfromthefuelfabricationactivitiesatWestinghouseAtom.Thedoses reported by Ranstad Mineral for 2001 are a yearly dose of 14 mmanSv and an average dose of 0.27 mSv.
For the personnel that work with waste handling at Westinghouse Atom fuel factory the individual doses are below 1.0 mSv.
F.24.2.2 | Radiation doses from releases to the environment |
Figure F2 below shows the radiation doses related to all releases from nuclear power plants and other nuclear facilities for the year 2001. The values for
From the available release data it is not possible to single out releases from the radioactive waste handling at the nuclear power plants. The releases from CLAB are included in the releases from Oskarshamn NPP. From SFR releases to the air and water are measured. The releases are reported as part of the total release from Forsmark NPP and constitute a small part of this release. For example a release of 1.14·105 Bq
Figure F2. Radiation doses (in mSv) to individuals in the critical group from releases in year 2001.
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Figure F3. Radiation doses (in mSv) to individuals in the critical group during 1985 to 2001(doses from
F.24.3 | Regulatory control |
See Section E.19.2.3 | |
F.24.4 | Conclusion |
The Swedish Party complies with the obligations of Article 24.
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ARTICLE 25. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
1.Each Contracting Party shall ensure that before and during operation of a spent fuel or radioactive waste management facility there are appropriate
2.EachContractingPartyshalltaketheappropriatestepsforthepreparationandtestingof emergency plans for its territory insofar as it is likely to be affected in the event of a radiological emergency at a spent fuel or radioactive waste management facility in the vicinity of its territory.
F.25 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
F.25.1 General
The emergency plans for the NPPs and Studsvik include the installations for spent fuel and radioactive waste management at these facilities. The CLAB and SFR facilities are included in the emergency plans for the NPPs OKG and Forsmark respectively. The fuel fabrication facility Westinghouse Atom AB also has an emergency plan.
F.25.2 | Regulatory requirements |
In the Government bill 1980/81:90, issued after the
SSI’s role is to maintain and further develop the national radiation protection preparedness. The preparedness shall be assessed in national and international exercises, and shall be
The development and practice of an
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-alerting the emergency preparedness personnel without delay,
-bringing the plant to a safe and stable state,
-informing about the technical situation at the plant.
The plan shall be kept up to date and tested in regular exercises. It is further required that there are specially assigned and trained personnel, suitable emergency operating centres, technical systems, tools and protective equipment to the extent needed to carry out the tasks mentioned. Further details about planning conditions are given in the general recommendations to the regulations.
In the Rescue Services Act and Ordinance it is stated that a county is responsible for the protection of and information to the citizens living there in the event of a nuclear accident of any kind. The Swedish Rescue Services Agency has also issued requirements regarding alarming and informing the public.
Sweden has signed the Convention of Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency and the Convention of Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident. Sweden has in addition made several bilateral agreements concerning information in the event of an accident. These conventions and bilateral agreements apply to all nuclear facilities, including facilities for the management of spent nuclear fuel or radioactive waste.
The licensees are required to have a certain number of exercises every year. Every forth year a NPP has a comprehensive national exercise together with the county and central authorities, to check the emergency plans and the capability of the
F.25.3 | National monitoring and measuring |
A network of permanent radiation monitoring stations (SSI gamma stations) has been in operation since the end of the 1950’s. After the Chernobyl accident, the number of monitoring stations was increased from 25 to 37,anddatatransmissiontoSSIviamodemsandtelephonelines wasintroduced.Thestationsaredesignedto initiate an alarm in the event of elevated radiation levels. All components of the system are now out of date and the entire monitoring system must be evaluated. The measurement chambers have become increasingly unreliableandmustbe eitherupdatedorreplaced.Theelectronicsfordatastorageandtransmissionaremore than 10 years old and use a communication protocol that is no longer supported by the telephone system. During 2001, operating disturbances occurred regularly at
Coordinatednationalpreparednessformeasurementsof ionizingradiationhasbeensetupbyagreements with the radiation physics departments at six universities, and also with FOI (Swedish Defence Research Agency) in Umeå and Studsvik Nuclear AB. The nuclear power plants participate in the national preparedness on a voluntary basis. Malå Geoscience AB keeps an emergency supply of monitoring instruments. SGU (Geological Survey of Sweden) has maintained its capacity for airborne spectrometry, with measuring equipment partially funded by SSI. SLU (Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences) in Alnarp has been
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contracted to carry out an exercise programme for radiation measurements in agriculture, using voluntary defence organizations and the contract laboratories. FOI has been contracted to keep fi ve air fi lter stations in operation, including analysis of the air fi lter samples. No activity levels above the reporting limit have been detected during 2001. SSI has made an agreement with SMHI (Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological Institute) for continual dispersion forecasts and the handling of international alarms (National Warning Point). The dispersion forecasts for hypothetical emissions are calculated every six hours for all Swedish nuclear power plants and for a number of nuclear power plants in neighbouring countries. The forecasts are continuously available for SSI at SMHI. SSI sends them out if an accident should occur.
The location of the
Figure F4. Gamma radiation, and air sampling stations in Sweden.
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F.25.4 | Regulatory control |
SSI and SKI inspect the
In addition to inspections of the emergency planning, SKI and SSI occasionally inspect the plant actions during emergency exercises. For this purpose a special inspection model has been developed in order to assess the most important tasks for safety.
The
F.25.5 Conclusion
The Swedish Party complies with the obligations of Article 25.
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ARTICLE 26. DECOMMISSIONING
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure the safety of decommissioning of a nuclear facility. Such steps shall ensure that:
(i)qualified staff and adequate financial resources are available;
(ii)theprovisionsof Article24withrespecttooperationalradiationprotection,dischargesandunplanned and uncontrolled releases are applied;
(iii)the provisions of Article 25 with respect to emergency preparedness are applied; and
(iv)records of information important to decommissioning are kept.
F.26 DECOMMISSIONING
F.26.1 | Legal and regulatory requirements |
According to the Ordinance (1998:899) of Environmentally Hazardous Activities and the Ordinance (1998: 905) of Environmental Impact Assessment an EIA shall be established at the prospect of the decommissioning. The mentioned ordinances are issued under the Environmental Code. This means the EIA shall comprise an overall assessment, relating to all kinds of environmentally hazardous detriment (e.g. ionizing or
F.26.1.1 | Nuclear safety |
According to the Act on Nuclear Activities (SFS 1984:3), the holder of a licence for nuclear activities shall be responsible for ensuring that all measures are taken needed for:
-maintaining safety, with reference to the nature of the activities and the conditions in which they are conducted;
-ensuring the safe handling and final disposal of nuclear waste arising in the activities or nuclear material arising therein that is not reused;
-the safe decommissioning and the dismantling of plants in which nuclear activities are no longer to be conducted.
It follows from the third paragraph that a licencee is not exempted from responsibilities according to the act until decommissioning and dismantling has taken place. In the general regulations SKIFS 1998:1 there are requirements for decommissioning plans to be prepared before decommissioning and dismantling activities maybestarted.Theplanshouldincludemeasures,whichmustbeimplementedtoensurethesafecontainment of thegeneratednuclearwaste.Thus,thegeneralobligations,thegeneralregulationsSKIFS1998:1andseveral SSI regulations (see below) are applicable for the decommissioning and dismantling activities, regarding:
-that qualified staff and financial resources are available (as accounted for in section F.22),
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-that provisions with respect to operational radiation protection, discharges and unplanned and uncontrolled releases are applied (as accounted for in section F.24),
-that provisions with respect to emergency preparedness are applied (as accounted for in section F.25),
-that records of information important to decommissioning are kept.
F.26.1.2 | Radiation protection |
Most of the SSI regulations on radiation protection that are applicable at nuclear facilities are also valid duringdecommissioning(seesectionF.24).However,thereareatpresentnoregulationsregardingdischarges during decommissioning. The regulations SSI FS 2000:12 concerning protection of human health and the environment from discharges of radioactive substances from certain nuclear facilities are not applicable to the decommissioning of a nuclear facility. SSI intends to promulgate regulations regarding discharges during decommissioning.Itmaybeexpectedthatanypotentialdoseconstraints(intheseregulations)willnotexceed those given in SSI FS 2000:12.
Filing of documentation at nuclear facilities is regulated in SSI FS 1997:1. The
Planningof radiationprotectionissuesbeforeandduringthedecommissioningof nuclearplantsisregulated in SSI FS 2002:4. The regulations put requirements on the planning both during operation and after final shutdown. The main purpose of the regulations is to ensure that worker doses and releases of radioactivity to the environment during decommissioning are in accordance with ALARA principles and within specified limits,byrequiringadequateplanningof thedecommissioningactivitiesinadvance.Theregulationswillenter into force January 1, 2004, and the content of the regulations is described below.
Area of application
The regulations are intended to be applicable to all nuclear facilities, except permanent installations in repositories for radioactive wastes (such parts that will remain after closure).
Definitions
The term ”decommissioning” is used to describe all actions taken by the licensee after final shutdown in order to reduce the amount of radioactive substances in the land and building structures to levels that permit release of the site and any buildings left behind.
The term ”release of site” is used to describe a decision by the SSI that, from a radiation protection point of view, there are no further restrictions on the use of land and any remaining buildings.
The term ”finally shutdown facility” is used to describe a facility in which the main operations has ceased with no intention to resuming them.
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New or reconstructed facilities
It is required that radiation protection issues of the future decommissioning shall be considered during construction of a new nuclear facility or when an existing facility is reconstructed.
Decommissioning plans
Fornuclearfacilities inoperation,themainrequirementof theregulationsisthatthelicenseholdershallhave apreliminaryplanforfuturedecommissioningof
Finally shut down facility
When a facility has been finally shut down, the regulations require that the license holder present an overall description of the foreseen decommissioning, covering methods,
Dismantling and demolition after final shutdown
The regulations require that the license holder shall submit an overall description of the work to SSI at least four months before dismantling is initiated. The description shall essentially be a detailed plan of the foreseen activities, covering the same issues as the
Basis for site release
After decommissioning, the licensee should prove that the site could be released from regulatory control. Therefore the regulations require that the license holder shall document relevant information during decommissioning. The documentation shall contain results from measurements and calculations, as well as information concerning decisions and actions taken that have influence on the distribution and the amount of remaining radioactive substances.
F.26.2 | Measures taken by the licence holders |
Commercial power plants
So far only generic decommissioning plans have been developed for the Swedish nuclear power plants as part of the basis for the annual cost estimates (see section E.19.1.4) but the closure of the nuclear power reactor Barsebäck 1 has resulted in extensive planning work at the plant to prepare for the complete dismantling and decommisioning. The activities are being closely monitored by SKI and SSI. Comprehensive dismantling and
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demolition work will not be initiated until the other unit at the site, Barsebäck 2, has also been shut down.
Research facilities
There are a number of facilities at the Studsvik site that are in the process of being decommissioned and/or dismantled. Plans for the decommissioning and dismantling of those facilities have, before actual decommissioning activites started, been prepared by the licensees and submitted to SKI for evaluation and approval, according to requirements in the general regulations. The status of the facilities under decommissioning is accounted for in section D.36.2.
F.26.3 | Regulatory control |
Regulatory control is conducted by means of the regulatory review and approval of plans for decommissioning and dismantling, complemented by inspection activites at the sites, as necessary.
F.26.4 Conclusion
The Swedish Party complies with the obligations of Article 26.
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SECTION G – SAFETY OF SPENT
FUEL MANAGEMENT
ARTICLE 4. GENERAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that at all stages of spent fuel management, individuals, society and the environment are adequately protected against radiological hazards. In so doing, each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to:
(i)ensure that criticality and removal of residual heat generated during spent fuel management are adequately addressed;
(ii)ensure that the generation of radioactive waste associated with spent fuel management is kept to the minimum practicable, consistent with the type of fuel cycle policy adopted;
(iii)take into account interdependencies among the different steps in spent fuel management;
(iv)provide for effective protection of individuals, society and the environment, by applying at the national level suitable protective methods as approved by the regulatory body, in the framework of its national legislation which has due regard to internationally endorsed criteria and standards;
(v)take into account the biological, chemical and other hazards that may be associated with spent fuel management;
(vi)strive to avoid actions that impose reasonably predictable impacts on future generations greater than those permitted for the current generation;
(vii)aim to avoid imposing undue burdens on future generations.
G.4 GENERAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS
The Swedish Party complies with the obligations of Article 4.
The legislative and regulatory system in Sweden do not distinguish between general safety requirements for a facility for the management of spent nuclear fuel and the general safety requirements for a facility for the management of radioactive waste, as regards the objectives of the Joint Convention. Thus, in order not toduplicateinformationinthisreport,informationregardinggeneralsafetyrequirementsforanuclearfacility is presented in section H.11.
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ARTICLE 5. EXISTING FACILITIES
EachContractingPartyshalltaketheappropriatestepstoreviewthesafetyof anyspentfuelmanagament facilityexistingatthetimetheConventionentersintoforceforthatContractingPartyandtoensurethat, if necessary, all reasonably practicable improvements are made to upgrade the safety of such a facility.
G. 5 | EXISTING FACILITIES |
G.5.1 | The regulatory requirement (SKIFS 1998:1) |
The general safety regulations (SKIFS 1988:1) apply to the operation of all types of nuclear installations, including facilities for the treatment, storage and disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste. The basic provisions regarding safety assessment and review and can be summarised in the following points:
Safety Analysis
Analyses of conditions that are of importance for the safety of a facility shall be carried out before a facility is constructed and taken into operation. The analyses shall subsequently be kept
Safety Report
A preliminary safety report shall be prepared before a facility may be constructed. A final safety report shall be prepared before the facility may be taken into operation. The contents of the safety report are specified in the regulations.Beforethefacilitymaybeconstructedandtakenintooperation,thesafetyreportshallbeevaluatedand approved by the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate. The safety report shall subsequently be kept
Safety Review
A safety review shall determine or control that the applicable safety related aspects of a specific issue have been taken into account and that appropriate
Safety Programme
After it is taken into operation, the safety of a facility shall be continuously analysed and assessed in a systematic manner. Any need for improvement of safety measures, engineering as well as organisational, which
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arises as a result of such analyses and assessments, shall be documented in a safety programme. The safety programme shall be updated on an annual basis.
Periodic Safety Review of Facilities
At least once in every ten years, a new, integrated analysis and assessment of the safety of a facility shall be made. The analyses, assessments as well as the measures proposed on the basis of these shall be documented and submitted to the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate.
Modifications
A safety review shall be performed for engineering or organisational modifications to a facility, which can affect the conditions specified in the safety report as well as essential modifications to the report. Before the modifications may be introduced, the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate shall be notified and the Inspectorate can decide that additional or other requirements or conditions shall apply with respect to the modifications.
G.5.2 | Measures taken by the licence holders |
Revised safety reports
The contents of the safety reports have been revised and more details about the origin and treatment of waste should be included, especially with regards to traceability and documentation.
G.5.2.1 | Central Storage for Spent Nuclear Fuel (CLAB) |
The most important spent fuel facility in Sweden is the interim storage for spent nuclear fuel (CLAB) located at the OKG site. SKB is the licensee for CLAB and has made an agreement with OKG for operation of the facility. OKG has implemented the requirements in the general regulations SKIFS 1998:1 in its operating organisation. CLAB benefits from this as the management system for the operation of CLAB is fully integrated with the management system for the operation of the nuclear power plants at the OKG site. SKB, as the licencee for CLAB, is ultimately responsible for the implementation of the new regulations and has closely monitored the development.
CLAB has been in operation since 1985. Prior to the introduction of the general regulations SKIFS 1998: 1, the requirement for a periodic safety review (ASAR) was a condition in the NPP licences. In the general regulations the requirement for an ASAR is now mandatory for all nuclear facilities.
The fuel storage pools in CLAB are expected to be full early in 2004. Therefore in 1996 SKB initiated a project to increase the storage capacity from 5000 to 8000 tons of fuel by excavating a new rock cavern to provide additional storage pools. Although there was at the time no formal requirement to perform a periodic safety review, SKB decided, after consultation with SKI, to perform such a review. The main purpose was to gather experience from the construction and operation of the existing facility to be utilised in the design and construction of the extension. The
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and the regulatory review identified a few additional recommendations. The recommendations have been implemented for the most part.
G.5.2.2 | Storage of spent fuel from the research reactor R1 in Studsvik |
Following the issuance of SKIFS 1998:1 revised safety reports and safety programmes have been submitted to SKI for review. An action plan has been submitted describing provisions for safe extended storage, as required by the regulatory authorities. The main alternative, though, is to send the spent fuel for reprocessing abroad and to use the recovered uranium and plutonium to manufacture
G.5.3 | Regulatory control |
At the time that the Joint Convention entered into force, the general safety status of the Swedish spent nuclear facilities was satisfactory.
For the past years SKI’s review activities have been focused on the implementation of the general safety regulationsSKIFS1998:1.Theregulations,describedinsectionE.19.2.4,provideamorestructuredapproach to inspection and safety assessment, and have generally improved the situation. Extensive inspections of the safety review functions and fulfilment of the competence assurance requirement have been carried out.
CompliancewiththerequirementsoncompetenceassuranceinthegeneralsafetyregulationsSKIFS1998: 1 was inspected in 2000 at all the nuclear power sites. These inspections showed a need for improved analysis tools, in order to define competence requirements, for other personnel groups than operating personnel, for whomasystematicapproachhasbeenusedforseveralyears.Workwasinitiatedwithintheimplementingorganisations at all the sites to improve the analysis tools, and was in principle completed by the end of 2002.
The conclusions drawn by SKI from these inspections were that requirements on documentation of the new procedures were not fully met. There was some disagreement with the licensees about how to conduct the independent safety review in relation to the primary reviews. This issue has been addressed in joint discussions with the licensees. The safety programmes required of each licensee according to SKIFS 1998:1 have been requested by SKI and were submitted by all sites in 2000. The SKI review of these programmes by is still in progress.
SKI is closely monitoring the current extension work at CLAB. The most critical part, the excavation of the new rock cavern close to the existing pools for spent fuel, was successfully completed by the end of 2000, and the civil and installation work is in progress. The original plan was to have the new storage pools in operation at the beginning of 2003, but the construction work has been slightly delayed. The plan has been revised and the new pools are now expected to be commissioned seven months late, in August 2004.
G.5.4 Conclusion
The Swedish Party complies with the obligations of Article 5.
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ARTICLE 6. SITING OF PROPOSED FACILITIES
1.Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that procedures are established and implemented for a proposed spent fuel management facility:
(i)to evaluate all relevant
(ii)to evaluate the likely safety impact of such a facility on individuals, society and the environment;
(iii)to make information on the safety of such a facility available to members of the public;
(iv)to consult Contracting Parties in the vicinity of such a facility, insofar as they are likely to be affected by that facility, and provide them, upon their request, with general data relating to the facility to enable them to evaluate the likely safety impact of the facility upon their territory.
2.In so doing, each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that such facilities shall not have unacceptable effects on other Contracting Parties by being sited in accordance with the general safety requirements of Article 4.
G.6 SITING OF PROPOSED FACILITIES
The Swedish Party complies with the obligations of Article 6.
The legaslative and regulatory system in Sweden does not distinguish between the siting procedure for a facility for management of spent nuclear fuel and the siting procedure for a facility for management of radioactive waste, as regards the objectives of the Joint Convention. Thus, in order not to duplicate information in this report, information regarding the procedures for the siting of a nuclear facility is presented in section H.13.
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ARTICLE 7. DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION OF FACILITIES
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:
(i)the design and construction of a spent fuel management facility provide for suitable measures to limitpossibleradiologicalimpactsonindividuals,societyandtheenvironment,includingthosefrom discharges or uncontrolled releases;
(ii)atthedesignstage,conceptualplansand,asnecessary,technicalprovisionsforthedecommissioning of a spent fuel management facility are taken into account;
(iii)the technologies incorporated in the design and construction of a spent fuel management facility are supported by experience, testing or analysis.
G.7 | DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION OF FACILITIES |
G.7.1 | The regulatory requirement |
The general safety regulations (SKIFS 1988:1) apply to the operation of all types of nuclear installations, including facilities for treatment, storage and disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste.
G.7.1.1 | Suitable measures to limit radiological impact |
The requirements for limiting the possible radiological impact on individuals, society and the environment, including those from discharges or uncontrolled releases, are founded upon the basic provisions stipulated in 4§ first paragraph in the Act on Nuclear Activities (1984:3). This is clarified further in the general safety regulations (SKIFS 1988:1) in which it is stated that nuclear accidents shall be prevented through a basic
-ensuring that the design, construction, operation, monitoring and maintenance of a facility is such that abnormal events, incidents and accidents are prevented,
-ensuring that multiple devices and measures exist to protect the integrity of the barriers and, if the integrity should be breached, to mitigate the ensuing consequences,
-ensuring that any release of radioactive substances, which may still occur as a result of abnormal events, incidents and accidents, is prevented or, if this is not possible, controlled and mitigated through devices and prepared measures.
G.7.1.2 | Conceptual plans and provisions for decommissioning |
The Act on Nuclear Activities states that the holder of a licence for nuclear activities is responsible for ensuring that all necessary measures are taken to ensure the safe handling and final disposal of nuclear waste, or
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nuclear material that is not reused, as well as the safe decommissioning and the dismantling of facilities. It has therefore not been considered necessary to introduce an explicit requirement in the general regulations (SKIFS 1998:1) for the preparation of conceptual plans or technical provisions for the decommissioning of spent nuclear facilities, at the design stage.
Withregardtoradiationprotection,SSIrecentlyissuednewregulations,SSIregulationsonPlanningbefore and during decommissioning of nuclear facilities (SSI FS 2002:4), that will enter into force January 1, 2004. The regulations introduce requirements for decommissioning with respect to documentation, alternative actions and waste management.
G.7.1.3 | Technology supported by experience |
The general safety regulations (SKIFS 1988:1) specifies specify requirements regarding design and construction. It is stated states in that in order to meet the basic safety provisions the design of the facility, with adaptation to the specific conditions of each facility, shall;
-be able to withstand component and system failures,
-have reliability and operational stability,
-be able to withstand such events or conditions which can affect the safety function of the barriers or
-have maintainability, controllability and testability of inherent parts as long as these parts are used for their intended purposes.
Additional requirements related to design and construction are specified as follows;
-Thedesignprinciplesanddesignsolutionsshallbetestedunderconditionscorrespondingtothosewhich can occur during the intended application in a facility. If this is not possible or reasonable, they must have been subjected to the necessary testing or evaluation related to safety.
-The design solutions shall be adapted to the personnel’s ability to manage, the facility, in a safe manner, under normal conditions as well as the abnormal events, incidents and accidents that might occur
-Building components, devices, components and systems shall be designed, manufactured, installed, controlled and tested in accordance with requirements which are adapted for their importance for safety.
G.7.2 | Measures taken by the licence holders |
G.7.2.1 | Suitable measures to limit radiological impact |
The safety philosophy applied in the design of all Swedish nuclear facilities is based on the principles of
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G.7.2.2 | Conceptual plans and provisions for decommissioning |
Generic decommissioning plans have been developed by SKB, as part of the basis for the annual cost calculations (see section E.19.1.4.)
G.7.2.3 | Technology supported by experience |
The principle of proven technology is broadly accepted and implemented in the design and construction proceduresfortheSwedishnuclearfacilities.Theuseof properlyenvironmentallyqualifiedequipmentensures functioning of
G.7.3 | Regulatory control |
During the licensing process the PSAR, FSAR and STF document are reviewed by the regulatory authorities, to ensure compliance with fundamental safety principles and criteria. A prerequisite for obtaining a licence is that the regulatory review concludes that the facility is designed according to the provisions in the general regulations (SKIFS 1998:1).
G.7.4 Conclusion
The Swedish Party complies with the obligations of Article 7. There is however room for improvment. More comprehensive, consistent and clear safety regulations for decommissioning of nuclear facilities need to be developed. The regulatory body have recently taken actions towards this end.
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ARTICLE 8. ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY OF FACILITIES
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:
(i)before construction of a spent fuel management facility, a systematic safety assessment and an environmental assessment appropriate to the hazard presented by the facility and covering its operating lifetime shall be carried out;
(ii)before the operation of a spent fuel management facility, updated and detailed versions of the safety assessment and of the environmental assessment shall be prepared when deemed necessary to complement the assessments referred to in paragraph (i).
G.8 | ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY OF FACILITIES |
G.8.1 | The regulatory requirement |
G.8.1.1 | Assessment of safety |
Requirements on safety assessment, safety review and reporting are listed in the general safety regulations (SKIFS 1998:1). Many of these requirements are not new but were posed earlier as licensing conditions for facilities licensed before the regulations came into force. Some of the requirements are, however, more comprehensivecomparedtoearlierconditions,andsomearenew.Thelegallybindingrequirementsregarding safety assessments are summarised in the following points:
-A comprehensive safety analysis shall be performed before a facility is constructed and before it is taken into operation. The analysis shall subsequently be kept
-A preliminary safety report shall be prepared before a facility may be constructed, and a final safety report shall be prepared before the facility may be taken into operation. The safety reports shall contain informationasspecifiedintheregulations.Thepreliminaryandthefinalsafetyreportsshallbereviewed, evaluated and approved by SKI as requiered. The final safety report shall be kept
G.8.1.2 | Environmental assessment |
The Act on Nuclear activities also states that an EIA (Environmental Impact Assessment) shall be made in all licensing cases, and that the Environmental Code regulates the way the EIA shall be carried out as well as the contents of the documentation.. Requirements on environmental assessment are laid down in the Environmental Code (1998:808) as described in Section E.19.1.3.
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The purpose of an EIA is to establish and describe the direct and indirect impacts of a planned activity or measure as listed below.
An environmental impact statement shall contain the following information:
-A description of the activity or measure with details of its location, design and scope;
-A description of the measures being planned with a view to avoiding, mitigating or remedying adverse effects, for example action to prevent the activity or measure leading to an infringement of an environmental quality standard;
-Theinformationthatisneededtoestablishandassessthemajorimpactonhumanhealth,theenvironment and the management of land, water and other resources that the activity or measure is likely to have;
-A description of possible alternative sites and alternative designs, together with a statement of the reasons why a specific alternative was chosen as well as a description of the consequences if the activity or measure is not implemented;
-A
G.8.1.3 | The licensing procedure |
Three different permits/licences are required for a nuclear facility: a permit under the Environmental Code (1998:808) a licence under the Nuclear Activities Act (1984:3), and a building permit under the Planning and Building Act (1987:10). Licensing under the Environmental Code and the Act on Nuclear Activities occur in parallel. The applications under both laws must include an environmental impact statement (EIS) prepared according to the rules in Chapter 6 of the Environmental Code. The same EIS is thus used in both applications. Separate EISs are prepared for the encapsulation plant and the deep repository.
According to Chapter 17 of the Environmental Code, the Government shall, after preparation by the Environmental Court, examine the permissibility of the activity. After SKI’s preparation of the matter, the Government shall also examine permit applications under the Act on Nuclear Activities. If the Government finds that the construction and operation of the facility is permissible according to the Environmental Code andgrantsapermit/licenceundertheNuclearActivitiesAct,itremainsfortheEnvironmentalCourttogrant a permit/licence and stipulate conditions in accordance with the Environmental Code.
G.8.2 | Regulatory control |
The safety case as a basis for licensing and nuclear supervision
The safety level to be attained and maintained by the licensee of a nuclear facility is defined in the licensing process.
The licence to build, be in possession of and operate the facility is granted by the Government. This government licensing decision is applied for and granted early in the design process. These licence conditions requires that a preliminary safety analysis report (PSAR) be submitted and approved by the regulatory body before major construction activities are started. A final safety analysis report (FSAR) and technical specifications for operation (STF) should also be submitted and approved by the regulatory body before starting commercial operation.
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The PSAR, FSAR and STF documents are reviewed by the regulatory authorities, to ensure compliance with fundamental safety principles and criteria. Based on this licensing procedure, and on approval by the regulatory authorities, the FSAR and STF documents becomes the legally binding documents regulating technical configuration and operating limits and conditions, often referred to as ”the safety case”. This ”safety case” may be regarded as defining the minimum safety level that the licensee is legally committed to maintain as a condition for a permit to operate the facility. Hence, the safety case also provides the basis for regulatory supervision.
Additional licence conditions can be prescribed by SKI over time, based on national and international operating experience and new research results.
G.8.3 Conclusion
The Swedish Party complies with the obligations of Article 8.
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ARTICLE 9. OPERATION OF FACILITIES
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:
(i)the licence to operate a spent fuel management facility is based upon appropriate assessments as specified in Article 8 and is conditional on the completion of a commissioning programme demonstrating that the facility, as constructed, is consistent with design and safety requirements;
(ii)operational limits and conditions derived from tests, operational experience and the assessments, as specified in Article 8, are defined and revised as necessary;
(iii)operation, maintenance, monitoring, inspection and testing of a spent fuel management facility are conducted in accordance with established procedures;
(iv)engineering and technical support in all
(v)incidents significant to safety are reported in a timely manner by the holder of the licence to the regulatory body;
(vi)programmes to collect and analyse relevant operating experience are established and that the results are acted upon, where appropriate;
(vii)decommissioningplansforaspentfuelmanagementfacilityarepreparedandupdated,asnecessary, using information obtained during the operating lifetime of that facility, and are reviewed by the regulatory body.
G 9 | OPERATION OF FACILITIES |
G.9.1 | The regulatory requirement |
Thegeneralsafetyregulations(SKIFS1998:1)containlegallybindingrequirementsrelevantforallobligations of Article 9. These requirements are summarised below.
G.9.1.1 | Initial authorisation |
As mentioned in section G.8, a preliminary comprehensive safety report is required before the construction of a spent nuclear facility. A final complete safety analysis report, which also takes into account the results from commissioning tests, is required before the facility is taken into operation.
G.9.1.2 | Operational limits and conditions |
Documented
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maintained during the operation of the facility. The Technical Specifications shall be subjected to a twofold safety review by the licensee and submitted to SKI for approval. The licensee shall notify SKI about any changes, after they have been subjected to a
G.9.1.3 | Established procedures |
Suitable, verified and documented procedures are required for all operational states including accidents. The proceduresforoperabilityverificationandproceduresusedinotheroperationalstatesthannormaloperation shall be subjected to a twofold safety review by the licensee. Procedures for maintenance important for safety are also covered by the requirement. Maintenance programmes shall be documented. Inspection and testing of mechanical components shall be carried out according to qualified methods and verified procedures.
G.9.1.4 | Engineering and technical support |
Thelicenseeshallensurethatadequatepersonnelisavailablewiththenecessarycompetenceandsuitabilityneeded
G.9.1.5 | Reporting of incidents in a timely manner |
SKIFS1998:1containsonechapteraboutreportingrequirementsandanannexspecifyingtheserequirements for various types of events. The following is a brief summary:
-Reporting without delay: emergency alarm events and events and conditions in category 1 (see below)
-Reporting within 16 hours: INES events at level 2 or higher
-Reporting within 7 days: a comprehensive investigation report about alarm events or events and conditions in category
-Reporting within 30 days: a comprehensive investigation report of events and conditions in category 2
In addition, there are requirements on daily reporting of the operational state, and the occurrence of any abnormal events or disturbances, and requirements on a comprehensive annual report summarising all experienceimportantforthesafetyof theplant.Specificationsaregivenaboutthecontentsof thedifferentreports and further interpretation of the reporting requirements is given in the general recommendations.
In one of the basic paragraphs of SKIFS 1998:1, requirements are given on actions to be taken by the licensee in cases of deficiencies in barriers or in the
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Category 1
Severe deficiency observed in one or more barriers or in the
Category 2
Deficiency observed in one barrier or in the
Category 3
Temporary deficiency in the
In all three cases, corrective measures shall be subject to a twofold safety review by the licensee. The results of these reviews shall be submitted to SKI. Regarding category 3 events, there is no requirement to make a specific report to SKI. It is sufficient to make a compilation of these events in the annual report.
G.9.1.6 | Programmes to collect and analyse operating experience |
The licensee shall ensure that experience from its own facilities and from similar activities in other relevant facilities is continuously analysed, used and communicated to the personnel. It is further required that all events and conditions which are detected and which are important to safety are investigated in a systematic manner, in order to determine sequences and causes, as well as to establish the measures needed in order to restore the safety margins and to prevent recurrence. The results of the investigations shall be disseminated within the organisation and shall contribute to the development of safety at the facility.
G.9.1.7 | Decommissioning plans |
Thereisnoformalrequirementforpreparingdecommissioningplansforspentnuclearfacilitiesduringoperation. There is, however, in the general regulations a requirement for decommissioning plans to be prepared before the decommissioning and dismantling activities may be started. The plan should include measures, which must be implemented to ensure the safe containment of the generated nuclear waste.
AsdescribedinsectionG.7.1.2.conceptualdecommissioningplansforspentfuelfacilitiesarenevertheless prepared and if need be, updated, as part of the basis for the annual review by SKI of the cost estimates performed by SKB and described in section E.19.1.4.
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G.9.2 | Measures taken by the licence holders |
G.9.2.1 | Initial authorisation |
No spent nuclear facility has been commissioned since 1985 when the central interim storage for spent fuel (CLAB) was taken into operation. The application procedure for the ongoing extension works to increase the capacity from 5000 to 8000 tons of uranium, is the first time the modernised legislative and regulatory system has been implemented. Although neither the Environmental Code, the new SKI regulations 1998:1 and 2002:1, nor the new Radiation Protection Act had been issued at the time for the application, the formal procedure to initiate the project was run according to procedures later established by the issuance of those documents, as described in sections E.19 (Legislative and regulatory framework), E.20 (Regulatory Body) and G.6 (Siting of proposed facilities).
The siting process for the encapsulation plant, and the final repository for spent nuclear fuel
G.9.2.2 Operational limits and conditions
The operational limits and conditions for nuclear facilities are described in the Technical Specifications (STF), a document, which is considered to be one of the cornerstones in the governing and regulation of the operation of the Swedish nuclear activities. Every STF is
The original STF for each facility is derived from the safety analyses in the FSAR, in which the behaviour of the facility is described. Correction and updating takes place, when new and better knowledge is available, either from research, tests or operational experience. Suggestions for changes in STF are reviewed carefully from the safety point of view at different levels in the operating organisation and are finally approved by the regulatory body, before they are included in the document.
The fact that STF is reviewed and revised regularly has contributed to making it a living document. It is also part of the quality and management system and used frequently in particular by the operations staff. An essential part of STF is the general clause that says that ”…should any doubt appear about the interpretation of the text, the general purpose of STF shall be guiding. This means that the facility in all indefinite situations shall be maintained or brought respectively to a safe state.” Other parts of STF, which have been developed more recently, are the description of the background to the document. The background description is important for preserving and transferred to new staff the knowledge and experience of those who participated in the original production of STF. Modified and maintained equipment must pass an operability test, to verify that the equipment fulfils specified operational requirements before being accepted for continuous operation.
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G.9.2.3 | Established procedures |
All activities that directly affect the operation of the facility are governed by procedures of different kinds covering normal operation, emergency operation and functional tests. Maintenance activities according to an approvedmaintenanceprogrammearealsotoagreatextentaccomplishedaccordingtoprocedures,however, not always as detailed as the operating procedures, in which activities are described in sequences step by step. Signing off the completion of steps carried out in the procedures is mandatory in most cases, in order to confirm the completion and facilitate verification.
Thedevelopmentof proceduresfollowsspecifieddirectives,whichincludethereviewingof thedocuments, normally, by more than one person other than the author, before being approved by the operations manager or someone else at the corresponding level. The same applies for revising procedures. Revising procedures is to be carried out continuously, in particular maintenance procedures, when new experience is obtained. Emergency procedures have been developed in order to deal with anticipated operational events.
G.9.2.4 | Engineering and technical support |
The principles for staffing are reported in section F.22 (Human and financial resources)
Competencethatmightnotbecompletelyavailablewithintheownorganisationatallplantsisforinstance expertiseandresourcesformaterialsandchemistryassessments,radiationshieldingandenvironmentalconsequence calculations, expertise and resources for software for safety applications and also process control and measurement techniques. In particular the
G.9.2.5 | Incident reporting |
The other type of LER, called RO (Reportable Occurrence), is used for less severe events. This type of event is mentioned in the daily report, which is sent to the regulatory bodies, followed up by a preliminary report within seven days and a final report within 30 days. The reports are reviewed at different levels within the operating organisation and approved by the operations or production manager before submittal.
The front of the standardised report form describes the event in general: identification number, title, reference to STF, date of discovery and length of time until corrective actions were completed, conditions at the time of occurrence, system consequences, a contact person at the plant and activities affected by the event.
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On the reverse side of the document a description of the event is given. The following titles are used:
-Event course and operational consequence
-Safety significance
-Direct and root causes
-Planned/decided measures
-Lessons learned by the event
If the description of the event is extensive additional pages may be attached to the form. Reports are also required in accordancewithSTFwhenthepermittedlevelsof activityreleasefromthefacilityareexceeded,orintheeventof unusually highradiationexposuretoindividuals.Thesetypesof
G.9.2.6 | Operating experience analysis and |
The objective of the analysis and feedback programme concerning operating experience is to learn from their own and others’ experience and thus prevent recurrences of events, particularly those that might affect the safety of the facility. The operating experience
G.9.2.7 | Decommissioning plans |
As described in section G.7.2.2, a conceptual decommissioning plan for CLAB has been prepared and is updatedasneeded.Theplanconstitutesthebasisforthenuclearpowerutilities’costestimatesfordismantling and final disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste.
G.9.3 | Regulatory control |
G.9.3.1 | Initial authorisation |
The regulatory control is achieved throught the procedures described in sections E.19.2.1 (Licensing) and E.19.2.2 ( Institutional control, regulatory inspection and reporting).
G.9.3.2 | Operational limits and conditions |
Applications for changes to STF, and for exemptions from STF, are reviewed by inspectors and specialists at SKI. Based on the application and information provided by the licensees, and the associated safety analyses, assessments are made about how the proposed changes or exemptions contribute to the risk profile of the facility.
A few years ago SKI inspected the training and retraining in STF of
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was found that the training could be improved for other groups who come into contact with the requirements of
G.9.3.3 Procedures
Operational and maintenance procedures are normally not reviewed by SKI. Only in connection with event investigations would SKI ask for a procedure to be submitted for review. In the frame of quality assurance inspections or reviews of quality audits made by the licensees (see section F.23) have SKI reviewed into the routines used for updating procedures.
G.9.3.4 | Engineering and technical support |
SKIhasnotsofarspecificallyinspectedtheengineeringandtechnicalsupportavailableatthefacilities.Inconnection with other inspections and reviews, the staffing situation has occasionally been commented upon.
G.9.3.5 | Incident reporting |
Licensee event reports are reviewed upon arrival by the responsible site inspector, who asks the facility for clarification if necessary. As a routine all LERs are screened once a week by a standing group of inspectors and specialists in order to assess the event, the analysis and the measures taken by the licensee. If there are any regulatory concerns the issue is brought up at a management meeting and a decision made about any further measures to be taken by SKI.
G.9.3.6 | Experience feedback analysis |
The major operating experience feedback comes from within the organisation itself and consequently the largest analysis effort is focused on the events in their own facility. The
G.9.3.7 | Decommissioning plans |
The decommissioning plan (see section G.9.1.7) must be submitted to SKI for approval before the decommissioning and dismantling activities may be started
G.9.4 Conclusion
The Swedish Party complies with the obligations of Article 9.
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ARTICLE 10. DISPOSAL OF SPENT FUEL
If, pursuant to its own legislative and regulatory framework, a Contracting Party has designated spent fuel for disposal, the disposal of such spent fuel shall be in accordance with the obligations of Chapter 3 relating to the disposal of radioactive waste.
G.10 DISPOSAL OF SPENT FUEL
G.10.1 | Regulatory requirement |
According to the Act on Nuclear Activities the following definitions apply:
-spent nuclear fuel which has not been placed in final storage is defined as nuclear material
-spent nuclear fuel which has been placed in final storage is defined as nuclear waste.
Reprocessing is not part of the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle in Sweden, as described in section C, and the policy and practices for management of spent nuclear fuel is direct disposal, as described in section B.
It is also clearly stated in the general obligations in the Act on Nuclear Activities (10 §) that the holder of a licence for nuclear activities shall be responsible for ensuring that all measures are taken needed for:
-Maintaining safety, with reference to the nature of the activities and the manner in which they are conducted
-Ensuring the safe handling and final disposal of nuclear waste arising from the activities or nuclear material arising therein that is not reused;
G.10.2 Measures taken by the licence holder
The practical implication is that spent fuel is in practice treated as high level radioactive waste.
G.10.3 Conclusion
The Swedish Party complies with the obligations of Article 10.
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SECTION H – SAFETY OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT
ARTICLE 11. GENERAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that at all stages of radioactive waste management individuals, society and the environment are adequately protected against radiological and other hazards. In so doing, each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to:
(i)ensure that criticality and removal of residual heat generated during radioactive waste management are adequately addressed;
(ii)ensure that the generation of radioactive waste is kept to the minimum practicable;
(iii)take into account interdependencies among the different steps in radioactive waste management;
(iv)provide for effective protection of individuals, society and the environment, by applying at the national level suitable protective methods as approved by the regulatory body, in the framework of its national legislation which has due regard to internationally endorsed criteria and standards;
(v)take into account the biological, chemical and other hazards that may be associated with radioactive waste management;
(vi)strive to avoid actions that impose reasonably predictable impacts on future generations greater than those permitted for the current generation;
(vii)aim to avoid imposing undue burdens on future generations.
H.11 GENERAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS
Swedish legislation makes a distinction between radioactive waste originating from nuclear activities (spent fuel and nuclear waste) and radioactive waste emanating from activities outside the nuclear fuel cycle, e.g. medicaluse,industry,researchandconsumerproductsetc(definitionsof radioactivewasteandnuclearwaste according to Swedish law are given in section E.19). However the legislative and regulatory systems do not distinguish between the general safety requirements for a facility for the management of radioactive waste and general safety requirements for a facility for the management of spent nuclear fuel, with regards to the objectives of the Joint Convention. Thus, in order not to duplicate information in this report, information regarding the general safety requirements of a nuclear facility described in this section are not repeated in section G.4 General safety requirements (for spent fuel management) for which they are also valid.
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H.11.1 | Regulatory requirements |
Basic safety provisions are stipulated in the Act on Nuclear Activities (1984:3). The requirements are further clarified in the general safety regulations (SKIFS 1998:1). In the regulations it is stated that, in order to ensure adequate protection at all stages of spent fuel management, the licensee shall:
1establish documented guidelines for how safety shall be maintained at the facility as well as ensure that the personnel performing duties which are important to safety are well acquainted with the guidelines,
2ensure that the activities carried out at the facility are controlled and developed with the support of a quality system which covers those activities which are of importance for safety,
3ensure that decisions on
4ensure that adequate personnel is available with the necessary competence and suitability on all respects needed for those tasks which are of importance for safety as well as ensure that this is documented,
5ensure that responsibilities and authority are defined and documented with respect to personnel carrying out work which is important to safety,
6ensure that the personnel is provided with the necessary conditions to work in a safe manner,
7ensure that experience from the facility’s own and from similar activities is continuously utilised and communicated to the personnel concerned,
8ensure that safety, through these and other measures, is maintained and continuously developed.
IntheRadiationProtectionAct(1988:220)itisstipulatedthatradioactivewasteshallbehandledanddisposed of in a manner that is satisfactory from a radiation protection point of view. More detailed requirements on the handling of radioactive waste and nuclear waste at nuclear facilities are stipulated in SSI FS 2001:1.
There are also regulations on the protection of human health and the environment in connection with the final management of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste (SSI FS 1998:1). The purpose of these regulations is to limit the harmful effects on human health and the environment in connection with the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste. Discharges to air and water from a facility to the surrounding environment are regulated in SSI FS 2000:12 (see section F.24.1 2).
In addition there are requirements concerning the
As presented in section E.19.1.2 SSI has also issued regulations concerning clearance of nuclear and nonnuclear waste, SSI FS 1996:2 and SSI FS 1983:7, respectively.
H.11.1.1 | Criticality and removal of residual heat |
The general safety regulations (SKIFS 1998:1) state that radiological accidents shall be prevented by the design, construction, operation, monitoring and maintenance of a facility. It follows that a criticality analysis as well as an analysis of heat generation and removal of residual heat must be included in the safety report supporting the license application for any nuclear facility.
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The license application for the interim storage for spent nuclear fuel (CLAB) included a criticality analysis as well as an analysis of heat generation. A
H.11.1.2 | Interdependencies in waste management and minimisation of radioactive waste |
The fact that the
-An
-Measures for the safe
-If such waste is generated that does not conform to the specifications in the safety report, measures for the safe handling of this particular waste shall be documented and SKI notified before any measures are taken. The documentation is subject to a twofold safety review by the licensee before notification (SKIFS 1998:1).
-Plans shall be established for the handling and disposal of all waste that exists at the facility arises at the facility or in other ways is brought to the facility (SSI FS 2001:1).
-The plans shall include e.g. amounts of different categories of waste, estimated nuclide specific content and sorting, treatment and interim storage of the waste (SSI FS 2001:1).
-The plans shall be reported to the authorities before the waste is generated (SSI FS 2001:1).
-Thepossibilitythatradiationdosestopersonnelcanincreasewhenreleasestotheenvironmentarelimited shall be taken into account during optimisation, as shall the consequences of other waste management alternatives (SSI FS 2000:12).
-Human health and the environment shall be protected from detrimental effects of ionising radiation, during the time when various stages of the final management of spent nuclear fuel or nuclear waste are being implemented as well as in the future (SSI FS 1998:1).
H.11.1.3 | Protection of individuals, society and the environment |
General radiation protection provisions are described in section F.24.1.
SSI has particularly addressed radiation protection of the public and the environment in connection with radioactivewastemanagementinthreedifferentregulations(SSIFS1998:1,2000:12and2001:1,seeE.19.1.2). In summary it is required that:
-a repository for spent nuclear fuel or nuclear waste shall be designed so that the annual risk of harmful effects after closure does not exceed
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-the final management of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste shall be implemented so that biodiversity and the sustainable use of biological resources are protected
-human health and the environment shall be protected during the operation of a nuclear facility as well as in the future.
H.11.1.4 Biological, chemical and other hazards
An Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) must be submitted together with an application for a licence accordingtotheActonNuclearActivitiesandtheRadiationProtectionAct,asaccountedforinsectionE.19. It is stated in the general considerations in the Environmental Code that due consideration shall be taken to possible effects from chemical, biological and other hazards. It follows that chemical, biological and other hazards during the operation of a nuclear facility must be addressed in the EIA.
As stated in H.11.1.2 both SSI and SKI require that
Thequestionof
Only packages approved by SKI and SSI may be transported to a repository. For this approval, the waste must comply with the conditions stated in the safety report of the repository. Furthermore, the licensee has to submit documentation showing that due regard has been taken to all relevant aspects, including biological, chemical and other hazards with regard to the
H.11.1.5 Strive to avoid actions that impose impacts on future generations
One purpose of SSI FS 2001:1 is to limit the harmful effects of radiation from the waste today and in the future. In SSI FS 2000:12 it is also stated that human health and the environment shall be protected from the harmful effects of ionising radiation during the operation of a nuclear facility as well as in the future. SSI FS 1998:1 has general requirements stipulating that human health and the environment shall be protected from detrimental effects of ionising radiation, during the time when various stages of the final management of spent nuclear fuel or nuclear waste are being implemented as well as in the future. All these regulations strive to avoid actions that impose reasonably predictable impacts on future generations greater than those permitted for the current generation.
H.11.1.6 | Aim to avoid imposing undue burdens on future generations |
As described in the section E.19 the practices for the management of spent fuel and radioactive waste are governed by principles adopted by the Swedish Parliament. The first governing principle reads ”The expenses for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste are to be covered by fees on the production of energy that has resulted in these expenses.” The second principle reads ”The reactor owners are to safely dispose of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste.” Thekeywords(underlined)implythatburdenonfuturegenerationsshouldbeavoided,especiallywith
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regard to the fundamental aspects of safety and costs. The key words also imply that action should be taken without postponement, i.e. the generation that has benefited from the nuclear power generation should also deal with the management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste.
The holder of a licence to operate a nuclear facility is primarily responsible for the safe handling and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste, as well as decommissioning and dismantling the facility. The nuclear industry, through its
H.11.2 Conclusion
The Swedish Party complies with the obligations of Article 11.
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ARTICLE 12. EXISTING FACILITIES AND PAST PRACTICES
Each Contracting Party shall in due course take the appropriate steps to review:
(i)the safety of any radioactive waste management facility existing at the time the Convention enters into force for that Contracting Party and to ensure that, if necessary, all reasonably practicable improvements are made to upgrade the safety of such a facility;
(ii)the results of past practices in order to determine whether any intervention is needed for reasons of radiation protection bearing in mind that the reduction in detriment resulting from the reduction in dose should be sufficient to justify the harm and the costs, including the social costs, of the intervention.
H. 12 EXISTING FACILITIES AND PAST PRACTICES
H.12.1 | The regulatory requirement |
H.12.1.1 | The general safety regulations (SKIFS 1998:1) |
The general safety regulations apply to the operation of all types of nuclear installations, including facilities for treatment, storage and disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste. The basic provisions regarding safety assessment and review and can be summarised in the following points:
Safety Analysis
Analyses of conditions that are of importance for the safety of a facility shall be carried out before a facility is constructed and taken into operation. The analyses shall subsequently be kept
Safety Report
A preliminary safety report shall be prepared before a facility may be constructed. A final safety report shall be prepared before the facility may be taken into operation. The content of the safety report is specified in the regulations. Before the facility may be constructed and taken into operation, the safety report shall be evaluated and approved by the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate. The safety report shall subsequently be kept
Safety Review
A safety review shall determine or check that the applicable safety related aspects of a specific issue have been taken into account and that SKIFS 1998:1 appropriate
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tically and shall be documented. A safety review shall be performed within those parts of the organisation responsible for the specific issues (”primary review”). A second safety review shall be performed by a safety review function appointed for this purpose and that has an independent position relative those parts of the organisation responsible for the specific issues (”secondary review”).
Safety Programme
After it is taken into operation, the safety of a facility shall be continuously analysed and assessed in a systematic manner. Any need for improvement regarding safety measures, engineering or organisational issues, which arise as a result of such analyses and assessments, shall be documented in a safety programme. The safety programme shall be updated on an annual basis.
Periodic Safety Review of Facilities
At least once every ten years, a new, integrated analysis and assessment of the safety of a facility shall be performed. The analyses and assessments, as well as the measures proposed on the basis of these shall be documented and submitted to SKI.
Modifications
A safety review shall be performed for engineering or organisational modifications to a facility which can affect the conditions specified in the safety report as well as essential modifications to the report. Before the modifications may be included in the report, the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate shall be notified and the Inspectorate can decide that additional or other requirements or conditions shall apply with respect to the modifications.
H.12.1.2 | Past practices |
As described in the introduction, section A.7.2, a special fee is levied on the nuclear power utilities in accordance with a special law, the Studsvik Act, to cover expenses for managing nuclear waste from old experimental facilities, in particular the facilities at Studsvik, the Ågesta reactor and the uranium mine in Ranstad. The special fee is the same for all four nuclear power utilities, currently SEK 0.0015 per
H.12.2 | Measures taken by the licence holders |
Revised safety reports
The contents of the safety reports have been revised and more details about the origin and treatment of waste should be included, especially with regards to traceability and documentation.
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H.12.2.1 | Existing facilities |
Final Repository for Operational Waste (SFR)
SFR, located at the FKA site, is a central final repository for operational waste from the nuclear power plants and for lowan intermediate waste from Studsvik. The licensee for SFR, SKB has made an agreement with FKA for the operation of the facility. FKA has implemented the requirements of the general regulations SKIFS 1998:1 in the operating organisation. SFR benefits from this since the management system for the operation of SFR is fully integrated with the management system for the operation of the nuclear power plants at the FKA site. SKB, as the licencee for SFR, is ultimately responsible for the implementation of the new regulations and has closely monitored the development.
SFR has been in operation since 1988. A comprehensive monitoring and control programme has been in operation since the beginning of the construction work and will continue throughout the operating period. Groundwater flows, water chemistry, rock movement, the performance of the bentonite barrier and the properties of the waste are all monitored. Furthermore, a programme for continuous monitoring of the environment is being conducted. The information from these control and monitoring programmes provides valuable data for safety assessments.
The licence conditions include a requirement for an update of the Safety Report (SAR) at least every 10 years.Priortotheintroductionof thegeneralregulationsSKIFS1998:1,therequirementforaperiodicsafety review (ASAR) was only a condition in the NPP licences. In the general regulations the requirement for an ASAR is mandatory for all nuclear facilities. In June 2001, SKB submitted an integrated revised safety report and periodic safety review report (ASAR) for SFR called SAFE.
Temporary storage facilities at the NNP sites
Temporary storage for radioactive waste at the nuclear power plants, as described in section D.32.3, is in practice considered to be an integral part of the plant. The operation of the temporary storage facilities is therefore integrated with the operation of the nuclear power plants. Fulfilment of the requirements in the general regulation is thereby accomplished and verified through regulatory review and inspection activities at the nuclear power plants.
Temporary storage facilities at the Studsvik
Temporary storage facilities for radioactive waste at Studsvik as listed in section D.32.4.2, have individual licences. Following the issuance of SKIFS 1998:1 revised safety reports and safety programmes have either been submitted to SKI for review, or are under preparation for submission.
H.12.2.2 | Past practices |
The four utilities operating nuclear power reactors in Sweden have formed a special company, AB SVAFO (Sydkraft, Vattenfall, Forsmark och OKG) to deal with their responsibilities according to the Studsvik Act.
According to estimates, SEK 1.2 billion will be needed up to the year 2030 to meet the expenses for these activities. The activities performed by AB SVAFO are closely monitored by SKI.
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H.12.3 Regulatory control
At the time that the convention entered into force, the general safety status of the Swedish spent nuclear facilities was satisfactory.
The SKI review activities has in recent years been focused on the implementation of the general safety regulationsSKIFS1998:1.Theseregulations,describedinsectionE.19.2.4,provideamorestructuredapproach to inspection and safety assessment and have generally improved the situation. Extensive inspections of the safety review function and fulfilment of the competence assurance requirement have been carried out.
Compliance with the requirements in the general safety regulations SKIFS 1998:1 concerning the assurance of competence was inspected in 2000 at all the nuclear power sites. These inspections showed a need for improved analysis tools, in order to define competence requirements, for other personnel groups than operating personnel for whom a systematic approach has been used for several years. Work was initiated within the implementing organisations at all the sites to improve the analysis tools, and was in principle completed by the end of 2002.
The conclusions of SKI from these inspections were that requirements concerning documentation of the new procedures were not fully met. There was also some disagreement with the licensees about how to conduct the independent safety review in relation to the primary reviews. This issue has been addressed in joint discussions with the licensees. The safety programmes required by each licensee according to SKIFS 1998:1 have been requested by SKI and were submitted by all sites in 2000. The review of these programmes by SKI is still in progress.
No formal requirements for the management of spent fuel and radioactive waste were established in Sweden until the late 1970’s.
As described in the introduction, section A.5.1, the authorities performed a joint study during the mid 1990’s with the objective of improving the understanding of past practices regarding the management of radioactive waste. The report concludes that there is no indication that there is any waste containing plutonium or radium is not under satisfactory supervision. Another important conclusion in the report is the importance of keeping proper records.
H.12.4 Conclusion
The Swedish Party complies with the obligations of Article 12.
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ARTICLE 13. SITING OF PROPOSED FACILITIES
1.Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that procedures are established and implemented for a proposed radioactive waste management facility:
(v)to evaluate all relevant
(vi)to evaluate the likely safety impact of such a facility on individuals, society and the environment;
(vii)to make information on the safety of such a facility available to members of the public;
(viii)to consult Contracting Parties in the vicinity of such a facility, insofar as they are likely to be affected by that facility, and provide them, upon their request, with general data relating to the facility to enable them to evaluate the likely safety impact of the facility upon their territory.
2.In so doing, each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that such facilities shall not have unacceptable effects on other Contracting Parties by being sited in accordance with the general safety requirements of Article 11.
H.13 | SITING OF PROPOSED FACILITIES |
ThelegislativeandregulatorysysteminSwedendoesnotdistinguishbetweenthesitingprocedureforafacility for the management of radioactive waste and the siting procedure for a facility for the management of spent nuclear fuel, with regard to the objectives of the Joint Convention. Thus, the information presented in this section is valid for all nuclear facilities, including the siting of the proposed facility for management of spent nuclear fuel. In order not to duplicate information in this report, information regarding the procedures for the siting of a nuclear facility in this section is is not repeated in section G.6 Siting of proposed facilities (for spent fuel management) for which they are also valid.
H.13.1 | The regulatory requirement |
H.13.1.1 | Assessment of safety and environmental impact |
According to the Act on Nuclear Activities a license is required to construct, possess and operate any nuclear facility.AlicenceapplicationmustcontainanEIA.TheproceduresforcarryingouttheEIA,aswellasitscontents, are specified in the Environmental Code (see section E.2.1.3). The EIA must contain the following:
-A description of the activity or measure with details of its location, design and scope;
-A description of the measures being planned with a view to avoiding, mitigating or remedying adverse effects;
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-The information needed to establish and assess the main impacts on human health, the environment and management of land, water and other resources that the activity or measure is likely to have;
-Adescriptionof possiblealternativesitesandalternativedesigns,togetherwithastatementof thereasons why a specific alternative was chosen and a description of the consequences if the activity or measure is not implemented;
-A
In addition to the EIA the preliminary safety report for a proposed spent fuel management is of key importance for license application. Requirements on the content of the safety report are given in SKI’s regulations concerning safety in certain nuclear facilities (SKIFS 1998:1), and include for example:
-A description of how the site and its surroundings, from the standpoint of safety, can affect the facility;
-A description of the design basis, including the requirements which have determined the design and construction of the facility. Descriptions of facilities for the handling of spent fuel or nuclear waste shall contain requirements which are determined by the description of safety in the particular repository after closure;
-A description of measures taken to ensure adequate protection of workers, the public and the environmentfromradiation,asrequiredbytheRadiationProtectionActandregulationspromulgatedaccording to that act.
AsdescribedinsectionE.19.1.1theoperatorsof nuclearpowerplantsmustjointlyperformacomprehensive
H.13.1.2 | Public information and involvement |
There are several procedures that serve the purpose to involve the public in the siting of new spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste facilities. As mentioned above an EIA must be performed for any new nuclear facility. Swedish legislation emphasises the role of the public and other stakeholders in the EIA. The developer must initiate early (long before a license application is submitted) consultations with those parties that might be affected by a new facility. Parties that must be consulted include:
-Municipalities that may host the facility;
-Regulatory authorities, primarily SKI and SSI and County Administrative Boards;
-National environmental organisations;
-Local interest groups;
-Affected individuals, e.g. those living close to a proposed location.
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The County Administration Boards have an important function besides participating in the consultations. They are requested to assist the developer in identifying stakeholders and to facilitate consultations and an exchange of information.
Furthermore, the circulation of the nuclear power plants’ joint
According to the Act (1992:1537) and Ordinance (1981:671) on the Financing of Future Expenses for Spent Nuclear Fuel etc. the municipalities that might host a spent nuclear fuel or nuclear waste facility, including a repository, are reimbursed for their own information to the public.
H.13.1.3 Consulting Contracting Parties
The Environmental Code specifies that if another country is likely to be affected, the responsible authority as designated by the Government shall inform the competent authority in that country about the planned activity. The country concerned, and the citizens, who may be affected, should be given the opportunity to takepartintheconsultationprocedure.TheGovernmenthasdesignatedtheSwedishEnvironmentalProtection Agency to be responsible for this task. Such information shall also be supplied when another country, which is likely to be exposed to a significant environmental impact so requests.
H.13.2 | Implementation of regulatory requirements |
All planned spent fuel and nuclear waste facilities, including repositories, will be sited, constructed and operated by SKB. The supporting
-The
-Consultations and an EIA for the planned encapsulation facility and the repository for spent nuclear fuel began formally in 2002, but in practice started in the
The municipalities that might host a spent nuclear fuel facility, including a repository, have been reimbursed for their information activities since the
H.13.3 | Regulatory control |
SKI and SSI have regular consultations with SKB regarding progress in the siting of the planned facilities.
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SKI and SSI are consulted regarding the EIA. The concerned County Administrative Boards are also consulted regarding the EIA and thus exercise some regulatory control, however not in the fields of safety and radiation protection.
H.13.4 Conclusion
The Swedish Party complies with the obligations of Article 13.
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ARTICLE 14. DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION OF FACILITIES
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:
(i)thedesignandconstructionof aradioactivewastemanagementfacilityprovideforsuitablemeasures to limit possible radiological impacts on individuals, society and the environment, including those from discharges or uncontrolled releases;
(ii)atthedesignstage,conceptualplansand,asnecessary,technicalprovisionsforthedecommissioning of a radioactive waste management facility other than a disposal facility are taken into account;
(iii)at the design stage, technical provisions for the closure of a disposal facility are prepared;
(iv)the technologies incorporated in the design and construction of a radioactive waste management facility are supported by experience, testing or analysis.
H.14 DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION OF FACILITIES
H.14.1 | The regulatory requirement |
The general safety regulations (SKIFS 1998:1) apply to the operation of all types of nuclear installations, including facilities for treatment, storage and disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste.
H.14.1.1 | Suitable measures to limit radiological impact |
The requirements for limiting the possible radiological impact on individuals, society and the environment, including those from discharges or uncontrolled releases, are founded upon the basic provisions stipulated in 4§ first paragraph in the Act on Nuclear Activities (1984:3). This is clarified further in the general safety regulations (SKIFS 1988:1) in which it is stated that nuclear accidents shall be prevented through a basic
-ensuring that the design, construction, operation, monitoring and maintenance of a facility is such that abnormal events, incidents and accidents are prevented,
-ensuring that multiple devices and measures exist to protect the integrity of the barriers and, if the integrity should be breached, to mitigate the ensuing consequences,
-ensuring that any release of radioactive substances, which may still occur as a result of abnormal events, incidents and accidents, is prevented or, if this is not possible, controlled and mitigated through devices and prepared measures.
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H.14.1.2 | Conceptual plans and provisions for decommissioning |
TheActonNuclearActivitiesstatesthattheholderof alicencefornuclearactivitiesisresponsibleforensuring that all necessary measures are taken needed to ensure the safe handling and final disposal of nuclear waste, or nuclear material that is not reused, as well as the safe decommissioning and the dismantling of facilities. It has therefore not been considered necessary to introduce an explicit requirement in the general regulations (SKIFS 1998:1) for the preparation conceptual plans or technical provisions for decommissioning of spent nuclear facilities, at the design stage.
Withregardtoradiationprotection,SSIrecentlyissuednewregulations,SSIregulationsonPlanningbefore andduringdecommissioningof nuclearfacilities(SSIFS2002:4),thatwillenterintoforceonJanuary1,2004. The regulations introduce requirements for decommissioning with respect to documentation, alternative actions and waste management.
H.14.1.3 | Technical provisions for closure of repositories |
The SKI general regulations (SKI FS 1998:1) stipulate that analyses of conditions which are of importance for the safety of a facility shall be carried out before a facility is constructed and taken into operation. This is further specified in the SKI regulations (SKIFS 2002:1) where it is stipulated that for repositories, the safety assessments shall also comprise features, events and processes which can lead to the dispersion of radioactive substances after closure. Such safety analyses shall be made before the commencement of repository construction, repository operation and repository closure.
H.14.1.4 | Technology supported by experience |
The general safety regulations (SKIFS 1998:1) specify requirements regarding design and construction. It is stated that the design of the facility, with adaptation to the specific conditions of each facility, shall
-be able to withstand component and system failures,
-have reliability and operational stability,
-be able to withstand such events or conditions which can affect the safety function of the barriers or
-have maintainability, controllability and testability of inherent parts as long as these parts are used for their intended purposes.
Additional requirements related to design and construction are;
-Thedesignprinciplesanddesignsolutionsshallbetestedunderconditionscorrespondingtothosewhich can occur during the intended application in a facility. If this is not possible or reasonable, they must have been subjected to the necessary testing or evaluation related to safety.
-The design solutions shall be adapted to the personnel’s ability to manage the facility, in a safe manner, under normal conditions as well as during abnormal events, incidents and accidents that might occur.
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-Building components, devices, components and systems shall be designed, manufactured, installed, controlled and tested in accordance with requirements which are adapted for their importance for safety.
H.14.2 | Measures taken by the licence holders |
H.14.2.1 | Suitable measures to limit radiological impact |
The safety philosophy applied in the design of all Swedish nuclear facilities is based on the principles of defence in depth and of multiple barriers to prevent the release of radioactive material to the environment. Theyarealldesignedtofulfiltheintentionof therequirementsintheGeneralDesignCriteria.Thefoundation of the safety principle on the defence in depth is emphasised and made clearer through the implementation of that principle in the SKI regulations SKIFS 1998:1.
H.14.2.2 | Conceptual plans and provisions for decommissioning |
Generic decommissioning plans have been developed by SKB, as part of the basis for the annual cost calculations (see section E.19.1.4.)
H.14.2.3 | Technical provisions for closure of repositories |
Technical provisions for the closure of the final repository for operational waste (SFR) has been part of the safety assessment performed before SFR was constructed. An updated safety analysis was reviewed before the facility was taken into operation.
H.14.2.4 | Technology supported by experience |
The principle of proven technology is broadly accepted and implemented in the design and construction procedures for Swedish nuclear facilities. The use of properly environmentally qualified equipment ensures functioning of
H.14.3 | Regulatory control |
During the licensing process the PSAR, FSAR and STF documents are reviewed by the regulatory authorities to ensure compliance with fundamental safety principles and criteria. A prerequisite for obtaining a licence is that the regulatory review concludes that the facility is designed according to the provisions in the general regulations (SKIFS 1998:1).
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H.14.4 Conclusion
The Swedish Party complies with the obligations of Article 14. There is however room for improvment. More comprehensive, consistent and clear safety regulations for decommissioning of nuclear facilities need to be developed. The regulatory body have recently taken actions towards this end.
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ARTICLE 15. ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY OF FACILITIES
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:
(iii)before construction of a radioactive waste management facility, a systematic safety assessment and an environmental assessment appropriate to the hazard presented by the facility and covering its operating lifetime shall be carried out;
(iv)in addition, before construction of a disposal facility, a systematic safety assessment and an environmental assessment for the period following closure shall be carried out and the results evaluated against the criteria established by the regulatory body;
(v)before the operation of a radioactive waste management facility, updated and detailed versions of the safety assessment and of the environmental assessment shall be prepared when deemed necessary to complement the assessments referred to in paragraph (i).
H.15 | ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY OF FACILITIES |
H.15.1 | The regulatory requirement |
H.15.1.1 | Assessment of safety |
Requirementsonthesafetyassessment,safetyreviewandreportingarelistedinthenewgeneralsafetyregulations (SKIFS 1998:1). Many of these requirements are not new but were posed earlier as licensing conditions for facilities licensed before the regulations came into force. Some of the requirements are, however, more comprehensivecomperedtoearlierconditions,andsomearenew.Thelegallybindingrequirementsregarding safety assessments are summarised in the following points:
-A comprehensive safety analysis shall be performed before a facility is constructed and before it is taken into operation. The analysis shall subsequently be kept
-A preliminary safety report shall be prepared before a facility may be constructed, and a final safety report shall be prepared before the facility may be taken into operation. The safety reports shall contain informationasspecifiedintheregulations.Thepreliminaryandthefinalsafetyreportsshallbereviewed, evaluated and approved by SKI as requiered. The final safety report shall be kept
Additional requirements concerning the
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H.15.1.2 | Environmental assessment |
The Act on Nuclear activities also states that an EIA (Environmental Impact Assessment) must be carried out for all licensing cases, and that the Environmental Code regulates the way in which the EIA shall be carried out as well as the contents of the documentation. Requirements on environmental assessment are laid down in the Environmental Code (1998:808) as described in Section E.19.1.3.
The purpose of an EIA is to establish and describe the direct and indirect impact of a planned activity or measure as listed below. Another purpose is to enable an overall assessment to be made of this impact on human health and the environment.
An environmental impact statement shall contain the following information:
-A description of the activity or measure with details of its location, design and scope;
-A description of the measures being planned with a view to avoiding, mitigating or remedying adverse effects, for example action to prevent the activity or measure leading to an infringement of an environmental quality standard;
-Theinformationthatisneededtoestablishandassessthemajorimpactonhumanhealth,theenvironment and the management of land, water and other resources that the activity or measure is likely to have;
-A description of possible alternative sites and alternative designs, together with a statement of the reasons why a specific alternative was chosen as well as a description of the consequences if the activity or measure is not implemented;
-A
H.15.1.3 | The licensing procedure |
Three different permits/licences are required for a nuclear facility: a permit under the Environmental Code (1998:808), a licence under the Nuclear Activities Act (1984:3), and a building permit under the Planning and Building Act (1987:10). Licensing under the Environmental Code and the Act on Nuclear Activities occur in parallel. The applications under both laws must include an environmental impact statement (EIS) prepared according to the rules in Chapter 6 of the Environmental Code. The same EIS is thus used in both applications. Separate EISs are prepared for the encapsulation plant and the deep repository.
According to Chapter 17 of the Environmental Code, the Government shall, after preparation by the Environmental Court, examine the permissibility of the activity. After SKI’s preparation of the matter, the Government shall also examine permit applications under the Act on Nuclear Activities. If the Government finds that the construction and operation of the facility is permissible according to the Environmental Code and grants a permit/licence under the Act on Nuclear Activities, it remains for the Environmental Court to grant a permit/licence and stipulate conditions in accordance with the Environmental Code.
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H.15.2 | Regulatory control |
The safety case as a basis for licensing and nuclear supervision
The safety level to be attained and maintained by the licensee of a nuclear facility is defined in the licensing process.
The licence to build, possess and operate the facility is granted by the Government. This government licensingdecisionisappliedforandgrantedearlyinthedesignprocess.Theselicenceconditionsrequiresthat a preliminary safety analysis report (PSAR) be submitted and approved by the regulatory body before major constructionactivitiesarestarted.Afinalsafetyanalysisreport(FSAR)andtechnicalspecificationsforoperation (STF) should also be submitted and approved by the regulatory body before operation commences.
For a repository, the safety assessment should comprise features, events and processes that can lead to the dispersion of radioactive substances after closure, as described in section H.15.1.1. Such a safety assessment shall be made before repository construction, and before repository operation and before repository closure.
The PSAR, FSAR and STF documents are reviewed by the regulatory authorities, to ensure compliance with fundamental safety principles and criteria. Based on this licensing procedure, and on approval by the regulatory authorities, the FSAR and STF documents become the legally binding documents regulating technical configuration and operating limits and conditions, often referred to as ”the safety case”. This ”safety case” may be regarded as defining the minimum safety level that the licensee is legally committed to maintain as a condition for a permit to operate the facility. Hence, the safety case also provides the basis for regulatory supervision.
Additional licence conditions can be prescribed by SKI over time, based on national and international operating experience and new research results.
H15.3 Conclusion
The Swedish Party complies with the obligations of Article 15.
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ARTICLE 16. OPERATION OF FACILITIES
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:
(i)thelicencetooperatearadioactivewastemanagementfacilityisbaseduponappropriateassessments as specified in Article 15 and is conditional on the completion of a commissioning programme demonstrating that the facility, as constructed, is consistent with design and safety requirements;
(ii)operational limits and conditions, derived from tests, operational experience and the assessments as specified in Article 15 are defined and revised as necessary;
(iii)operation, maintenance, monitoring, inspection and testing of a radioactive waste management facility are conducted in accordance with established procedures. For a disposal facility the results thus obtained shall be used to verify and to review the validity of assumptions made and to update the assessments as specified in Article 15 for the period after closure;
(iv)engineering and technical support in all
(v)procedures for characterisation and segregation of radioactive waste are applied;
(vi)incidents significant to safety are reported in a timely manner by the holder of the licence to the regulatory body;
(vii)programmes to collect and analyse relevant operating experience are established and that the results are acted upon, where appropriate;
(viii)decommissioning plans for a radioactive waste management facility other than a disposal facility are prepared and updated, as necessary, using information obtained during the operating lifetime of that facility, and are reviewed by the regulatory body;
(ix)plans for the closure of a disposal facility are prepared and updated, as necessary, using information obtained during the operating lifetime of that facility and are reviewed by the regulatory body.
H.16 | OPERATION OF FACILITIES |
H.16.1 | The regulatory requirement |
The general safety regulations (SKIFS 1998:1) contain legally binding requirements relevant for all the obligations of Article 16. These requirements are summarised below.
H.16.1.1 | Initial authorisation |
As mentioned in section H.15, a preliminary comprehensive safety report is required before the construction of a spent nuclear facility. A final completesafety analysis report, which also takes into account the results from commissioning tests, is required before the facility is taken into operation.
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H.16.1.2 | Operational limits and conditions |
Documented
H.16.1.3 | Established procedures |
Suitable, verified and documented procedures are required for all operational states including accidents. The proceduresforoperabilityverificationandproceduresusedinotheroperationalstatesthannormaloperation shall be subjected to a twofold safety review by the licensee. Procedures for maintenance important for safety are also covered by the requirement. Maintenance programmes shall be documented. Inspection and testing of mechanical components shall be carried out according to qualified methods and verified procedures.
H.16.1.4 | Engineering and technical support |
The licensee shall ensure that adequate personnel is available with the necessary competence and suitability needed for those tasks which are important for safety, and also ensure that this is documented. A
H.16.1.5 | Procedure for characterisation and segregation of waste |
All waste to be disposed of in
Waste to be disposed of in shallow land burial facilities are specified and described in the licenses (see section D32.4.4). The licencee must notify SSI at least 3 months in advance of each disposal campaign and must then provide information about each waste package.
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H.16.1.6 | Reporting of incidents in a timely manner |
SKIFS1998:1containsonechapteraboutreportingrequirementsandanannexspecifyingtheserequirements for various types of events. The following is a brief summary:
-Reporting without delay: emergency alarm events and events and conditions in category 1 (see below)
-Reporting within 16 hours: INES events at level 2 or higher
-Reporting within 7 days: a comprehensive investigation report about alarm events or events and conditions in category
-Reporting within 30 days: a comprehensive investigation report of events and conditions in category 2
In addition, there are requirements on daily reporting of the operational state, and the occurrence of any abnormal events or disturbances, and requirements on a comprehensive annual report summarising all experienceimportantforthesafetyof theplant.Specificationsaregivenaboutthecontentsof thedifferentreports and further interpretation of the reporting requirements is given in the general recommendations.
In one of the basic paragraphs of SKIFS 1998:1, requirements are given on actions to be taken by the licensee in cases of deficiencies in barriers or in the
Category 1
Severe deficiency observed in one or more barriers or in the
Category 2
Deficiency observed in one barrier or in the
Category 3
Temporary deficiency in the
In all three cases, corrective measures shall be subject to a twofold safety review by the licensee. The results of these reviews shall be submitted to SKI. Regarding category 3 events, there is no requirement to make a specific report to SKI. It is sufficient to make a compilation of these events in the annual report.
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H.16.1.7 | Programmes to collect and analyse operating experience. |
Thelicenseeshallensurethatexperiencefromitsownfacilitiesandfromsimilaractivitiesinotherrelevantfacilities iscontinuouslyanalysed,usedandcommunicatedtothepersonnelconcerned(SKIFS1998:1).Itisfurtherrequired thatalleventsandconditionswhicharedetectedandwhichareimportanttosafetyareinvestigatedinasystematic manner,inordertodeterminesequencesandcauses,aswellastoestablishthemeasuresneededinordertorestore the safety margins and to prevent recurrence. The results of the investigations shall be disseminated within the organisation and shall contribute to the development of safety at the facility. In accordance with SKIFS 1998:1 it istheresponsibilityof thelicensee,aslongastherepositoryisinoperation,tocontinuouslykeepinformedof the conditions of importance to the assessment of repository safety, also after closure.
H.16.1.8 Decommissioning plans
Thereisnoformalrequirementforpreparingdecommissioningplansforspentnuclearfacilitiesduringoperation.Thereis,however,inthegeneralregulations(SKIFS1981:1)arequirementfordecommissioningplansto be prepared before the decommissioning and dismantling activities may be started. The plan should include measures, which must be implemented to ensure the safe containment of the generated nuclear waste.
AsdescribedinsectionH.14.1.2.conceptualdecommissioningplansforspentfuelfacilitiesarenevertheless prepared and if need be, updated, as part of the basis for the annual review by SKI of the cost estimates performed by SKB and described in section E.19.1.4.
H.16.1.9 | Plans for closure of repository |
SKIFS 1998:1 states that a facility for the final disposal of nuclear waste shall be designed so that the barriers can provide the required safety without monitoring or maintenance after the repository is closed. SKI regulations concerning the
H.16.2 | Measures taken by the licence holders |
H.16.2.1 | Initial authorisation |
No radioactive waste management facility has been commissioned since 1988 when the repository for radioactive operational waste
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According to current plans, SKB is to submit a licence application for a repository for
Also according to current plans, the repository for
H.16.2.2 | Operational limits and conditions |
TheoperationallimitsandconditionsfornuclearfacilitiesaredescribedintheTechnicalSpecifications(STF), adocument,whichisconsideredtobeoneof thecornerstonesinthegoverningandregulationof theSwedish nuclear activities. Every STF is
The original STF for each facility is derived from the safety analyses in the FSAR, in which the behaviour of thefacilityisdescribed.Correctionsandupdatingtakesplace, when newand betterknowledgeis available, either from research, tests or operational experience. Suggestions for changes in STF are reviewed carefully from the safety point of view at different levels in the operating organisation and are finally approved by the regulatory body, before they are included in the document.
The fact that STF is reviewed and revised regularly has contributed to making it a living document. It is also part of the quality and management system and used frequently in particular by the operations staff. An essential part of STF is the general clause that says that ”…should any doubt appear about the interpretation of the text, the general purpose of STF shall be guiding. This means that the facility in all indefinite situations shall be maintained or brought respectively to a safe state.” Other parts of STF, which have been developed more recently, are the description of the background to the document. The background description is important for preserving and transferring to new staff the knowledge and experience of those who participated in the original production of STF. Modified and maintained equipment must pass an operability test to verify that the equipment fulfils specified operational requirements before being accepted for continuous operation.
H.16.2.3 | Established procedures |
All activities that directly affect the operation of the facility are governed by procedures of different kinds coveringnormaloperation,emergencyoperationandfunctionaltests..Maintenanceactivitiesaccordingtoan approvedmaintenanceprogrammearealsotoagreatextentaccomplishedaccordingtoprocedures,however, not always as detailed as the operating procedures, in which activities are described in sequence, step by step. Signing off of the completion of steps carried out in the procedures is mandatory in most cases, in order to confirm the completion and facilitate verification.
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The operating personnel are deeply involved in the production and revision of operating procedures. The development of procedures follows specified directives, which include the reviewing of the documents, normally, by more than one person other than the author, before being approved by the operations manager or someone else at the corresponding level. The same applies for the revision of procedures. The revision of procedures is to be carried out continuously, when new experience is obtained particularly in the case of maintenance procedures,. Emergency procedures have been developed in order to deal with anticipated operational occurrences.
H.16.2.4 | Engineering and technical support |
The principles for staffing are reported in section F.22 (Human and financial resources)
Competencethatmightnotbecompletelyavailablewithintheownorganisationatallplantsisforinstance expertiseandresourcesformaterialsandchemistryassessments,radiationshieldingandenvironmentalconsequence calculations, expertise and resources for software for safety applications and also process control and measurement techniques. In particular the
H.16.2.5 | Procedure for characterisation and segregation of waste |
The responsibility for the collection, segregation, characterisation, treatment and conditioning of radioactive waste rests with the waste producer. The waste producers have therefore implemented routines for ensuring that the waste complies with the predefined WTDs or with the licence conditions for the shallow land burial facilities (see section H.16.1.5).
H.16.2.6 | Incident reporting |
The other type of LER, called RO (Reportable Occurrence), is used for less severe events. This type of event is mentioned in the daily report, which is sent to the regulatory bodies, followed up by a preliminary report within seven days and a final report within 30 days. The reports are reviewed at different levels within the operating organisation and approved by the operations or production manager before submittal.
The front of the standardised report form describes the event in general: identification number, title, reference to STF, date of discovery and length of time until corrective actions were completed, conditions
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atthetime itoccurred,systemconsequences,acontactpersonattheplantandactivitiesaffectedbytheevent. On the reverse side of the document a description of the event is given. The following titles are used:
-Event course and operational consequence
-Safety significance
-Direct and root causes
-Planned/decided measures
-Lessons learned by the event
If the description of the event is extensive additional pages may be attached to the form. Reports are also required in accordance with STF when the permitted levels of activity release from the facility are exceeded or in the event of unusually high radiation exposure to individuals. These types of
H.16.2.7 | Operating experience analysis and |
The objective of the analysis and feedback programme concerning operating experience is to learn from their own and others’ experience and thus prevent recurrences of events, particularly those that might affect the safety of the facility. The operating experience
H.16.2.8 Decommissioning plans
As described in section H.16.1.8 there are no formal requirements for the preparation of decommissioning plansforspentnuclearfuelfacilitieswhilstinoperation.Therearehoweversomegenericandgeneraldecommissioning plans which have been prepared as part of the basis for the nuclear power utilities’ cost estimates for dismantling and final disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste (see section H.13.2.2).
H.16.2.9 | Plans for closure of repository |
The closure of repositories will not take place for at least
H.16.3 | Regulatory control |
H.16.3.1 | Initial authorisation |
The regulatory control is achieved through the procedures described in sections E.19.2.1 (Licensing) and E.19.2.2 (Institutional control, regulatory inspection and reporting).
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H.16.3.2 | Operational limits and conditions |
InspectorsandspecialistsatSKIreviewapplicationsforchangesinSTF,andforexemptionsfromSTF.Based on the application and information provided by the licensees, and the associated safety analyses, assessments are made about how the proposed changes or exemptions contribute to the risk profile of the facility.
A few years ago SKI inspected the training and retraining in STF of
H.16.3.3 Procedures
Operational and maintenance procedures are normally not reviewed by SKI. Only in connection with event investigations would SKI ask for a procedure to be submitted for review. In the frame of quality assurance inspections or review of quality audits made by the licensees (see section F.23) have SKI looked into the routines used for updating procedures.
H.16.3.4 | Engineering and technical support |
SKIhasnotsofarspecificallyinspectedtheengineeringandtechnicalsupportavailableatthefacilities.Inconnection with other inspections and reviews, the staffing situation has occasionally been commented upon.
H.16.3.5 | Characterisation and segregation of waste |
As described in section H.16.5 both SSI and SKI must approve all waste types before disposal. SKI and SSI verify compliance by inspections both at the waste producer and the operator of the disposal facility, e.g.
H.16.3.6 | Incident reporting |
Licensee event reports are reviewed upon arrival by the responsible site inspector, who asks the facility for clarification if necessary. As a routine all LERs are screened once a week by a standing group of inspectors and specialists in order to assess the event, the analysis and the measures taken by the licensees. If there are any regulatory concerns the issue is brought up at a management meeting and a decision made about any further measures to be taken by SKI.
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H.16.3.7 Experience feedback programme
TheregulatorycontrolisachievedthroughtheproceduresdescribedinsectionE.19.2.2(Institutionalcontrol, regulatory inspection and reporting). SKI and SSI would also in connection with event investigations and in connection with other inspections and reviews, follow up the experience feed back programme.
H.16.3.8 | Plans for decommissioning |
The decommissioning plan (see section H.16.1.8) must be submitted to SKI for approval before the decommissioning and dismantling activities may be started.
H.16.3.9 | Plans for closure of repository |
As described in section H.16.2.9 the closure of repositories is still an
H.16.4 Conclusion
The Swedish Party complies with the obligations of Article 16.
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ARTICLE 17. INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES AFTER CLOSURE
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that after closure of a disposal facility:
(i)records of the location, design and inventory of that facility required by the regulatory body are preserved;
(ii)active or passive institutional controls such as monitoring or access restrictions are carried out, if required; and
(iii)if, during any period of active institutional control, an unplanned release of radioactive materials into the environment is detected, intervention measures are implemented, if necessary.
H.17 INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES AFTER CLOSURE
H.17.1 | Records keeping |
Generally, the implementing organisations are responsible for the development and management of records. Nevertheless, R&D is being carried out on these subjects. SSI has issued regulations (SSI FS 1997:1) establishing requirements for record management, under which specified documents concerning location, design and inventory of waste are required to be kept in archives, for more than 100 years. These relevant records will be transferred to national and regional official archives when facilities are decommissioned or closed. The authorities’ documents are regularly transferred to national archives as regulated in the Act on Archives (1990:7) and regulations issued by the National Archives of Sweden. This mechanism has been in place since 1618.
H.17.2 | Institutional control |
Requirements for institutional control after closure are not established or formally decided. The SKI regulations (SKI FS 1998:1) stipulate that a facility for the disposal of nuclear waste shall be designed so that the barriers provide the required safety without monitoring or maintenance after the repository is closed. This is further specified in the SKI regulations (SKIFS 2002:1) in which it is stipulated that safety after closure of a repository shall be maintained through a system of passive barriers. Also SSI’s regulations (SSI FS 1998:1) on the protection of human health and the environment in connection with the final management of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste require that the
All waste repositories so far taken into operation in Sweden
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entire facility.
In the case of
In the case of the four shallow land burial facilities for
Exempt waste may be deposited on municipal disposal sites, and will be subject to institutional control as decided by county or municipal authorities.
According to SSI Regulations on the Protection of Human Health and the Environment from Discharges of Radioactive Substances from certain Nuclear Facilities (SSI FS 2000:12), the holder of a license shall conduct environmental monitoring. All discharge from facilities for the storage or disposal of radioactive waste shall be monitored by nuclide specific measuring program.
H.17.3 | Intervention measures |
Asdescribed above, SKI regulations stipulate that a facility for the final disposal of nuclear waste shall be designed so that safety after closure of a repository is provided by a system of passive barriers. Prior to the repository closure, the final safety assessment must be renewed and approved by the regulatory authority. If the regulatory authority approves the closure of the repository the licence holder may be relieved from his responsibilities and obligations. Thus, if intervention measures are needed, it will be the responsibility of the State.
H.17.4 Conclusion
The Swedish Party complies with the obligations of Article 17.
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SECTION I – TRANSBOUNDARY MOVEMENTS
ARTICLE 27. TRANSBOUNDARY MOVEMENT
1.Each Contracting Party involved in transboundary movement shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that such movement is undertaken in a manner consistent with the provisions of this Convention and relevant binding international instruments. In so doing:
(i)a Contracting Party which is a State of origin shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that transboundary movement is authorized and takes place only with the prior notification and consent of the State of destination;
(ii)transboundary movement through States of transit shall be subject to those international obligations which are relevant to the particular modes of transport utilized;
(iii)aContractingPartywhichisaStateof destinationshallconsenttoatransboundarymovement only if it has the administrative and technical capacity, as well as the regulatory structure, needed to manage the spent fuel or the radioactive waste in a manner consistent with this Convention;
(iv)a Contracting Party which is a State of origin shall authorize a transboundary movement only if it can satisfy itself in accordance with the consent of the State of destination that the requirements of subparagraph (iii) are met prior to transboundary movement;
(v)aContractingPartywhichisaStateof
2.A Contracting Party shall not licence the shipment of its spent fuel or radioactive waste to a destination south of latitude 60 degrees South for storage or disposal.
3.Nothing in this Convention prejudices or affects:
(i)the exercise, by ships and aircraft of all States, of maritime, river and air navigation rights and freedoms, as provided for in international law;
(ii)rights of a Contracting Party to which radioactive waste is exported for processing to return, or provide for the return of, the radioactive waste and other products after treatment to the State of origin;
(iii)the right of a Contracting Party to export its spent fuel for reprocessing;
(iv)rights of a Contracting Party to which spent fuel is exported for reprocessing to return, or provide for the return of, radioactive waste and other products resulting from reprocessing operations to the State of origin.
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I.27 | TRANSBOUNDARY MOVEMENT |
I.27.1 | Regulatory requirement |
There are four different Acts that must be considered in order to obtain a complete picture of the regulatory requirements regarding transboundary movement of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste:
-the Radiation Protection Act;
-the Nuclear Activities Act;
-Council Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000;
-the Act on Control of Export of
In summary, a licence to export spent nuclear fuel or radioactive waste from Sweden cannot be granted if the destination is
i.south of latitude 60 degrees south;
ii.a State party to the Fourth
iii.a State that has forbidden the import of spent nuclear fuel or radioactive waste; or
iv.a State that, in the opinion of the responsible Swedish authorities, does not have the technical, legal or administrative resources to manage the spent nuclear fuel or radioactive waste safely.
I.27.2 | Regulatory control |
SwedenfollowstheadministrativeproceduressetforthintheDirective92/3/Euratominordertoensurethatstates of destinationandstatesof transithavetheopportunitytogivetheirpriorconsent,andarenotifiedasisstatedinthe directive. However, since the Swedish definition of nuclear waste is broader than the current definition in Directive 92/3/Euratom,allnuclearwastecannotbehandledaccordingtothisprocedure,sincesomeof thiswasteisregarded as”material”accordingtothedefinitioninthedirective.Inthosecaseslicensesaregrantedonacasebycasebasis.
A licence to import nuclear waste may only be issued on condition that the remaining radioactive waste is
I.27.3 | Experience of transboundary movements |
Studsvik Nuclear AB carries out volume reduction of radioactive waste on a commercial basis, by incineration of combustible waste and melting of scrap metal. The activities are to a certain extent based on services to companies abroad, and Studsvik imports radioactive waste and scrap metal for the purpose of volume reduction. The remaining radioactive waste is
I.27.4 Conclusion
The Swedish party complies with article 27 for such radioactive waste that is covered by the definition in Euratom directive 92/3. Due to the Swedish definition of nuclear waste, a case by case licensing procedure must be applied in some cases.
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SECTION J – DISUSED SEALED SOURCES
ARTICLE 28. DISUSED SEALED SOURCES
1.Each Contracting Party shall, in the framework of its national law, take the appropriate steps to ensure that the possession, remanufacturing or disposal of disused sealed sources takes place in a safe manner.
2.A Contracting Party shall allow for reentry into its territory of disused sealed sources if, in the framework of its national law, it has accepted that they be returned to a manufacturer qualified to receive and possess the disused sealed sources.
J.28 | DISUSED SEALED SOURCES |
J.28.1 | Regulatory requirements |
All handling of disused sealed sources (possession, remanufacturing, disposal) is covered by the Radiation Protection Act (SFS 1988:220). Remanufacturing of disused sealed sources does not take place in Sweden. AccordingtotheActanyonethathasconductedactivitiesinvolvingsealedsourceshastoensurethesafemanagement and disposal of the disused sealed sources. Detailed requirements are found in SSI regulations.
SSI’s Regulations on Radiation Therapy (SSI FS 2000:4) stipulate that in the case of the purchase of radioactive sources or equipment, which contain such sources, a plan shall be drawn up for the future handling of radioactive waste.
SSI’s Regulations on Accelerators and Sealed Sources (SSI FS 2000:9) stipulate that the licence holder shall ensure that an up to date and documented plan exists for decommissioning the plant. The plan shall include ananalysisof theresourcesneededtotakecareof allradioactivesubstancesandradioactivedemolitionwaste in a safe way from a radiation protection point of view, should the question of decommissioning arise.
In SSI’s Regulations on the use of Equipment in Industry Containing Sealed Sources or
Sweden allows the
sealed sources. | |
J.28.2 | Regulatory control |
Disusedsealedsourcesareeitherreturnedtothesupplierormanufacturer,orsenttoStudsvikNuclearAB.Studsvikisthe onlyapprovedradioactivewastemanagementfacilityinSwedenforhandlingradiationsourcesthatneedalicence.
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Thereishoweverroomforimprovment.StudsvikNuclearABisnotrequiredtoaccept,handleanddispose of disused sealed sources without compensation, since the company operates on a commercial basis. Hence, problems may arise if the holder of a sealed source cannot afford the cost for handling at Studsvik, or if Studsvik refuses to handle a sealed source. A Governmental committee has been appointed to consider and propose a national system for the handling and final disposal, not only of disused sealed sources but for all kinds of radioactive waste generated outside the nuclear fuel cycle. The committee was appointed in 2002 and is to submit its final report to the Government in December 2003.
J.28.3 Conclusion
The Swedish Party complies with the obligations of Article 28. There is however room for improvement. It is today uncertain whether all disused sealed sources can be handled or placed in final storage in Sweden in a manner that is satisfactory from a radiation protection point of view. This uncertainty is due to that the only radioactivewastemanagementfacilitythatcanmanagedisusedsealedsourcesoperatesonacommercialbasis and is thus not legally required to manage these sources. A Governmental committee has been appointed to consider and propose a national system for the handling and final disposal of radioactive waste generated outside the nuclear fuel cycle.
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SECTION K – PLANNED ACTIVITIES
TO IMPROVE SAFETY
KINTERNATIONAL
K.1 SKI and SSI
Important international work for the regulatory authorities follows as a consequence of the Swedish ratification of international conventions and having signed bilateral and multilateral agreements. In these cases the Government often assigns the task of providing expert knowledge and fulfilling Swedish obligations to the authorities.
In addition, international sharing of efforts and results is considered as crucial by Sweden for efficient regulatorywork.Swedenconsidersitimportantthatnationalregulatoryprogrammesareopentointernational scrutiny and peer review, since these mechanisms provide a form of quality assurance.
For these reasons SKI participates actively in a number of IAEA, OECD/NEA, and EU committees and working groups. SKI is also a member of INRA (International Nuclear Regulatory Association) and WENRA (Western European Nuclear Regulators Association).
Senior experts from SSI are active participants in, for example, the International Commission on RadiologicalProtection(ICRP),theOECD/NEA,IAEA,EUcommitteesandworkinggroups,andtheUNScientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR).
Both SKI and SSI have bilateral agreements with the corresponding authorities in a number of countries, e.g. the Nordic Countries, Canada, France, Japan, Lithuania, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, United Kingdom, and USA.
SKI’s and SSI’s international engagement is not limited to regulatory issues but also includes participation ininternationalresearchprojects.Mostof theseprojectsarewithinEU’sresearchprogramme,OECD/NEA and the IAEA.
The international activities are very extensive in the fields of nuclear safety and radiation protection. Even if the activities are generally regarded as important, SKI and SSI constantly have to prioritise their participation,becauseof limitedstaff resources.Cases,wherethetasksaredirectlyregulatedbyconventionsorspecial agreements signed by Sweden, have the highest priority. Participation in standing groups of international organisationsisalsogivenhighpriority.Otherinternationaltasksaregivenpriorityaccordingtotheestimated importance of the individual case.
K.2 SKB
SKB also gives international
The main aim for SKB’s international activities is to follow the research and development work conducted
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in other countries and to participate in international projects within the field of nuclear waste management. Furthermore, the international work provides perspective to the domestic programme and contributes to maintaining
SKB actively participates in several IAEA, EU and OECD/NEA committees and working groups. SKB is also engaged in a large number of research projects within these international organisations. SKB is for example contributing to 16 projects within EU’s current Fifth Framework Programme, and is now heavily involved in the planning of the structure of the networking and research activities in the EU’s Sixth Framework programme.
Encapsulation technology is developed in the Canister Laboratory. This is done in close
One important example of SKB’s international research
K.3 | SKI’s and SSI’s international support programmes |
SKI receives a special grant from the Government for
The aims of the bilateral assistance are:
-to improve reactor safety and minimise the risk of a nuclear accident with uncontrolled radioactive releases at the facilities in question.
-to improve conditions so that radioactive waste, including spent nuclear fuel, shall be handled and stored in a manner that is acceptable from the point of view of safety and radiation protection, regarding personnel, the public and environment.
-to improve the conditions so that operators, authorities and other organisations shall be well prepared for the decommissioning of nuclear facilities.
-tostrengthenthelegislationandexercisingof authorityinconnectionwithnuclearfacilitiesandhandling of radioactive waste.
-to contribute to the development and strengthening of the countries’ authorities and organisations within the national emergency preparedness and to establish
SIP’s activities have focused on improving the safety and organisation at the Ignalina nuclear power plant, as well as on support for the development of the Lithuanian regulatory authority. Support has also been
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directed towards radioactive waste management and the preparation of the decommissioning of Ignalina’s Unit 1. The total support to Lithuania during the period 1992 – 2000 amounted to SEK 329 million.
Since 1996, SIP’s support has also included Russia, where
There is extensive international
K.4 |
Asmentionedintheintroduction(sectionA)thewastemanagementsystemof
In 2002 the Government appointed a special investigator and a committee to investigate these problems. The Swedish Radiation Authority assists the committee. At the end of 2003 the investigator shall submit a proposal to the Government on how to organise a well working management system for the
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List of references
Government directive 2002:67 on a national system for the management of
Financing. Covering the expenses of nuclear waste. SKI Brochure. March, 2000.
Högberg L, Svensson G & Viktorsson C. Regulation for continuous improvements – the new regulatory strategy of SKI. Presentation at IAEA International Conference on Topical Issues in Nuclear, Radiation and Radioactive Waste Safety, 31 August- 4 September, 1998.
Leijonhufvud S. A history about Nuclear Power in Sweden. Issued in connection with the 25 year jubilee of ABB Atom. (in Swedish)
Quality Assurance for Safety in Nuclear Power Plants and other Nuclear Installations. IAEA Safety Series No
Melber B, Durbin N, Lach D & Blom I. Quality Systems Evaluation Method: Development and Implementation. Volume 1. SKI Report 95:62.
Nucleus 2/2003. Special english edition. May, 2003.
SFS 1984:3, Act on Nuclear Activities. (in Swedish)
SFS 1988:220, Radiation Protection Act. (in Swedish)
SFS 1988:1597, Act on the Financing of certain Nuclear Waste (the Studsvik Act). (in Swedish) SFS 1992:1537, Act on the Financing of Future Expenses on Spent Nuclear Fuel. (in Swedish) SFS 1998:808, Environmental Code. (in Swedish)
SFS 2000:1064, Act on the Control of
SKB.
SKB.
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SKB.
SKI.
SKI. The Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate’s Review Statement and Evaluation of the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co’s RD&D Programme 2001. SKI Report 02:33. September 2002
SKI. Proposal for fees and guarantees for 2003. SKI Report 02:47. October 2002. (in Swedish)
SKI Annual Report 2002. (in Swedish)
SSI Annual Report 2002. (in Swedish)
SOU 1976:32: Spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste.
SOU 1996:73: Swedish Nuclear Regulatory Activities – Volume 1 – An Assessment. SOU 1996:74: Swedish Nuclear Regulatory Activities – Volume 2 – Descriptions.
The safetyand radiation protection status of the Swedish Nuclear Power Plants 2001. SKI Report 02:14, SSI Report 2002:07. (in Swedish)
KASAM website: | www.kasam.org |
SKI website: | www.ski.se |
SSI website: | www.ssi.se |
SKB website: | www.skb.se |
Governments website: | www.regeringen.se |
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Departementsserien 2003
Kronologisk förteckning
1.Axel Oxenstierna – Furstespegel för
2.Finansiell samordning inom rehabiliteringsområdet. S.
3.Ny ordning för utfärdande av rättsintyg. Ju.
4.Magisterexamen i internationell belysning. U.
5.Stärkt rättsskydd för barn i gränsöverskridande fall. Ju.
6.Bostadsbyggandets hinderbana – en ESO- rapport om utvecklingen
7.Förtjänst och skicklighet – om utnämningar och ansvarsutkrävande av generaldirektörer. Fi.
8.Säkrare grannskap – osäker värld. Säkerhetspolitisk rapport från försvarsberedningen. Fö.
9.Reformerade regler om värdesäkring av skadeståndslivräntor. Ju.
10.Ett sammanhållet bidragssystem för etniska organisationer. Ju.
11.Historiska arrenden – en kartläggning. Ju.
12.Efter skatt – om sanningen ska fram. Sociala utgifter i Sverige
13.Överskottsinformation. Ju.
14.Förslag till ändringar i djurskyddslagen, m.m. Jo.
15.Europabolag. Ju.
16.Precooking in the European Union
–The World of Expert Groups. Fi.
17.Lönegaranti vid företagsrekonstruktion. Ju.
18.Testverksamhet m.m. i övre Norrlands inland – en ny basindustri. Slutrapport
–bil- och komponenttestnäringen i Norrlands inland. N.
19.Fastighetstaxering och beskattning av tredimensionellt avgränsade fastigheter. Fi.
20.Sweden’s first national report under the Joint Convention on the safety of spent fuel management and on the safety of radioactive waste management. Swedish implementation of the obligations of the Joint Convention. M.
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Departementsserien 2003
Systematisk förteckning
Justitiedepartementet
Ny ordning för utfärdande av rättsintyg. [3]
Stärkt rättsskydd för barn i gränsöverskridande fall. [5]
Reformerade regler om värdesäkring av skadeståndslivräntor. [9]
Ett sammanhållet bidragssystem för etniska organisationer. [10]
Historiska arrenden – en kartläggning. [11] Överskottsinformation. [13] Europabolag. [15]
Lönegaranti vid företagsrekonstruktion. [17]
Försvarsdepartementet
Säkrare grannskap – osäker värld. Säkerhetspolitisk rapport från försvarsberedningen. [8]
Socialdepartementet
Finansiell samordning inom rehabiliteringsområdet. [2]
Efter skatt – om sanningen ska fram. Sociala utgifter i Sverige
Finansdepartementet
Axel Oxenstierna – Furstespegel för 2000- talet. [1]
Bostadsbyggandets hinderbana – en ESO- rapport om utvecklingen
Förtjänst och skicklighet – om utnämningar och ansvarsutkrävande av generaldirektörer. [7]
Precooking in the European Union
– The World of Expert Groups. [16]
Fastighetstaxering och beskattning av tredimensionellt avgränsade fastigheter. [19]
Utbildningsdepartementet
Magisterexamen i internationell belysning. [4]
Jordbruksdepartementet
Förslag till ändringar i djurskyddslagen, m.m. [14]
Näringsdepartementet
Testverksamhet m.m. i övre Norrlands inland
– en ny basindustri. Slutrapport – bil- och komponenttestnäringen i Norrlands inland. [18]
Miljödepartementet
Sweden’s first national report under the Joint Convention on the safety of spent fuel management and on the safety of radioactive waste management. Swedish implementation of the obligations of the Joint Convention. [20]
178